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INTRODUCTION
Without the ability to keep secrets, individuals lose the capacity to
distinguish themselves from others, to maintain independent lives,
to be complete and autonomous persons.... This does not mean
that a person actually has to keep secrets to be autonomous, just
that she must possess the ability to do so. The ability to keep
secrets implies the ability to disclose secrets selectively, and so the
capacity for selective disclosure at one's own discretion is impor-
tant to individual autonomy as well.'
Secrecy is a form of power.2 The ability to protect a secret, to
preserve one's privacy, is a form of power.' The ability to pene-
trate secrets, to learn them, to use them, is also a form of power.
Secrecy empowers, secrecy protects, secrecy hurts. The ability to
learn a person's secrets without her knowledge-to pierce a person's
privacy in secret-is a greater power still.
People keep secrets for good reasons and for evil ones.
Learning either type of secret gives an intruder power over another.
Depending on the people compromised and the secrets learned, this
power may be deployed for good (preventing a planned harm) or ill
(blackmail, intimidation).
This Article is about the clash between two types of power: the
individual's power to keep a secret from the state and others, and
the state's power to penetrate that secret.' It focuses on new
'KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 302 (1988) (footnote omitted).
2 "Secrecy" refers to the intentional concealment of information so as to prevent
others from "possessing it, making use of it, or revealing it" to third parties. SISSELA
BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 6 (1982). It also
refers to "the methods used to conceal [information], such as codes or disguises." Id.
3 Privacy is "that portion of human experience for which secrecy is regarded as
most indispensable." Id. at 7. Secrecy and privacy are not identical, however. See id.
at 10. Privacy is "the condition of being protected from unwanted access by
others-either physical access, personal information, or attention. Claims to privacy
are claims to control access to what one takes... to be one's personal domain." Id.
at 10-11.
' In this sense, "the right to privacy has everything to do with delineating the
legitimate limits of governmental power." Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
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conflicts between the perennial desire of law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to have the capability to penetrate secrets at
will, and private citizens who are acquiring the ability to frustrate
these desires. This is an article about the Constitution and the
arcana of secret-keeping: cryptography.'
This is also a long article. It is long because it addresses three
complex issues. First, it outlines some of the promises and dangers
of encryption. Second, it analyzes the constitutional implications of
a major government proposal premised on the theory that it is
reasonable for the government to request (and perhaps some day to
require) private persons to communicate in a manner that makes
governmental interception practical and preferably easy. Third, it
speculates as to how the legal vacuum regarding encryption in
cyberspace shortly will be, or should be, filled.
What fills that vacuum will have important consequences. The
resolution of the law's encounter with cryptography has implications
far beyond whether the government adopts the Clipper Chip or
whether a particular cipher may be licensed for export. The
resolution of this debate will shape the legal regulation of cyber-
space and in so doing shape its social structures and social ethics.
Cryptologists6 use a few terms that may not be familiar to
lawyers, and it is useful to define them at the outset of any
discussion relating to encryption. Cryptography is the art of creating
and using methods of disguising messages, using codes, ciphers, and
other methods, so that only certain people can see the real message.
Codes and ciphers are not the same. A code is a system of commu-
nication that relies on a pre-arranged mapping of meanings such as
those found in a code book. A cipher is a method of encrypting any
text regardless of its content.' Paul Revere's "[o]ne, if by land, and
two, if by sea" was a code.' If the British had landed by parachute,
HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989). Of course, true privacy also requires delineating the
limits of the power of private parties, including detectives, credit bureaus, and others.
' Cryptography cuts across the law in many interesting ways. Most of the statutory
issues, however, are outside the scope of this Article. In particular, this Article does
not discuss cryptography as it relates to intellectual property law.
6 Cyptology is the study of cryptography and cryptanalysis. See DAVID KAHN, THE
CODEBREAKERS at xvi (1967).
7 See id. at xiii-xvi; see also Horst Feistel, Cyptography and Computer Privacy, SCI.
AM., May 1973, at 15, 15 (drawing a distinction between codes and ciphers).
8 HENRY W. LONGFELLOW, The Landlord's Tale: Paul Revere's Ride, in 4 THE
POETICAL WORKS OF HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW 25, 25 (1966). For an
example of a literary cipher, see EDGAR A. POE, The Gold-Bug, in THE COMPLETE
TALES AND POEMS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE 42, 62-67 (1938). See also Terence Whalen,
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no quantity of lanterns would have sufficed to communicate the
message. The modern cryptographic systems discussed in this
Article are all ciphers, although some are also known as electronic
code books.
Those who are supposed to be able to read the message
disguised by the code or cipher are called recipients. "The original
message is called a plaintext. The disguised message is called a
ciphertext. Encryption means any procedure to convert plantext into
ciphertext. Decryption means any procedure to convert ciphertext
into plaintext."9 An algorithm is a more formal name for a cipher.
An algorithm is a mathematical function used to encrypt and
decrypt a message. Modern algorithms use a key to encrypt and
decrypt messages."0 A single-key system is one in which both sender
and receiver use the same key to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Until recently, all ciphers were single-key systems. One of the most
important advances in cryptography is the recent invention of
public-key systems, which are algorithms that encrypt messages with
a key that permits decryption only by a different key."1 The legal
and social implications of this discovery figure prominently in this
Article.
Cryptanalysis is the art of breaking the methods of disguise
invented with cryptography. Lawyers will recognize the cryp-
tographers' terms for cryptanalysts who seek to read messages
intended only for recipients: enemies, opponents, interlopers, eavesdrop-
pers, and third parties.1 2 In this Article, however, cryptanalysts who
work for U.S. law enforcement or intelligence organizations such as
the FBI or the National Security Agency (NSA) will be called public
servants. Key escrow refers to the practice of duplicating and holding
the key to a cipher-or the means of recreating or accessing the key
to a cipher-so that some third party (the escrow agent) can decrypt
messages using that cipher. As used in the Clipper Chip debates,
the term "escrow" is something of a misnomer because the escrow is
The Code for Gold: Edgar Allan Poe and Cyptography, 46 REPRESENTATIONS 35 (1994).
' Eric Bach et al., Cyptography FAQ (03/10: Basic CQyptology) § 3 (Oct. 31, 1994),
available online URL ftp://rftm.mit.edu/pub/useneVnews.answers/cryptography-faq/
part03. A message that has never been disguised is called a cleartext. See KAHN, supra
note 6, at xvi.
10 The number of possible values of a key is called the keyspace.
n See infra Technical Appendix, part B (describing public-key cryptography).
1
2 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 4 (1994) (defining cryptanalytic
terms).
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primarily for the benefit of the government rather than the owner
of the key.
Part I of this Article describes advances in encryption technology
that are increasing personal privacy, particularly electronic privacy,
but reducing the U.S. government's ability to wiretap telephones,
read e-mail surreptitiously, and decrypt computer disks and other
encrypted information. To ensure the continuation of the wiretap-
ping and electronic espionage capabilities that it has enjoyed since
soon after the invention of the telegraph and the telephone, 3 the
government has devised an Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES),'4
to be implemented in the Clipper Chip 5 and other similar
devices.' 6  In Clipper and related products the government
" On the early use of telegraphic cryptography in military combat, see KAHN,
supra note 6, at 190-91.
14 See Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 185,
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997, 5998 (1994) [hereinafter
FIPS 185] ("Key escrow technology was developed to address the concern that
widespread use of encryption makes lawfully authorized electronic surveillance
difficult."). Fora discussion of Federal Information ProcessingStandards (FIPS), see
infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
'" Although the chip is universally known as "Clipper," the government has
alternately adopted and abandoned the name. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY: FEDERAL POLICY AND ACTIONS 6 n.6 (1993) [hereinafter
GAO COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY] (explaining that the name was used, then dropped).
The official use of the name "Clipper" recently has been revived. See SusAN LANDAU
ET AL., ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, INC., CODES, KEYS AND CONFLICTS:
ISSUES IN U.S. CRYPTO POLICY 52 n.1 (1994) [hereinafter ACM REPORT] (stating that
Intergraph Corp., which had trademarked the name for one of its microprocessors,
"graciously ceded" the rights to the name).
" The technical name for the Clipper-compliant family of devices is the Escrowed
Encryption Standard (EES). For the nonclassified specifications for these devices, see
FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6004-05. The Clipper Chip itself is designed for use in
secure telephones; its cousin, the Capstone Chip, will be used for electronic mail,
digital signatures, see infra Technical Appendix, part C, public key exchange, see infra
Technical Appendix, part B, and random number generation. For a brief introduc-
tion to the Capstone Chip and its technical specifications, see generally National Inst.
of Standards and Technology, Capstone Chip Technology (Apr. 30, 1993), in BUILDING
IN BIG BROTHER, supra note t (manuscript at 147) [hereinafter Capstone Chip Tech-
nology]. A PCMCIA card (Type 1) using Capstone will likely be purchased in bulk by
the Pentagon. See infra text accompanying note 245. The PCMCIA card was formerly
known as a "Tessera" card, but the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) has now changed the name to the "Fortezza" card because a private company
had previously trademarked the name "Tessera." See Interview with Gary Latham,
Mantech Strategic Associates, Ltd., in Miami, Fla. (Sept. 30, 1994) (Mr. Latham is a
consultant employed by NIST); see also Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed
Encayption Standard, in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note t (manuscript at 131,
145) (noting that "Tessera" is a trademark of Tessera, Inc., which has no connection
with the EES project).
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proposes a simple bargain: In exchange for providing the private
sector with an encryption technology certified as unbreakable for
years to come by the NSA, 17 the government plans to keep a copy
of the keys'-the codes belonging to each chip-which, the govern-
ment hopes, will allow it to retain the ability to intercept messages
sent by the chip's user. The government's proposal includes
procedures designed to reduce the risk that the keys would be
released to law enforcement agencies without legally sufficient
justification, although the likely effectiveness of these procedures is
debatable. Most U.S. residents remain free, however, to reject the
government's offer, use alternatives to Clipper (so long as the
software or hardware remains in the U.S.),"9 and withhold their
keys from the government." With ever more secure methods of
The entire EES project has been plagued by problems with intellectual property
law. Not only did the names originally selected for the EES chips conflict with
existing trademarks, but the algorithm for the escrow concept itself was the subject
of an infringement claim by MIT professor Silvio Micali. Professor Micali claimed he
had patented the escrow concept. After initially denying there was infringement,
NIST agreed to settle Professor Micali's claim by purchasing a nonexclusive license
for all EES systems "developed for authorized government law enforcement purposes"
whether inside or outside the government. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Patent
Agreement Removes Perceived Barrier to Telecommunications Security System (July
11, 1994) (press release); see also Ellen Messmer, NIST Acknowledges Patent Infringe-
ment, NETWORK WORLD,July 25, 1994, at 20 (noting that the exact terms of the NIST
settlement agreement were not being revealed).
17 Established in 1952 by presidential directive, the NSA is the U.S. government's
chief signals intelligence and cryptological department. See KAHN, supra note 6, at
675-84 (outlining the development of the NSA from 1952 through 1966); JEFFREY
RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 15-20 (1985) (describing the
bureaucratic structure of the NSA). See generally JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE
PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY (1982) (tracing the develop-
ment of the NSA between 1952 and 1982).
" Vice President Gore has suggested that the proposal might be modified in
the future to allow some companies to use certified private escrow agents rather
than depositing their keys directly with the government. See Letter from Vice
President Al Gore to Congresswoman Maria Cantwell (July 20, 1994), available
online URL ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/gore4-clipper-retreat_
cantwelL072094.letter [hereinafter Gore-Cantwell Letter]. But see Statement of
Patrick Leahy on Vice President Gore's Clipper Chip Letter (July 21, 1994), available
online URL ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/gore-clipper-retreat_
leahy.statement (stating that the Gore letter "represents no change in policy").
NIST is currently exploring alternatives to the existing EES proposal that would
rely more heavily on third-party escrow agents. See Interview with Gary Latham, supra
note 16.
19 See infra part I.C.1.c.i (discussing the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR), which restrict the export of cryptographic software).
o The government can require that federal agencies and government contractors
use Clipper. Indeed, the government has announced that the Attorney General will
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encryption becoming easier to use, U.S. residents can protect their
electronic communications and records so well that they are able to
frustrate interception attempts by even the most sophisticated
government agencies.2
1
Part II examines the legal justifications and constitutional
implications of the EES proposal. It argues that the EES proposal
violates the spirit, although not the letter, of the Administrative
Procedures Act and represents an abuse of the technical standard-
setting process. The involvement of the NSA may violate the
Computer Security Act, but the absence of public information as to
its role makes a firm judgment impossible. Part II also discusses
Clipper's inherent policy and technical weaknesses and the
inconsistencies between the Administration's policy objectives-to
the extent they are unclassified-and the Clipper proposal itself. It
concludes, however, that a purely voluntary Clipper program
violates no statutory or constitutional provisions, and that even if it
does, there is no one with standing to challenge such a violation.
Part II also concludes that an optional Clipper will probably make
only a modest contribution to the government's stated goal of
maintaining its wiretap and electronic espionage capability.
Thus, Part III considers the constitutional implications of the
more radical proposal that some commentators find implicit in the
policies animating Clipper: requiring all users of strong encryption
to register their ciphers' keys with the government. After a
whirlwind survey of evolving conceptions of the constitutional right
to privacy as well as more settled First, Fourth, and Fifth Amend-
ment doctrines, Part III concludes that although mandatory key
escrow would infringe personal privacy, reduce associational
purchase "several thousand" Clipper-equipped telephones. See Office of the Press
Secretary, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary 2 (Apr. 16, 1993), in
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Government-Developed "Key
Escrow" Chip Information Packet (Apr. 16, 1993) (information packet accompanying
press release) [hereinafter "Key Escrow" Information Packet].
If Clipper becomes the exclusive encryption protocol used by the U.S. govern-
ment, then anyone who wishes to communicate with the government concerning
nonclassified but sensitive information will have to use Clipper.
21 Without access to relevant classified information, it is impossible to know
whether the NSA or other government agencies might have discovered a means of
breaking even the most sophisticated publicly available ciphers. Considering the
intense secrecy that would surround such a cryptanalytic capability, however, one can
safely act as if it does not exist. Even if the government had the capability to break
supposedly unbreakable cryptography, such cryptanalysis would be a vital national
secret-so vital that the government would never use that capability in a manner that
would risk revealing its existence before the middle of the next large war.
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freedoms, potentially chill speech, constitute a potentially unreason-
able search, and might even require a form of self-incrimination, the
constitutionality of mandatory key escrow legislation remains a
distressingly close question under existing doctrines.
Part IV addresses the cryptography controversy as an example
of the law's occasionally awkward response to a new technology.
The courts, and to a lesser extent the legislative and executive
branches, have yet to come to grips with many cryptographic conun-
drums. As a result, this part of the legal "landscape" remains
relatively barren. As more and more settlers arrive in cyberspace,
the nature of this new landscape will depend critically on the legal
metaphors that the colonists choose to bring with them.
Finally, the Technical Appendix discusses modern cryptographic
systems, including the widely-used Data Encryption Standard (DES),
and how they can (at least theoretically) be broken by attackers
armed with large numbers of relatively modest computers. It also
provides an introduction to public-key cryptosystems and to digital
signatures, which could represent the most important commercial
application of modem cryptographic techniques.
I. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY: PRIVATE SECURITY,
GOVERNMENT INSECURITY
Cryptography contributes to commercial, political, and personal
life in a surprising number of ways. Now that modern cryptogra-
phic techniques have put strong, perhaps uncrackable, cryptography
within the reach of anyone with a computer or even a telephone,
the use of strong cryptography is likely to increase further. As a
result, worried law enforcement and intelligence agencies have
developed the Clipper Chip in order to retain their capability to
eavesdrop on private electronic communications.
A. Who Needs Cryptography?
Many individuals and businesses want or need communications
and data security.2 2 Although these desires clearly have an objective
' Cryptography remains of paramount importance in guarding military and other
national-security-related secrets during both peacetime and wartime. These uses of
cryptography are outside the scope of this Article, although it bears mentioning that
to date the government remains by far the largest producer and consumer of
cryptography in this country. See ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that the
private market for cryptography remains a niche market in which a handful of
companies gross only a few tens of millions of dollars annually).
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basis in many cases, some of these desires are undoubtedly symbolic
and psychological. Who other than the recipient, after all, is likely
to want to read most private faxes and e-mail? 3 The subjective
nature of a desire for privacy makes it no less real or worthy of
respect.24 Encryption can play a critical role in contrib-uting to this
communications and data security.
25
The government's assurance that a cryptosystem is secure also
contributes to this security. Evaluating the strength of a cipher is
a black art that requires skills few businesses or individuals possess.
The government's endorsement will at least reassure those, such as
banks and lawyers, who have a duty to secure their communications
and data but lack the technical knowledge to determine what
ciphers are reliable.
1. Banks, ATM-Users, Electronic Transactors
Encryption is heavily used in banking, both in the United States
and abroad. Fedwire and the Clearing House Interbank Payment
System process a daily total of more than 350,000 messages with an
estimated value of between $1 and $2 trillion. These transactions
rely on U.S. government-approved encryption to protect against
unauthorized modification and forgery. 26 The U.S. Department of
the Treasury requires encryption of all U.S. electronic funds transfer
" But see infra part I.C.l.b (discussing the NSA's traffic analysis); infra note 405
and accompanying text (discussing the use of voice recognition as a surveillance tool).
24 See, e.g., SCHEPPELE, supra note 1, at 302 (commenting on the importance of
secrecy at the individual level).
' Of course, cryptography will not protect against all breaches of security. There
are many other ways to lose one's privacy, including trusting the wrong people,
leaving things in plain sight, and, of course, simple stupidity. Electronic listening
devices also make people vulnerable. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Comment, Cameras
in Teddy Bears: Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1045, 1047-48 (1991) (describing miniature video cameras and other surveillance
technologies); see also High-Tech Tools for Police Will "See Through" Clothes, INT'L
HERALD TRiB., Dec. 19, 1994, at 4 (reporting that police may soon carry electromag-
netic wave imagers that detect guns concealed under clothing).
6 See Gilles Garon & Richard Outerbridge, DES Watch: An Examination of the
Sufficiency of the Data Encryption Standard for Financial Institution Information Security
in the 1990s, CRYPTOLOGIA, July 1991, at 177, 177 (stating that since its adoption in
1977, DES "has become the most widely used cryptographic system in the world");
Lance J. Hoffman et al., Cryptography Policy, COMM. ACM, Sept. 1994, at 109, 111
(noting that the Clearing House Interbank payment system currently moves an
average of $1 trillion each day via wire and satellite). Both systems use the U.S. Data
Encryption Standard (DES), which arguably has reached or will soon reach the end
of its useful life for high-value security. See infra part I.B (noting that existing
methods of encryption are beginning to look dated and vulnerable).
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messages.
27
Banks use encryption to protect ID numbers that customers use
at bank automated teller machines (ATMs). 28 In addition, many
banks encrypt the customer data on ATM cards in order to protect
against forgeries. 29 The banking sector's awareness of its vulnera-
bility to electronic theft of funds has spurred the creation of crypto-
graphic standards for both retail and inter-bank transactions. °
As the economy continues to move away from cash transactions
towards "digital cash," both customers and merchants will need the
authentication provided by unforgeable digital signatures in order
to prevent forgery and transact with confidence.3 ' Forgery is a
perennial problem with electronic mail: copying is easy, there are
no tangible permanent media involved in the communication, and
programmers or system managers can alter e-mail headers to fake
the source of a message. Cryptography can provide an authenticat-
ing function for these electronic transactions. Cryptographic
27 See Gerald Murphy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Directive: Electronic Funds and
Securities Transfer Policy-Message Authentication and Enhanced Security, No. 16-02,
§ 3 (Dec. 21, 1992).
28 See AMERICAN NAT'L STANDARDS COMMITEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, X9
SECRETARIAT, AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR
PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PIN) MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY 9 (1982)
(describing proper ATM encryption standards); see also Beth E. Secaur, Note,
Automated Teller Machines Under the New York Banking Law: Do They Serve Community
Credit Needs?, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 117, 120-23 (1986) (discussing the technology and
development of ATMs).
' See E-mail from Ross Anderson, University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory,
to Michael Froomkin (Feb. 14, 1994) (on file with author) (discussing the technology
and development of ATMs).
SO See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 221 (citing cryptographic standards for bank
transactions). Banks rely primarily on the U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES). See
infra part I.B.1 (discussing how DES became the standard and why that standard is
becoming increasingly vulnerable). Nevertheless, consider this disturbing boast:
"'Give me $1 billion and 20 people and I'll shut America down. I'll shut down the
Federal Reserve, all the ATMs; I'll desynchronize every computer in the country.'"
Technology as Weapony, INFO. WK., Jan. 10, 1994, at 48, 50 (quoting futurist Alvin
Toffler's recollection of an unidentified intelligence official's statement).
31 See DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 2
(1993) ("Without strong cryptography, no one will have the confidence to use
networks to conduct business, to engage in commercial transactions electronically, or
to transmit sensitive personal information."); Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 111
("One of the consequences of an increasingly electronics-oriented economy will be
the need to provide some amount of anonymity and privacy for users of such a digital
cash system in order to ensure that electronic money remains anonymous and
untraceable . . . ."). For a discussion of digital signatures, see infra Technical
Appendix, part C.
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techniques can be used to produce a digital signature which, when
properly used, can prove that a cleartext message (such as a buy or
sell order) was really sent by the party from whom the message
appears to originate.12 In addition, a digital signature attests to
the integrity of the contents of a message. If the digital signature
system is properly implemented, the signature of every document
is uniquely calculated from the full text of the document, and is
uniquely associated with the sender. There is no way to fake a
signature by copying a signature from one document and attaching
it to another, nor is it possible to alter the signed message in any
way without the recipient immediately detecting the deception.33
The slightest change in a signed document will cause the digital
signature verification process to fail. Indeed, a signature verifica-
tion failure will be caused by a transmission error affecting a single
bit of the message.
3 4
The proposed National Information Infrastructure, better known
as Vice President Al Gore's information superhighway, envisions
"telebanking" and other electronic transactions.3 5  It recognizes,
however, that as these services expand, so too will "public concern
about communications and personal privacy."36  One important
issue will be the extent to which consumer-oriented digital payment
systems allow for anonymity and privacy; another will be the extent
to which law enforcement and banks will require audit trails that
lead to the consumer.
3 7
12 See infra text preceding note 798 (noting that digital signatures uniquely identify
the sender and connect the sender to the message).
33 A properly generated digital signature copied from one message has an
uninfinitesimal chance of successfully authenticating any other message. See infra
note 799 and accompanying text.
31 See infra text accompanying note 798.
" See Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunica-
tions-Related Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 6842, 6842 [hereinafter Inquiry on
Privacy Issues] ("As the [National Information Infrastructure] develops, Americans
will be able to access numerous commercial, scientific, and business data bases...
[and] engage in retail, banking and other commercial transactions ... all from the
comfort of their homes."); see also Microsoft and Visa to Provide Secure Transaction
Technologyfor Electronic Commerce, PR Newswire, Nov. 8, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
PRNews-C database (announcing plans to provide secure electronic bankcard transac-
tions across global public networks using RSA encryption).
" Inquiry on Privacy Issues, supra note 35; Cf. JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR
SALE: HOW COMPUTERIZATION HAS MADE EVERYONE'S PRIVATE LIFE AN OPEN SECRET
28 (1992) ("As the population grows more computer literate and databanks become
more prevalent and sophisticated, long-distance, invisible assaults on privacy will
occur more frequently.").
" See infra part I.A.5 (discussing use of cryptography by criminals).
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2. Businesses with Commercial and Trade Secrets
Stealing a secret is often much cheaper than discovering, or
even rediscovering, it oneself. The United States annually invests
more than $130 billion in nongovernmental research and develop-
ment."8 The fruits of this investment present a tempting target for
industrial espionage, from both foreign and domestic competi-
tors.
3 9
Business information need not be scientific or technical to be of
enormous value. Sensitive market information such as the amount
that a corporation plans to bid at an auction for valuable oil leases
or the amount that a construction company plans to offer at tender
is of enormous benefit to a competitor. 0 Knowledge of a com-
pany's cost and price structure, market research, strategic plans,
order and customer lists are of obvious benefit to competitors. For
an investor, inside information such as planned merger or acquisi-
tion activity, can also reap huge profits. Encryption helps prevent
high-tech eavesdropping, while at the same time discourages some
low-tech theft: a stolen laptop with an encrypted disk represents a
loss of hardware, but not of sensitive information.
41
The increasing importance of intellectual property makes infor-
mation security especially valuable to industry; the portability of
ideas makes it ever-harder to achieve. The increase in mobile com-
munications also plays a role. As workers rely on networks to tele-
commute to the office, or use cellular telephones to communicate
with colleagues, or download e-mail onto their laptops while away
from the office, they expose their information to eavesdroppers.42
m See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 596
[hereinafter 1993 U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. This sum includes all research and
development conducted outside the government, regardless of whether funded by
industry or government.
s9 See GAO COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 12.
40 See, e.g., ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 1 (describing electronic industrial
espionage against an Alaskan oil company and by British Airways against Virgin
Atlantic Airlines).
41 See James Daly, Laptop Thefts Spur Security Efforts, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 12,
1992, at 1, 12 (discussing theft of laptops to obtain corporate plans, and the ways
devised by firms to deny access to information on laptops).
42 See Key Escrow: Its Impact and Alternatives 6 (May 3, 1994) (testimony of Dr.
Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer, Sun Microsystems, Inc., before the
Subcommittee on Technology and Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee) (on file
with author) (discussing factors making security more essential and more difficult to
achieve).
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The risk to U.S. corporations of both high- and low-tech
industrial espionage is particularly great because they are not just
the target of domestic and foreign competitors, but also of foreign
intelligence agencies. Indeed, according to the FBI, foreign
governments routinely use their intelligence services to acquire
valuable information about U.S. corporations." As a result,
without some form of communications and data security, sensitive
technical and market information can be intercepted from faxes,
cellular and microwave telephone calls, satellite communications,
and inadequately protected computer systems." Foreign firms
may soon face a similar threat of industrial espionage by U.S. intelli-
gence agencies searching for new roles, and continued appropria-
tions, in the post-cold-war era.
45
4s According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, the governments of at least 20 nations
are "actively engaged in economic espionage." Louis J. Freeh, Address at the
Executives' Club of Chicago 8 (Feb. 17, 1994) (transcript available at the FBI)
[hereinafter Freeh Speech]; see also ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 1 (describing
Soviet electronic surveillance of the IBM corporation in the 1970s); id. at 24 (describ-
ing the U.S. as the "greatest potential prey" of communications intelligence); David
Silverberg, Spy Charges Fray Ties Between U.S., France; French Officials Refute Espionage
Accusations, DEF. NEWs, May 3, 1.993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(describing U.S. accusations of industrial espionage by the French government
allegedly aimed at 49 U.S. manufacturing companies, 26 financial institutions, and
various U.S. government laboratories).
44 See Freeh Speech, supra note 43, at 11 (urging private businesses to be vigilant
in protecting valuable information such as research and development results, market-
ing plans, and corporate negotiating positions).
4- CIA DirectorJames Woolsey described economic and industrial espionage by
the CIA as "the hottest current topic in intelligence." Ross Thomas, Industrial
Espionage: The CIA's New Frontier, L.A. TIMEs,July 18, 1993, at M2. The suggestion
that the CIA diversify into industrial espionage received some support. See, e.g.,
Gerard P. Burke, Economic Espionage: Government Help Is Needed, GOV'T EXECUTIVE,
Nov. 1992, at 56 (noting that the U.S. government should attend to the "intelligence
being directed against American business ... without pause for philosophical
agonizing"). It was also criticized because it was unclear how the CIA proposed to
define a "foreign" corporation and how it proposed to decide which "domestic"
corporations would enjoy the spoils. See William T. Warner, Economic Espionage: A
Bad Idea, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12,1993, at 13. Later in 1993, Director Woolsey stated that
for "ethical and legal reasons" the CIA had decided not to embark on the project.
Tim Kennedy, Men and Matters, MONEYCLIPs, Dec. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Moclip File (quoting Director Woolsey's statement on Larry King Live). But
see Robert Dreyfuss, Company Spies: The CIA Has Opened a Global Pandora's Box by
Spying on Foreign Competitors of American Companies, MOTHERJONES, May-June 1994,
at 16, 16 (suggesting that the "CIA has already begun a clandestine effort to help the
American auto industry").
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3. Professionals
Lawyers have long relied on ordinary telephones to communi-
cate with clients and are increasingly using cellular telephones and
electronic mail.4 6 Every lawyer knows that she should never
discuss client confidences in a crowded restaurant. If such a
confidence is overheard by a third party, even unintentionally,
waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be imputed.4 7 Anyone
with the right sort of receiver can overhear cellular telephone con-
versations. Unfortunately, the ease with which electronic mail mes-
sages can be intercepted by third parties means that communicating
by public electronic mail systems, like the Internet, is becoming
almost as insecure as talking in a crowded restaurant.4 8 Similarly,
the ease with which intruders can gain access to unprotected com-
puters that can be accessed via the Internet means that unencrypted
data on such machines is at risk.4 9 Even ordinary telephone con-
4' A 1993 survey by the American Bar Association Legal Technology Resource
Center found that almost 75% of attorneys have a computer assigned to them. See
Betty Cline, Protecting Electronic Confidences, LEGAL TIME,June 20, 1994, at S30, S30);
see also David P. Vandagriff, Opening the Computer Door, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 92,
92 (describing a law firm which relies on e-mail to communicate with and attract
clients). This does not of course prove that 'all lawyers use their computers.
Communications between a client and her attorney, made in confidence by the
client when seeking legal advice, are privileged, unless this protection is waived by the
client or her representative. This privilege can be waived by unintentional disclosure.
See 81 AM.JUR. 2D Witnesses § 379 (1992) ("The presence of a third person indicates
a lack of intention that the communications.., are meant to be confidential."). But
see 2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EvIDENCE § 1074, at 1019 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing
California Evidence Code § 954, which permits the holder of the privilege to prevent
disclosure of privileged communications, and extends the privilege to communica-
tions which are overheard by an "eavesdropper, finder or interceptor").
4' See Jeffrey I. Schiller, Secure Distributed Computing, SC:. AM., Nov. 1994, at 72,
72 (suggesting an increasing frequency of "passive attacks"-eavesdropping--on the
Internet). For an assessment of the security of commercial services, such as Compu-
Serve, as a medium for attorney-client confidences, see Ronald Abramson, Protecting
Privilege in E-mail Systems, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 29.
Although the Internet grew out of the Defense Department network it is now
insecure. As a result, the U.S. intelligence community has created the "Intelink," a
secure alternative network for communications too important to be entrusted to the
Internet. See William F. Powers, Cloak and Dagger Internet Lets Spies Whisper in Binary
Code, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1994, at A4 (noting that the intelligence community
created the "Intelink" because the "very public, very uncontrollable global mesh of
computer networks [(the Internet)] was too risky a place to do business").
"' See Peter H. Lewis, Computer Snoopers Imperil Pentagon Files, Experts Say, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1994, at Al, B1O (reporting that there "'are probably no secure
systems on the Internet'" (quoting Peter G. Neumann, principal scientist at SRI
International, a think tank formerly known as the Stanford Research Institute)); see
also Terri A. Cutrera, Comment, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental
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versations may be at risk if the signal travels by microwave or satel-
lite." Although there are no cases to date holding that failure to
encrypt a cellular telephone conversation or an electronic mail mes-
sage, much less a regular phone call, constitutes professional negli-
gence, the ease with which these can be overheard or intercepted,
combined with the growing simplicity of encryption software, make
it conceivable that failure to use encryption may be considered a
waiver of privilege at some point in the future (at least for insecure
media such as electronic mail and cellular telephones)."
Lawyers are not the only professionals who receive client
confidences. Doctors, therapists, and accountants all receive sensi-
tive information which they then have a duty to keep confidential.
These duties can arise in tort or contract, or pursuant to state and
federal statutes. 2 Some of these duties are reflected in evidentiary
privileges,5" but a privilege is not required to create the duty.
5 4
4. National ID Cards and Data Authentication
Because strong cryptography can be used to authenticate
data," it makes nearly unforgeable national ID cards possible. The
cards could have the owner's date of birth, social security number,
Rights of Computer Users, 60 UMKC L. REV. 139, 140-42 (1991) (surveying "hackers'
skirmishes with the law").
o As the ACM Report states:
[T]here has been a migration of communications from more secure media
such as wirelines or physical shipment to microwave and satellite channels;
this migration has far outstripped the application of any protective
measures. Consequently, communications intelligence is so valuable that
protecting its flow ... is an important objective of U.S. national security
policy.
ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
" See, e.g., Cline, supra note 46, at S30 (describing the risks and ethical concerns
of the increased use of technology in the legal field as well as the possible ways to
protect confidential information).
5 See Vincent M. Brannigan & Ruth E. Dayhoff, Medical Informatics: The Revolution
in Law, Technology, and Medicine, 7J. LEGAL MED. 1, 48-50 (1986) (noting that there
are several different approaches in the law to protect patient privacy, including tort
litigation and violation of state or federal privacy acts).
5s See, e.g., 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 448 (1992) (describing physicians' eviden-
tiary privileges).
' The recent theft ofa laptop computer from the hypnotherapist who treated the
Princess of Wales illustrates the dangers to doctors and their patients. After the theft,
the British press began an orgy of speculation about the revelations that might
emerge, see Edward Pilkington, Theft from Princess's Bulimia Therapist Raises New
Privacy Fears, GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 1994, at 3, although none did.
5 See generally infra Technical Appendix, part C (discussing digital signatures).
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a digitized photograph, and any other information (for example,
health, immigration status, or prior convictions)." Users (who
might include liquor stores, police, banks, employers, or a national
health insurance trust) would have a reader with the government's
public key on it, which they would use to decrypt the card. So long
as the government was able to keep its private key secret, the ID
card would be unforgeable.
National ID cards raise a host of problems outside the scope of
this Article, many of which could be exacerbated by the use of
cryptography. Chief among these difficulties is the danger that the
government might encrypt additional information on cards that
would be invisible to the holder but might be accessible to law
enforcement, or even some employers. Examples of such secret
information include criminal record, military discharge status, or
health information. 7 Less ominously, digital signatures provide a
means of authenticating all electronic data. In a world in which
bank, tax, and medical records, and the contents of the digital
library are all at risk of accidental or malicious alteration, authenti-
cation of data becomes critical. By providing a reliable guarantee
that data with a proper signature is authentic, digital signatures
provide a certain means of detecting changes when someone tries
to rewrite history.
'6 See Gustavus J. Simmons, Subliminal Communication Is issible Easy Using the
DSA, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY-EUROCRYPT '93: WORKSHOP ON THE THEORY
AND APPLICATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES 218,219 (Tor Helleseth ed., 1994)
(describing the various types of information that can and may be digitized onto an ID
card).
' In the 1970s the Pentagon admitted that the Army was stamping discharge
papers with 530 different "SPN" code numbers that gave savvy employers derogatory
information about servicemen, including some with honorable discharges. The codes
did not appear on discharge papers issued to servicemen but were available to
employers who asked for more detailed records. Classifications included "drug
abuse," "disloyal or subversive security program," "homosexual tendency," "unsuit-
ability-apathy, defective attitudes and inability to expend effort constructively," and
"unsuitability-enuresis [bed wetting]." See Dana A. Schmidt, Pentagon Using Drug-
Abuse Code, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1972, at 11. Receipt of antiwar literature sufficed to
be classified as disloyal or subversive. See Peter Kihss, Use of Personal-Characterization
Coding on Military Discharges Is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1973, at 46. In response
to public pressure, the Pentagon abandoned the program and reissued discharge
papers without the codes. See Pentagon Abolishes Code on Discharges of Military Misfits,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1974, at 64; Uncoded Discharge Papers Are Offered to Veterans, N.Y.
TIMES, April 28, 1974, at 33.
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5. Criminals
Cryptography not only allows individuals to keep their commu-
nications and records secret, it also allows them to keep their
identities secret. We are accustomed to more anonymity in our
commercial life than we realize, although this form of privacy is
shrinking. Purchasing a newspaper for a few coins from a vending
machine or a store leaves no audit trail: ordinary cash is anony-
mous.58 Although the use of credit cards continues to increase,
there are some transactions that people prefer to keep untrace-
able.5" It seems safe to suppose that some cash transactions, while
legal, might not occur if the only payment option were something
that leaves a record.
Cryptologists have worked out protocols for untraceable,
anonymous, electronic cash ("E$") that also resist illicit duplication.
These permit customers to acquire E$ from a digital bank without
disclosing their identity to the bank. Using high-level cryptographic
techniques, the E$ is unforgeably certified as valid, but can be spent
only once.
60
Unfortunately, although cryptography allows the creation of
privacy-enhancing E$ and helps ensure that an Orwellian surveil-
lance state remains in the realm of fiction, its advantages come at
a price. The same features that might make uncrackable encryption
attractive to groups seeking to change the social order by lawful but
unpopular means, and that protect those working towards unpopu-
lar causes from retribution, also provide security to lawbreakers.
Untraceable E$ may help make untraceable "perfect crimes"
possible.
61
' U.S. paper money is not completely anonymous, however, because each (authen-
tic) bill carries a unique serial number and bills can be marked to facilitate tracking.
" For example, when my spouse and I purchase surprise gifts for each other, we
tend to pay in cash because we have joint checking and credit card accounts.
' See David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992, at 96, 96-97
(discussing electronic cash). Seegenerally infra Technical Appendix, part C (describing
digital signatures).
61 A "perfect crime" works as follows: The criminal commits an act of extortion,
for example, blackmail or kidnapping, which does not require face-to-face contact
with the victim to make the demand for money. Instead of demanding small
unmarked bills, the extortionist demands that the victim publish the digital signatures
of a large quantity of E$ in a newspaper. Because the "payoff" occurs via publication
in a newspaper, there is no danger of being captured while attempting to pick up a
ransom. And because the E$ is untraceable, the extortionist is able to spend it
without fear of marked bills, recorded serial numbers, or other forms of detection.
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Undoubtedly, criminals and conspirators will find a use for
encryption,62 but so too will many others. Not every diarist
records crimes in his daybook, but for many people there will be a
certain satisfaction in knowing that their most private thoughts are
safe from anyone's prying eyes, be they major governments or
younger siblings.
63
6. Users of Telephones, Electronic Mail, Faxes, or Computers
a. Cellular Telephones
There are at least twelve million cellular telephone subscribers
in the United States. 4 Few of these telephones use encryption.
Most of the cellular telephones that use some form of encryption
use a very simple masking algorithm which is easy to defeat with
parts available in any Radio Shack. Although cellular telephone
eavesdropping is illegal
6 5 it is easy. 66
Currently, this strategy would require a sophisticated criminal, because the
extortion demand would have to include the result of computations based on large
random numbers, but not the random numbers themselves. These computational
results would be used by the digital bank as inputs for its production of the verified
E$ and would not only ensure the untraceability of the E$ but also prevent anyone
but the criminal-who is the only one who knows the large random numbers-from
using the E$ whose digital signatures are published in the newspaper. See Sebastiaan
von Solms & David Naccache, On Blind Signatures and Perfect Crimes, 11 COMPUTERS
& SECURITY 581, 582-83 (1992) (describing the mathematical steps that must be
followed in order to effectuate a "perfect crime"). If, however, digital money
becomes commonplace, all the necessary functions will be built into easily available
software. This may not be too far away. See Peter H. Lewis, Attention Shoppers:
Internet Is Open, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at DI (describing the purchase of a
compact disc via the Internet by using digital signatures and high-grade cryptography
to encrypt a credit card number).
612 See, e.g., Dan Lehrer, Clipper Chips and Cypherpunks, 259 NATION 376,376 (1994)
(describing William Steen's use of PGP to encrypt what sheriff's deputies claimed was
potential evidence of traffic in child pornography). Similarly, the defendant in
Commonwealth v. Copenhefer would have benefitted from encryption. See 587 A.2d
1353, 1355-56 (Pa. 1991) (holding that an additional warrant was not required to
retrieve incriminating data "deleted," but still recoverable, from the defendant's
computer's hard disk).
65 See infra text accompanying note 761.
6 See Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 111.
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988) (providing that "any person who... intentionally
intercepts.., any wire, oral, or electronic communication.., shall be fined... or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both").
6 SeeJohn Markoff, Electronics Plan Aims to Balance Government Access with Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at Al, A18 ("[C]ellular phone calls can be monitored by
anyone with an inexpensive scanner.").
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b. Standard Telephones
Currently, only the U.S. government has a large network of
secure telephones, and they are expensive.6 7 Although AT&T has
developed secure telephones based on the Clipper Chip that will
provide encrypted communications so long as both parties have a
Clipper-equipped telephone, most telephone conversations remain
vulnerable to legal and illegal wiretapping and, if the signal travels
by microwave or satellite, to other forms of interception as well.
68
c. Faxes
Faxes are as vulnerable to interception as any other telephone
call, yet few fax transmissions are encrypted.69 Fax interception
equipment is "relatively inexpensive" and in some countries is
routinely used by telephone companies or the government to
monitor fax traffic. 71 Consequently, software vendors are now
adding encryption options to common operating systems such as
Microsoft's Windows.
71
Encryption also protects against the consequences of misdialing
a telephone number and reaching the wrong fax machine-an
increasingly common problem as the number of dedicated fax lines
grows.
d. E-mail
The exponential growth in the Internet's popularity has fueled
the private demand for encryption. 72 Military-grade cryptography,
or something close to it, is easily available free to any user of the
Internet who knows how to download a file.
73
67 See ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 10 (referring to "the government's STU-III
secure telephone system, which is inaccessible to the general public").
8 See supra note 50.
69 See Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 111.
70 New AT&T Security Device Targets Spying by Fax, PR Newswire, June 13, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
71 See Microsoft At Work Fax Software Debuts in Windows for Workgroups 3.11,
Business Wire, Oct. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
' See Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 111.
73 See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 437. The most popular program is Phil
Zimmermann's Pretty GoodTm Privacy (PGPTm), currently in MIT freeware version
2.6.2 for noncommercial use only, and for commercial use in PGP Viacrypt version
2.7. See Philip Zimmermann, PGPT User's Guide Volume I: Essential Topics (Oct. 11,
1994), available online URL ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP [hereinafter PGPTM User's
Guide]. PGP is available to U.S. and Canadian residents for file transfer protocol
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e. Personal Records
Many people have things they want to hide from their colleagues
or family members. The secret can be as trivial as a planned
surprise party, as personal as a love letter or sexual orientation, or
as unsavory as a planned theft or past misdeed. It can be a private
diary or the plans for a bomb. These records may be on paper or
stored on a computer disk. Some people derive a sense of security
from the knowledge that their communications and data are safe
from unauthorized snooping by their friends, family, or anonymous
computer hackers. Others seek an even greater sense of security by
attempting to encrypt their communications and records in a
manner that cannot be decrypted even by authorized law enforce-
ment.74
7. Dissidents and Others
Most, if not all, of the readers of this Article probably experi-
ence life in the United States as one of political freedom. For some
of these readers, a desire for communications and electronic
records security, particularly security from possible or suspected
government surveillance or intrusion, may appear to be an excess
of libertarian paranoia. The existence of low-water marks in civil
liberties (such as the 1798 Alien and Sedition Act,75 the 1920s'
(FTP) from rtfm.mit.edu. Ftp is the file transfer program by which documents and
program files can be retrieved from any computer on the Internet where they have
been placed for public copying.
In order to comply with U.S. export restrictions, however, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology requires that would-be downloaders read the warnings located
in a file whose name changes every 30 minutes before obtaining the short-lived access
code needed to download the program. Foreign residents, or those with less
patience, can download the file by connecting to an English server: ftp://ftp.ox.ac.
uk/pub/crypto/pgp, or a German server: ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/
virus/crypt/pgp, and then selecting the appropriate sub-directory for the operating
system and PGP version of their choice. For an excellent introduction to PGP, see
SIMSON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRET=Y GOOD PRIVACY (forthcomingJan. 1995).
' See infra part I.C.1.a (discussing law enforcement's view of the importance of
electronic intelligence gathering).
' The Alien and Sedition Act made it a crime to publish "false, scandalous and
malicious writing" against the United States government, Congress, or the President,
with intent to excite "hatred" against them. 1 Stat. 596, 596 (1798). The Act,
supported primarily by the Federalist Party, did not make it a crime to excite hatred
against the Vice President or publish falsehoods about him because the Vice President
at the time was Thomas Jefferson, who was not a Federalist. See generally JAMES M.
SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1956) (discussing the background, enforcement, and implications of the
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"Palmer raids," 76 the Japanese internment during World War II,
77
and COINTELPRO 8) may be seen by some readers as well-docu-
mented and anomalous departures from American ideals; other
readers may see them as symptoms of a more general tendency of
those in authority, approaching the "iron law of oligarchy."
7 9
Organized government intrusion into personal communications
and data privacy is less visible than an order to round up thousands
of civilians. It is also far more frequent. When given the duty and
authority to identify threats to national security," public servants
have shown a tendency to adopt a "vacuum cleaner[]" approach to
private information." Indeed, the Senate committee charged with
investigating domestic surveillance noted "the tendency of intelli-
gence activities to expand beyond their initial scope" and stated that
government officials "have violated or ignored the law over long
periods of time and have advocated and defended their right to
break the law."
82
Alien and Sedition laws).
76 See WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF
RADICALS 1903-1933, at 208-37 (1963) (describing the secret, mass roundups in the
1920s of some 10,000 immigrants and others active in the labor movement, the
Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and other dissident groups; their interrogation
without access to counsel or bail; the illegal seizure of their records; the attempts to
extort confessions from them; and the FBI investigations of government officials who
sought to ensure due process for these arrestees).
" See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942) (authorizing internment
camps); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (rejecting
several constitutional challenges to the internment of U.S. citizens ofJapanese descent
pursuant to the Act); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to a curfew order pursuant to the Act); Act
of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503,56 Stat. 173 (criminalizing the refusal to comply
with internment orders of a military commander). See generally Eugene V. Rostow,
The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE LJ. 489 (1945) (describing and
criticizing the treatment ofJapanese aliens and U.S. citizens ofJapanese origin during
World War II).7 8 See FRANKJ. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF
AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 20 (1980) (arguing that COINTELPRO,
an FBI counterintelligence program, is a form of punishment directed at individuals
or readily identifiable groups for past actions without trial, and is thus an attainder).79 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 15 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., 1962)
(arguing that "oligarchy... is an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large-scale organ-
ization").
8 National security is defined as the "national defense and foreign relations" of
the United States. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982), reprinted in
50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
81 S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 4 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
COMMITTEE REPORT].82 Id. at 4, 5.
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It is harder to view fears of government surveillance as aberra-
tional when one learns that in the 1950s the FBI identified 26,000
"potentially dangerous" persons who should be rounded up in the
event of a "national emergency," and that it maintained this list for
many years.8 3 During the 1970s, even sympathizers dismissed as
fantastical the claims by Black Panthers and other dissident groups
that they were being wiretapped and bugged by the FBI. These
allegations proved to be correct.8 4 Indeed, the U.S. government
has an unfortunate recent history of intrusion into private matters.
During the 1970s, the FBI kept information in its files covering the
beliefs and activities of more than one in four hundred Ameri-
cans;85 during the 1960s, the U.S. Army created files on about
100,000 civilians.8" Between 1953 and 1973, the CIA opened and
photographed almost 250,000 first class letters within the U.S. from
which it compiled a database of almost 1.5 million names.
8 7
Similarly, the FBI opened tens of thousands of domestic letters,
while the NSA obtained millions of private telegrams sent from, to,
or through the United States.
88
Although the Constitution guarantees a high degree of political
freedom and autonomy, "[t]he Government has often undertaken
the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political
beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or
illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power." 9 Certainly,
neither statutory nor constitutional prohibitions have proved
consistently effective in preventing civil liberties abuses. For
example, U.S. Census data is supposed to be private, and that
privacy is guaranteed by law. Nevertheless, during World War II the
government used census data to identify and locate 112,000
' Id. at 7, 54-57. By 1958, the FBI had whittled down the list to only 12,870
names, but the FBI placed the names it removed from the round-up list on its "Com-
munist Index" (renamed the "Reserve Index" in 1960) for "priority consideration" for
"action" after the first group had been detained. Id. at 55-56.
By 1972, the FBI had access to the fingerprints of more than 85 million U.S.
residents. See Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of Information in the United States, 20
DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 97 n.347 (1971).
" See SANFORD J. UNGAR, FBI 137 (1975) (describing wiretapping of the Black
Panthers).
" See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 81, at 6 (noting that the FBI had
500,000 domestic intelligence files, many with more than one name included).
8 See id. at 6.
87 See id.
' See id. at 6, 58-59.
89 Id. at 5.
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Americans of Japanese ancestry who were then transported to
internment camps.9" Similarly, the CIA repeatedly violated the
prohibition on domestic intelligence contained in its charter. 1
One need not believe that such excesses are routine to sympa-
thize with those who fear that another such excess is foreseeable.
Indeed, whether one considers these operations to have been
justified, to have resulted from a type of a bureaucratic rationality
that rewards results regardless of legal niceties,9 2 or to have been
a form of security paranoia, this history could cause a reasonable
person to fear she might someday be swept up in an investiga-
tion.9 3 The passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 9 4 designed to define standards
for the use of wiretaps, appears to have reduced greatly the amount
of illegal wiretapping by police. Nonetheless, illegal wiretapping by
police has not been completely eliminated. 95
90 See DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 20, 23-25 (1983).
Although the IRS Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), provides for the
confidentiality of tax returns, one commentator has described this restriction as
"quite permeable." Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information
Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34JURIMETRIcsJ. 383,
429 (1994).
9' See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 81, at 56-59 (discussing domestic
CIA activities).
' For example, a former FBI officer stated, "We never gave any thought to
[whether proposed actions were legal] because we were just naturally pragmatists.
The one thing we were concerned about was this: will this course of action work, will
it get us what we want. ... " Id. at 968 (quoting testimony of former FBI Assistant
Director for Domestic Intelligence William Sullivan).
9 Imagine that a new client comes to consult you and says that she is about to
form a new political action group. This group will organize demonstrations and will
encourage a general strike to support an unpopular political or social opinion. The
group intends to consult you frequently so as to stay within the bounds of the law,
but it intends to use every politically and socially disruptive tactic that the law allows
in order to gain the maximum audience for its platform. Your client also believes
that at times some group members may conclude that extreme cases of injustice
require peaceful civil disobedience. On the way out, your new client asks if you think
the group should worry about having its telephones tapped by the police. What do
you say?
' Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 237, 253 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986)) [hereinafter Title III].
" The volumes of successful suppression orders demonstrate that the police
wiretap more than the courts believe is justified; most suppression orders, however,
involve cases where a court issued some process, if only on the basis of an inadequate
foundation. Exposure of illegal, bad-faith, and warrantless wiretaps seems to have
become rare, although clearly not completely a thing of the past. See, e.g., Eric
Schmitt, Suffolk Officers Testify They Wiretapped Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1988, at
B3 (reporting narcotics officers' testimony that they conducted illegal wiretaps with
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Not all government intrusion into privacy is centrally organized,
but that hardly makes it less intrusive. During the past five years
the IRS has caught hundreds of its employees snooping into the tax
records "of friends, neighbors, enemies, potential in-laws, stockbro-
kers, celebrities and former spouses."96 Authorized users of the
FBI's National Crime Information Center have used its databases to
check up on friends and neighbors and to check backgrounds for
political purposes.9 7 It is an article of faith for many Americans
that postal workers read the postcards they process-and not without
reason when postal workers are heard to say that they "pass the
really good ones around the office."
98
A reasonable person may also be concerned about surveillance
by nongovernmental actors. For instance, political campaigns are
notorious for dirty tricks, including the bugging of opponents;° 9
the yellow pages in any major city contain numerous advertisements
for detective agencies and investigators; °0 and eavesdropping and
bugging devices are readily available in stores.
10 1
In light of this history of public and private intrusion into
personal privacy and the growing interconnection of computers and
communications envisioned by the National Information Infrastruc-
ture, it is impossible to dismiss the desire for personal communica-
the approval of their supervisor and the chief of the District Attorney's narcotics
bureau).
' Robert D. Hershey, Jr., LR.S. Staff Is Cited in Snoopings, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1994, at Dl.
97 
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS, 2-3 (1994) (OTA-
TCT-606) [hereinafter OTA INFORMATION SECURITY].
" Elaine Viets, And the Winner Is: The Trashiest Ever, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
May 29, 1990, at 3D; see also Mark Miller, Vermont Writer Wins PEN Award, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1993, at E4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting
ex-postal worker E. Annie Proulx as saying, "I worked in the post office, and I know
perfectly well that everyone loves to read postcards.... Not only do [the postal
workers] read them, but if they get a particularly juicy one, they show it to their co-
workers" (alteration in original)).
9 See SAMJ. ERvIN,JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 133-37
(1980) (discussing Nixon's electoral dirty tricks);Jonathan Alter & Richard Sandza,
When Tricks Turn Dirty, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1983, at 18, 18 (reporting that Jimmy
Carter agreed not to bug television networks at the 1976 Democratic Convention only
after a media advisor raised the specter of Watergate). See generally BRUCE L.
FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS (1966) (discussing the history of dirty tricks in American
politics).100 See, e.g., BELL OF PA., CONSUMER YELLOW PAGES: PHILADELPHIA 276-77 (1994).
10 See Tom Seibel, The Spy Shop: Now Anyone Can Play James Bond, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, May 16, 1993, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
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tions and records security as pure paranoia. It may, in fact, be very
sensible.
B. The U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES)
Is Increasingly Vulnerable
While the need for communications security grows, the officially
sanctioned tools for providing that security are beginning to look
dated and vulnerable.
1. How DES Became a Standard
In the early 1970s, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS),
since renamed the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), decided to define a national standard cryptographic
algorithm. 0 2 The absence of a government standard, the NBS
determined, caused people to use competing cryptographic
products that were unable to communicate with each other.
10 3
The lack of interoperability among commercial cryptographic
products deterred firms from using encryption when it would have
been of value. Similarly, the absence of a standard kept the costs of
products high and reduced the incentive to improve them. In
selecting a standard cryptographic system, the NBS proposed to
certify the strength of its algorithm, and thus reassure potential
users that the system was strong enough to resist attack, something
that most users would be unable to determine for themselves. The
NBS determined that the algorithm it selected should be easy to
use, strong, suitable for use in electronic devices, and yet suffi-
ciently weak to be exportable without running afoul of export
control regulations which control cryptography.
10 4
" See Cryptographic Algorithms for Protection of Computer Data During
Transmission and Dormant Storage, 38 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,763 (1973) ("The
increasing volume, value and confidentiality of these records regularly transmitted
and stored by commercial and government agencies has led to heightened recognition
and concern over their exposure to unauthorized access and use .... The need for
protection is then apparent and urgent."); Encryption Algorithms for Computer Data
Protection, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,961, 30,961 (1974) ("Because of the significant value or
sensitivity of communicated and stored data, the need for adequate protection of this
data from theft and misuse has become a national issue.").
See Encryption Algorithm for Computer Data Protection, 40 Fed. Reg. 12,134,
12,134 (1975) ("In order to insure compatibility of secure data, it is necessary to
establish a data encryption standard and develop guidelines for its implementation
and use.").
04 The algorithm the NBS ultimately selected did not meet all these criteria
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In 1977, after several years of acrimonious public debate among
professional cryptologists, the NBS selected an algorithm developed
by IBM that the NSA had certified as "free of any statistical or
mathematical weaknesses.""0 5 It is now known as the Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES). 116  DES is a single-key cipher: the sender
and the receiver use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the
message. DES keys are fifty-six bits (about eight ASCII characters)
long.1 7 This means that there are seventy-two quadrillion (actual-
ly 72,057,594,037,927,936) different possible keys."' DES is ap-
proved for use by the government for its sensitive information, but
not for classified information.
10 9
The designation of DES as the U.S. standard was controversial,
foreshadowing the current controversy over Clipper. An earlier
version of the IBM project used a key with well over one hundred
bits."' The key shrank to fifty-six bits by the time it became the
U.S. standard. Critics charged that the shortened key was designed
to be long enough to frustrate corporate eavesdroppers, but short
enough to be broken by the NSA."' Some critics also feared
there might be a "back door,"" 2 an implanted weakness in a key
because other agencies considered it too strong to export. See infra part I.C.1.c.i
(describing U.S. export control of encryption software under the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR)).
105 BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 347; see U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence,
Unclassified Summary: Involvement of the NSA in the Development of the Data Encryption
Standard, reprinted in IEEE COMM., Nov. 1978, at 53,53-55 (discussing the debate over
the NSA involvement in the development of the algorithm).
106 DES, issued as FIPS 46 in January 1977, was reviewed, slightly revised,
reaffirmed for federal government use in 1983 and 1987, and reissued as FIPS 46-1
inJanuary 1988; on September 11, 1992, NIST announced a third review of FIPS 46
1, DES, and reaffirmed it for another five years as FIPS 46-2. See Revision of Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-1 Data Encryption Standard (DES), 58
Fed. Reg. 69,347, 69,347-48 (1993) [hereinafter FIPS 46-2].
DES is identical to the ANSI standard Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) defined
in ANSI X3.92-1981. See Eric Bach et al., Cryptography FAQ (05/10: Product Ciphers
Cryptology) § 5 (Aug. 30, 1993), available online URL ftp://rftm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/
news.answers/cryptography-faq/part05.
107 See FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,348.
0 See Garon & Outerbridge, supra note 26, at 179.
109 See FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,348.
n0 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 346 (stating that the key was originally 128 bits
long); SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 221 (stating that the key was originally 112 bits).
. See BAMFORD, supra -note 17, at 348 (noting that the if the IBM 128-bit key had
been used, "[a]s opposed to the moderate $5000 price tag, each solution would have
cost an unimaginable $200 septillion, or $200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000");
infra text accompanying note 776-80.
12 "Back doors" are sometimes inaccurately called "trap doors," although
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part of the encryption algorithm known as S-boxes, that would allow
the agency to use computational shortcuts to break the code."'
The problem was exacerbated by the unwillingness of DES's
creators to explain why they had chosen the particular, seemingly
arbitrary, method of mixing up bits that they had selected.
Cryptology is a field for the truly devious, and many cryptologists
were concerned that there might be a mathematical vulnerability
intentionally inserted by the cryptographers who designed the DES
cipher. The search for such back doors in government-sponsored
ciphers such as DES has been a popular pastime among suspicious
cryptologists since the NBS proposed DES, yet no back door has
been reported. Recently, however, academic cryptologists deter-
mined that DES's unusual algorithm is peculiarly resistant to a newly
discovered mathematical attack called "differential cryptanalysis"-a
technique which had not been discovered, at least in unclassified
form, at the time DES became the U.S. standard. DES's inventors
have since stated that they were aware in 1974 of DES's resistance
to differential cryptanalysis, but kept quiet to protect national
security.'
4
Export of DES is controlled by the State Department as if it were
a weapon like a tank or fighter plane."n Financial institutions and
the foreign offices of U.S.-controlled corporations routinely receive
clearance to export DES if they show a need, but the State Depart-
ment-presumably acting under the advice of the NSA-usually
refuses to allow others to export it.
Although U.S. law ordinarily prevents Americans from selling
DES-equipped encryption products to foreigners, DES is found
around the world and freely sold by foreign corporations in many
countries. It may be "the most widely used cryptosystem in the
technically a "trap door" function is one which is computationally easy in comparison
to its inverse. For example, multiplying large prime numbers is much, much easier
than factoring a very large number whose only factors are two large primes. See Brian
Hayes, The Magic Words Are Squeamish Ossifrage, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 312,312 (1994); see
also 19 Authors, Essay, The Law of Prime Numbers, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 185, 188 n.14
(1993) (I had to cite it).
11s See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 347. For a full description of the "S-box"
technique, complete with mind-numbing diagrams, see SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at
224-41, or Encryption Algorithm for Computer Data Protection, supra note 103, at
12,134.
.. See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 240.
"' Exports are controlled pursuant to the ITAR, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1994). See
infra part I.C.1.c.i.
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world."" 6 A full specification of DES is available in books sold in
the United States, 117 the export of which is not controlled,1 8
presumably on First Amendment grounds."
9
2. DES Is Vulnerable to Attack
In a world where computing speed almost doubles every year,
DES looks as if it has been a standard for a very long time. Its 56-
bit keys look more vulnerable to attack than ever before. DES is
thus approaching the end of its useful life, at least for high security
information. NIST recertified DES in 1993 but suggested that its
days as an official standard are numbered.
12
Given that computer processors become cheaper every day,
brute-force searches for DES keys are now well within the reach of
relatively affordable, massively parallel machines.12 ' A recent
paper describes a brute-force attack on DES as "alarmingly economi-
cal," estimating that for $1 million one could build an optimized
machine that would try fifty million keys per second and would
crack a DES key in an average of 3.5 hours. 22 An investment of
$10 million would produce a machine that would be expected to
crack a DES key every twenty-one minutes.2 2 DES-cracking
remains beyond the means of the casual snooper, but is now within
the means of many corporations and every government.
116 ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
117 See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 224-41.
18 See Letter from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Defense Trade
Controls, U.S. Dep't of State, to Phil Karn (Mar. 2, 1994), available online URL ftp://
ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/policy/crypto/ITAR-export/Karn-Schneier-exportcase/book_
lst.response (noting that a book is "not subject to the licensing jurisdiction of the
Department of State since the item is in the public domain").
19 In contrast to DES, the government has classified the SKIPJACK encryption
algorithm used by the Clipper family of chips. This should prevent the SKIPJACK
algorithm from being exported. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing
the SKIPJACK algorithm).
2 o See FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,347.
2 See generally Garon & Outerbridge, supra note 26, at 177-82 (arguing that DES
is becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack as the cost of breaking it decreases
exponentially).
" MichaelJ. Wiener, Efficient DES Key Search § 10 (Aug. 20, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). The attack requires that the attacker have access to
the plaintext as well as the ciphertext of a single message. Cryptologists call this a
"known plaintext" approach. Such attacks are easier than one might suppose, because
one does not need a long, known plaintext and it is often possible to infer something
about the contents of the message one seeks to cryptanalyze.
123 See id. § 4.
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The security problem is compounded by the probabilistic nature
of a brute-force key search. The strength of an algorithm is
expressed in the amount of time it would take to be certain of
finding the key by trying every possibility. The expected (average)
amount of time per key is only half that amount. If, however, an
attacker is engaged in a routine program of successively trying to
break keys, and knows how often they are changed, the attacker will
inevitably get lucky. This can be a serious threat in situations where
one piece of luck will garner the attacker a large return.
Suppose, for example, that a bank which becomes concerned
about the vulnerability of its DES keys decides to change the key
used for interbank financial transactions every day. Does this give
it security? If an attacker has a machine that is certain to break a
key in a year, then the attacker has over a 0.01% chance of breaking
the new key in an hour, and a 0.27% chance of breaking it in a
day.1 24 In plain English, the attacker has just better than a one in
ten thousand chance of breaking each key in the first hour; she has
a chance of about one in 370 of breaking each key before it is
changed. The attacker thus can hope for a large electronic funds
transfer to her bank account about once a year.
25
Worse, the attacker does not need special computers so long as
she has several of them. An attacker armed with only one 100Mhz
Pentium computer would have a minuscule daily chance of success.
If she links a group of 500 Pentium computers on a university
network, however, her chance of cracking DES in a day rises to just
above one in 40,000.126 These are not bad odds for a lottery in
which the payoff can be in the millions, and the cost of a ticket-idle
12 See Garon & Outerbridge, supra note 26, at 181.
125 In fact, there is more to a successful electronic funds transfer attack than
breaking the code. Banking protocols contain other safeguards designed to thwart
a "known plaintext" attack, making the calculations in the text more of a theoretical
possibility than a likelihood. Letter from Dorothy Denning, Professor and Chair,
Computer Sciences Department, Georgetown University, to Michael Froomkin 2
(Sept. 17, 1994) (on file with author).
126 Garon and Outerbridge estimate a one in 200,000 chance for 512 linked
machines running under 20 MIPS each, at which speed they are capable of 15,000
DES operations per second. See Garon & Outerbridge, supra note 26, at 187.
Pentiums should be at least seven times as fast. SeeJohn Blackford, The Promise of the
P6, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Aug. 1994, at 146 (noting that a 100Mhz Pentium is rated
at 150 MIPS and that successor chips will be twice as fast). The estimate is probably
low. Phil Karn recently reported using an optimized DES code on a 50 Mhz 486, and
achieving more than 38,000 DES encryptions per second. See Posting from Phil Karn
to Cypherpunks Mailing List (Aug. 6,1994) (on file with author). Pentiums operating
at 100 Mhz would probably run more than 2.5 times faster than this.
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time on computers in a university network-may be zero to the user.
The idea of networks of computers harnessed together to crack
a DES password may sound like science fiction, but something
similar is already happening. A group of computer scientists and
mathematicians recently used the Internet to harness computer time
donated by 600 volunteers. Using a total of about 5000 MIPS-
years' 27 of processing time to make 100 quadrillion calculations
over an eight month period, the group solved a problem equal in
complexity to breaking a 129-digit RSA key. I28 RSA is a commer-
cial public-key cryptosystem 29 and its keys are not precisely
comparable to DES keys, but even so the problem was far harder
than breaking DES's 56-bit key.'
30
3. How to Achieve Better Security
One solution to the aging DES problem may be to switch to
"triple-DES." As the name suggests, in triple-DES a message is
processed with DES three times, although the middle step is a
decryption (with a different key) in order to make the final product
12' A MIPS-year is the computer power of a computer capable of executing one
million instructions per second operating for a year. Five thousand MIPS-years is
approximately equal to the power of 33 100Mhz Pentiums running for a year. See
Blackford, supra note 126, at 146.
128 See Hayes, supra note 112, at 312; Gina Kolata, 100 Quadrillion Calculations
Later, Eureka!, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A13. The problem, known as RSA-129,
was first publicized in the Mathematical Games column of ScientficAmerican in 1977.
The challenge was to factor 114,381,625,757,888,867,669,235,779,976,146,612,010,
218,296,721,242,362,562,561,842,935,706,935,245,733,897,830,597,123,563,958,705,
058,989,075,147,599,290,026,879,543,541. See Martin Gardner, Mathematical Games:
A New Kind of Cipher That Would Take Millions of Years to Break, Sci. AM., Aug. 1977,
at 120, 123. The problem remained unsolved for 17 years. The answer, 5000 MIPS-
years later, was the factors 3,490,529,510,847,650,949,147,849,619,903,898,133,417,
764,638,493,387,843,990,820,577 and 32,769,132,993,266,709,549,961,988,190,834,
461,413,177,642,967,992,942,539,798,288,533. See Hayes,supra note 112, at 313. The
message encoded with the 129-digit key said: "The magic words are squeamish
ossifrage." See id. at 312.
12 For a definition of RSA, see Paul Fahn, RSA Laboratories, Answers to Frequently
Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography § 2.1 (Sept. 20, 1993), available online
URL ftp://rsa.com/pub/faq/Partl; ftp://rsa.com/pub/faq/Part2; ftp://rsa.com/
pub/faq/Part3 [hereinafter RSA Cryptography Today FAQ].
130 Brute-force attacks on RSA keys can use shortcuts, because RSA keys are
cracked by factoring large prime numbers. Shortcuts exist for this problem so that
not every possible number needs to be tested. "A rule of thumb suggests that adding
10 decimal digits to the length of a number [used as an RSA key] makes it from five
to 10 times as hard to factor." Hayes, supra note 112, at 316. Adding the same
number of decimal digits to DES would result in a larger increase in the computa-
tional complexity of a brute-force keysearch.
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compatible with regular DES.13 1 The advantage of using triple-DES
rather than a single 56-bit encryption is that messages remain more
compatible with existing equipment; the disadvantages are a loss in
speed, a need to revise existing software and hardware, inelegance,
and some lingering uncertainty as to its safety."3 2 NIST has been
silent on the security (or lack thereof) of triple-DES. The NSA has
not disclosed whether it considers triple-DES insecure, too secure,
or neither.3 ' It may be that the NSA has been silent on triple-DES
in the hopes that it will be elbowed out of the market by "escrowed"
encryption products such as Clipper. Triple-DES is probably very
hard to break; breaking through Clipper's protections will involve
no (computational) effort for authorized persons because the
government will keep a copy of the keys.1
34
131 See Wiener, supra note 122, § 9 (providing a schematic for triple-DES
encryption).
132 Some versions of triple-DES use a different key each time, while others reuse
the first key for the final round. The two-key version is estimated to be 1013 times as
resistant to a brute-force attack. Triple-DES is estimated to be even more secure. See
id.
'" The alternatives are legion. The NSA might not want to certify a cipher it
knew to be insecure, although it also might not wish to let it be known that a cipher
considered secure by others was in fact vulnerable. The most likely explanation,
however, is that triple-DES is so secure as to be computationally infeasible to break.
The hypothesis that the NSA opposes triple-DES because it is too hard to break
gains support from the NSA's lobbying campaign to discourage the X9 secretariat of
the American Bankers Association from undertaking a standards development process
that might lead to the adoption of triple-DES as an approved option for domestic and
international financial transactions. The NSA, which is a member of the X9 group,
gave several reasons for its opposition, including.
" The government is committed to EES and triple-DES is inconsistent
with this objective.
* Triple-DES is not exportable.
* "[Flurther proliferation of triple-DES is counter to national security and
economic concerns."
NSA Reasons for Negative Vote (Oct. 18, 1994) (circulated with X9 letter ballot) (copy
on file with author). Ultimately, after a reballoting of its executive committee, the X9
membership decided to undertake the standards development process for triple-DES
by forwarding the issue to its X9F Subcommittee on Data and Information Security.
See Letter from Cindy Fuller, Associate Director X9 Secretariat, to Michael Froomkin
(Jan. 31, 1995) (on file with author).
"s Indeed, NIST has stated that no publicly available cipher was suitable as the
new national standard because such a cipher could be used without escrow. See
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Key Escrow Initiative Questions and
Answers 3 (July 29, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Key Escrow Initiative
Q&A]. NIST selected SKIPJACK in order to "assure[] no one can use the algorithm
in non-escrowed systems." Id. The idea is to maximize the possibility that no one will
be able to use SKIPJACK with a key shielded from the government.
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A second solution, applicable only to time-sensitive information,
is to change DES keys very frequently. If a new DES key is used for
every message, by the time the attacker figures out the old key, it is
too late. Of course, this solution does not work for things that need
to be kept secret for long periods of time. It also requires that
parties to communication have some way to agree on a continuing
supply of new keys which, by definition, they cannot do on the inse-
cure channel which requires the encryption in the first place.' 5
A third solution is to abandon DES, in whole or in part, and try
something new. The U.S. government has selected a replacement
for DES that involves escrowed encryption using a new algorithm
called SKIPJACK. The government has indicated that it hopes U.S.
users of cryptography will adopt this option.
C. The Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
The industrialized world is in the opening stages of an "ongoing
telecommunications revolution with still undefined potential to
affect the way we communicate and develop our intellectual
resources." 3 These changes can be liberating, and they can be
painful; some have distributional consequences affecting relative
power as well as access to information.
The increases in personal privacy and communications security
promised by cryptography come at the expense of those who benefit
from insecure communications. If every telephone call is routinely
encrypted, domestic law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and
local police forces, will find wiretapping harder or even impossible.
If information on computers is routinely encrypted, police may find
evidence inaccessible or incomprehensible. When sophisticated
encryption technologies are used abroad, intelligence agencies such
as the NSA, which routinely seek to penetrate the communications
of foreign powers, find their missions complicated. To the extent
Because the SKIPJACK algorithm at the heart of the Clipper Chip is classified,
it has not had the benefit of almost 25 years of determined attack by academic
cryptologists. Even though the NSA spent 10 years developing SKIPJACK, see id. at
2-3, this lack of publicity leaves open the possibility that it has an intentional or
unintentional back door, something that seems very unlikely with DES.
"' Chaining, in which each secure message contains the key to the next message,
will work only where the same two parties send each other a continuous stream of
messages and are certain that the delays between messages will be short. If there are
any significant delays, the stream becomes vulnerable to probabilistic attack. See supra
text accompanying notes 124-25.
"s Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451 (1994).
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that American citizens are better off because wiretaps help catch
and convict criminals, and to the extent that communications intel-
ligence protects the national interest from foreign threats, develop-
ments that impede legitimate wiretaps may make us all worse off.
The fear of losing electronic surveillance capabilities because of
advances in encryption technology has produced a three-pronged
reaction from the law enforcement and intelligence communities.
First, their spokespersons have begun a public relations offensive
designed to explain why these capabilities matter.'37 Second, they
have sought legislation requiring that telephone networks and other
similar communications channels be designed in a manner that
facilitates wiretapping.' Third, they have designed and support-
ed EES, best known in its most famous implementation, the Clipper
Chip, which enables the government to keep a copy of the key
needed to decrypt all communications using EES. These activities
share the premise that it is reasonable for the government to
request, and in some cases require, that private persons commu-
nicate in a manner that makes interception by the government at
least practical and preferably easy.
1. Why the Government Wants EES to Replace DES
"What! fear not, man, but yield me up the keys."
39
The Administration 140 makes two types of arguments in favor
of EES. In its hard sell, the Administration, primarily through the
117 See, e.g., Freeh Speech, supra note 43.
"s On October 25, 1994, President Clinton signed the digital telephony bill. See
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,108 Stat.
4279 (1994). Both houses of Congress passed the bill shortly before the end of the
legislative session. See 140 CONG. REC. S14666 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (reporting the
Senate's passage of the bill by voice vote); 140 CONG. REC. H10917 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1994) (reporting the House's passage of the bill by two-thirds vote); see also Sabra
Chartrand, Clinton Gets a Wiretapping Bill That Covers New Technologies, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1994, at A27.
On the digital telephony bill, see generally Jaleen Nelson, Comment, Sledge
Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and Its Effect on Free Flow of
Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1139 (1994) (arguing that legislation
requiring communication through only certain media and also requiring communica-
tion providers to affirmatively assist the government in wiretapping is inconsistent
with rights of free flow of information and privacy in U.S. and international law).
'S9 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE THIRD PART OF KING HENRY VI act 4, sc. 7, 1. 37
(Andrew S. Cairncross ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1964).
140 It is clear that plans for EES have been gestating for years in the national
security bureaucracy. Because, however, the Clinton Administration has adopted
them wholeheartedly, this Article refers to the plan as the Administration's proposal.
744 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 709
FBI, paints a lurid picture of law enforcement stripped of an
essential crime-detection and evidentiary tool-wiretapping-while
pornographers, drug dealers, terrorists, and child molesters
conspire via unbreakable ciphers, storing their records and child
pornography in computers that become virtual cryptographic
fortresses. Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies, primarily the NSA,
quietly murmur that existing policies have proved ineffective in
preventing the increasing use of unescrowed encryption, and
suggest that their proposals should be adopted to prevent develop-
ments that might (or might not, they won't say) undermine the
nation's communications intelligence capabilities.
In its soft sell, the government argues that if the NSA has
designed a cryptographic system that it is willing to certify as secure
and make available to the American public, the government has an
obligation to take steps to prevent that cipher from being used
against it by criminals and foreign governments. In fact, the current
national standard cipher, DES, is strong enough that the U.S.
government has sought to prevent its export and may indeed regret
having let the algorithm become publicly available.' 4' EES, the
argument goes, just maintains the status quo. Even if everyone used
a Clipper-equipped telephone, telephone conversations would be no
less secure against legitimate government wiretapping than they are
today, while being more secure against illicit eavesdropping.
a. Domestic Law Enforcement
According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, electronic intelligence,
especially wiretapping, is crucial to effective law enforcement: if the
FBI and local police were to lose the ability to tap telephones
because of the widespread use of strong cryptography, the "country
[would] be unable to protect itself against terrorism, violent crime,
foreign threats, drug trafficking, espionage, kidnapping, and other
crimes."'1
43
From the statistics available, it is difficult to determine how
"4 "With hindsight, the intelligence community might consider the public disclo-
sure of the DES algorithm to have been a serious error and one that should not be
repeated." ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 25.
112 See Stewart A. Baker, Don't Wory, Be Happy: Why Clipper Is Good for You,
WIRED, June 1994, at 100, 100 (debunking seven "myths" about key escrow
encryption).
.4. Freeh Speech, supra note 43, at 13; see also OTA INFORMATION SECURITY, supra
note 97, at 9-10 (noting increasingly frequent portrayals of cryptography as a threat
to domestic security and public safety).
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much difference wiretaps actually make.' The FBI estimates that
wiretaps play a role in an average of 2200 convictions per year,145
but it is unclear how many of these convictions could have been
obtained without wiretaps. Despite an almost 50% increase since
1983, court-ordered wiretaps are still relatively rare: only 919 were
authorized in 1992 for all federal, state, and local police forces.
1 4
1
Of these, only 141 wiretap orders covered electronic devices such
as faxes, digital display pagers, voice pagers, cellular phones, or
electronic mail. In 1993, the 976 active court-ordered wiretaps
allowed police to hear approximately 1.7 million conversations
involving nearly 94,000 persons. The listeners described about 20%
of the conversations as incriminating. 147  The law enforcement
community suggests that wiretaps make the biggest difference in the
largest cases because wiretaps have been used to gather evidence in
90% of the terrorism cases brought to trial. 148 The average cost
of a wiretap was $57,256 in 1993,1" so it may be that the biggest
cases are the only ones in which the expense of monitoring a
telephone line seems justified. 5 '
Statistics aside, it seems only logical that the spread of strong,
user-friendly cryptography would increase the risk that evil people
will be able to frustrate law enforcement attempts to crack their
computers or bug their telephones. Whether the risk has yet
14 Title III authorizes the use of wiretaps. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). Orders for pen registers, which record the telephone numbers called but not
the content of the conversation, are much more frequent than wiretap orders. Also,
not every wiretap order necessarily falls under Title III.
"4" See Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment and Aviation of the House Comm. on
Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1994) (statement of James
Kallstrom, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter
Kalistrom Statement] (indicating that, in the 10-year period ending in 1992, more
than 22,000 convictions have resulted from court-authorized surveillances);
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1993 REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR
ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 6 (1993) [hereinafter WIRETAP REPORT] (stating that
in 1993 "a total of 2,428 persons [were] arrested as a result of electronic surveillance
activity; of those arrested, 413 were convicted").
' See Kallstrom Statement, supra note 145, at 3; WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 145,
at 4 (showing fluctuations between 600 and 1000 court-ordered wiretaps per year
between 1983 and 1993).
47 See WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 145, at 5.
' See Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 115.
.. See WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 145, at 5.
" For an interesting analysis of the costs and benefits of wiretapping, which
concludes that the digital telephony bill is not cost-effective, see Robin Hanson, Can
Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?, COMM. ACM, Dec. 1994, at 13.
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manifested itself is less clear. For all its predications of disaster in
the making, "the FBI has not been able to point to a single instance
to date [(September 1994)] where encryption has hampered [its]
investigation of a case."'
Nevertheless, the fear that rogue cryptography might allow
"terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals"'5 2 to evade law
enforcement seems to supply a large part of the motivation for the
Administration's support for EES. One can only sympathize with
officials who were, no doubt, asked whether they wished to go down
in history as the individuals responsible for letting loose a technolo-
gy that might someday hamper the investigation of a terrorist threat
to a large population center. 5 Faced with the FBI's Manichaean
vision of, on the one hand, a world of rampant cryptography in
which the bad guys remain impregnable behind cryptological walls
and, on the other hand, an ambitious plan to return to the status
quo ante in which the police remain able to intercept and under-
stand most if not all electronic communication, it is not surprising
that the Clinton Administration opted for what must have appeared
to be the safer course.
' Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 115. Similarly, the FBI warns that the
conversion of telephone networks to digital and fiber-optic systems threatens to
"make it impossible for the FBI to carry out court-approved surveillance in life-and-
death cases." Freeh Speech, supra note 43, at 12. According to FBI Director Louis
Freeh, "Development of technology is moving so rapidly that several hundred court-
authorized surveillances already have been prevented by new technological
impediments associated with advanced communications equipment." Id. at 13.
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) recently filed suit under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to force the FBI to release internal studies which
formed the basis for testimony to Congress that new technologies were already having
a harmful effect on law enforcement's wiretapping capabilities. See Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Press Release, Group Seeks Release of FBI Wiretap Data, Calls
Proposed Surveillance Legislation Unnecessary (Aug. 9, 1994). The FBI is resisting the
suit. See Telephone Interview with David Sobel, Legal Counsel, Electronic Privacy
Information Center (Nov. 29, 1994).
52 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, supra note 20, at 1.
155 Even an enthusiastic defender of an absolutist vision of the First Amendment
conceded that an "absolute" right against being tortured might nonetheless find room
for an exception in the case of "the man who knew where the [atom] bomb [was
ticking, but] sat grinning and silent in a chair" far from the place he had planted it.
Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63, reprinted in THE OCCASIONS OFJUSTICE: ESSAYS MOSTLY
ON LAw 89, 99 (1963). Explaining this position in a Constitutional Law class I
attended at Yale in 1984, Professor Black stated that he believed torture morally
justified in this extreme and hypothetical case. Once the torturer extracted the
information required, Black continued, he should at once resign to await trial,
pardon, and/or a decoration, as the case might be.
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b. Intelligence-Gathering
The communications intelligence capabilities of the United
States are a subject "characterized by secrecy even greater than that
surrounding nuclear weapons."' 54 Unclassified discussion of the
effect of strong private cryptography on the capabilities of intelli-
gence agencies quickly becomes conjecture. We do know, however,
that two of the most important functions of the NSA are to acquire
and decrypt foreign communications, and to coriduct traffic analysis
of foreign and international communications.
The two functions are related, but different. Acquisition and
decryption of foreign communications are the stuff of headlines:
listening to the Soviet President's telephone calls made from his
limousine or breaking German codes during World War II. Traffic
analysis is more subtle, but no less important. It is the study of the
sources and recipients of messages, including messages that the
eavesdropper cannot understand. In wartime, traffic analysis allows
intelligence agencies to deduce lines of command. Changes in the
volume and direction of traffic can signal the imminence of opera-
tions.155
Widespread foreign access to even medium-grade cryptography
makes it more difficult for U.S. communications intelligence to
select the messages that are worth decrypting, or even worth
reading.56 Worse, it makes traffic analysis much more difficult.
So long as most electronic communications are unencrypted, intelli-
gence agencies are able to sort messages in real time, and identify
those of interest, or those which warrant further attention.
57
154 ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 23.
155 See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing the U.S. Navy's use of traffic
analysis to determine the movements ofJapanese forces in World War II).
'1 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 359 (quoting then-NSA Director Bobby Ray
Inman as warning: "Application of the genius of the American scholarly community
to cryptographic and cryptanalytic problems, and widespread dissemination of result-
ing discoveries, carry the clear risk that some of the NSA's cryptanalytic successes will
be duplicated, with a consequent improvement of cryptography by foreign targets.").
157 See ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 25.
The goals of U.S. export control policy in the area of cryptography are (i) to
limit foreign availability of cryptographic systems of strategic capability,
namely, those capable of resisting concerted cryptanalytic attack; (ii) to limit
foreign availability of cryptographic systems of sufficient strength to present
a serious barrier to traffic selection or the development of standards that
interfere with traffic selection by making the messages in broad classes of
traffic (fax, for example) difficult to distinguish ....
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Furthermore, if most traffic is plaintext, then ciphertext cries out
for attention-here is someone with something to hide. Even if the
message cannot be decrypted quickly, the source can be flagged for
traffic analysis, which enables the intelligence agency to build up a
picture of the persons with whom the source communicates. If
everyone is using strong cryptography, then the most secret
messages no longer stand out.
c. Failure of Laws Designed to Prevent the Spread of Strong Cryptography
The United States has several long-standing laws and policies
designed to prevent strong cryptography from spreading abroad,
and even from being widely used at home. Although these may
have served to slow the spread of strong cryptography, ultimately
they have failed to stop it. The following is only a brief summary of
two exemplary policies and their effects. 5
i. Export Control: The ITAR
U.S. export control is designed to prevent foreigners from
acquiring cryptographic systems that are strong enough to create a
serious barrier to traffic analysis, or that are difficult to crack.'5 9
Two sets of regulations govern the export of encryption software:
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) govern "dual use"
technologies' 60 and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) apply to items that the government considers inherently
military in nature.'6 1 The EAR are generally less demanding, but
the ITAR take precedence.162  Under the ITAR regime, applica-
158 For a general survey of high-technology export controls, see Peter Swan, A
Road Map to Understanding Export Controls: National Security in a Changing Global
Environment, 30 AM. Bus. LJ. 607 (1992).
159 See ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 25.
16 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-99 (1994). The EAR are administered by the Bureau of
Export Administration in the Department of Commerce. The statutory authority for
the EAR, the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-2420 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992), lapsed on August 20, 1994. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2419 (West
Supp. 1994). President Clinton issued an executive order requiring that the EAR be
kept in force to "the extent permitted by law" under the International Emergency
Powers Act (IEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Exec. Order
No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994).
161 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (XIII)(b)(1) (1994). The ITAR are administered by the
Office of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State. If the State
Department chooses, it can transfer jurisdiction of an export application to the
Commerce Department. The statutory authority for the ITAR is the Arms Export
Control Act, codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
1
6 2 See Evan R. Berlack & Cecil Hunt, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in COPING
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tions to export cryptographic software as strong as (or stronger
than) DES are routinely denied."' 3 Only strong products that lack
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1994, at 11, 26 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A-705,1994) (arguing that "under-staffing, technically complex
applications, [and] many layers of review within DOD... [as well] as between DOD
and State" characterize the permit application process under the ITAR); Ira S.
Rubinstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT
CONTROLS 1994, supra, at 177, 194 (stating that, under the ITAR, the State
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) has primaryjurisdiction over
cryptographic software). The export of articles or services on the U.S. Munitions List
is regulated by the DTC under the ITAR. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.5 (1994). The DTC
settles disputes regarding whether an item is on the U.S. Munitions List according to
the commodity jurisdiction procedure, which determines whether the ITAR or the
EAR will apply. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (1994).
Whether the ITAR unconstitutionally restrict free speech is outside the scope of
this Article. For a discussion of this topic, see Constitutionality of the Proposed
Revision of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 5Op. Off. Legal Counsel
202, 213-14 (1981) (finding that the ITAR have constitutional and unconstitutional
applications, and that they should be narrowed so that they are less likely to apply to
certain protected speech); Christine Alexander, Preserving High Technology Secrets:
National Security Controls on University Research and Teaching, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 173, 203 (1983) (noting that export controls on technology raise constitutional
issues because technical expression may be considered speech and because such
controls infringe upon the right of academic freedom); Mary M. Cheh, Government
Control of Private Ideas-Striking a Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National
Security, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 22 (1982) (arguing that cryptographic information is
protected by the First Amendment);James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiy and the First
Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639, 654-56 (1979) (arguing that scientific inquiry
merits some degree of protection by the First Amendment); Harold P. Green, Consti-
tutional Implications of Federal Restrictions on Scientfic Research and Communication, 60
UMKC L. REV. 619, 643 (1992) (suggesting that the national security basis of
governmental restrictions on scientific freedom may be weak because it is impossible
to hold national security secrets effectively for even short periods of time); Ruth
Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientfic Information, 23JuRMETRICsJ. 50, 76-
83 (1982) (arguing that noncommercial scientific communication should receive full
First Amendment protection and noting that the ITAR may be unconstitutional unless
interpreted narrowly because they may lack ties to compelling government interests);
David A. Wilson, National Security Control of Technological Information, 25JURIMETRICS
J. 109, 128-29 (1985) (suggesting that research contracts be used as devices for imple-
menting the ITAR to avoid the constitutional difficulties associated with requiring
licenses); Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the Dissemination of
Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405,441-44 (1982) (arguing
that current export control laws are overbroad in their restriction of speech and
therefore employ excessive means to protect national security); Kenneth J. Pierce,
Note, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the First Amendment: A Need for
Legislation, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 213-19 (1984) (arguing that the ITAR's
licensing requirement is an unconstitutional prior restraint of protected speech);
Allen M. Shinn, Jr., Note, The First Amendment and the Export Laws: Free Speech on
Scientific and Technical Matters, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 368, 397-400 (1990) (arguing
that the regulation of scientific expression that would be unconstitutional if imposed
directly would also be unconstitutional if imposed by contract).
l6 See supra part I.B.1 (discussing how DES became a standard in the United
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the capability of being adapted for encryption, or which are
designed for specific banking applications, receive official export
clearance. 164
The ITAR have failed to prevent the spread of strong cryptogra-
phy. The ITAR prohibit export of cryptographic software,
165
nevertheless software created in the United States routinely and
quickly finds its way abroad. For example, when version 2.6 of PGP,
a popular military-grade cryptography program, was released in the
United States by graduate students at MIT as freeware, 166 a
researcher at the Virus Test Center at the University of Hamburg,
in Germany, received a copy within days from an anonymous
remailer.167  He then placed it on his internationally-known
Internet distribution site.168 As would-be sellers of cryptographic
products have frequently testified to Congress, the major effect of
the ITAR is to prevent U.S. companies from competing with those
foreign companies that sell sophisticated cryptographic software abroad.
States).164 See OTA INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, at 154; see also GAO
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 6-7, 24-28.
165 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(XIII)(b) (1994) (designating cryptographic software as
auxiliary military equipment). The ITAR state: "Software includes but is not limited
to the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, application programs,
operating systems and support software for design, implementation, test, operation,
diagnosis and repair." 22 C.F.R. § 121.8(f) (1994).
66 Freeware is software which is provided for distribution at no charge by the
author, although the author typically retains the intellectual property rights. See supra
note 73 (discussing the accessibility of Phil Zimmermann's PGP).
16
1 See E-mail from Vesselin Bontchev, Research Associate, Virus Test Center,
University of Hamburg, to Michael Froomkin (July 22, 1994) (on file with author)
(stating that Bontchev received a copy of PGP 2.6 from a chain of anonymous
remailers and put it on the university's FTP site). According to an e-mail sent to the
author by a person requesting anonymity, someone also uploaded a copy to a popular
Linux archive site (sunsite.unc.edu). Overnight, therefore, the many sites around the
world that mirror sunsite faithfillly and unwittingly distributed PGP 2.6 worldwide.
16 For the curious, the URL is ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/
crypt/pgp/2.6mit. Other copies quickly appeared at Internet distribution sites in
England, Italy, and other European countries.
169 See, e.g., Privacy Issues in the Telecommunications Industy: Hearings on the
Administration's "Clipper Chip" Key Escrow Enclyption Program Before the Subcomm. on
Technology and the Law of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaty, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May
3, 1994) [hereinafter Clipper Chip Hearings], available in WESTLAW, USTestimony
Database, 1994 WL 231119, at *13-26 (testimony of Stephen T. Walker, President,
Trusted Information Systems, Inc.) (summarizing studies showing how export controls
harm U.S. business); see also Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of
Encyption Software: Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software
Industiy's Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469,
481-82 (1994) (indicating that, because most countries do not have export controls
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Meanwhile, enforcement of the ITAR has produced absurd
results. The State Department has refused to license the export of
a floppy disk containing the exact text of several cryptographic
routines identical to those previously published in book form.
170
The refusal was all the more bizarre because the book itself was
approved for export.'17  The only reasons given by the State
Department for its refusal were that "[e]ach source code listing has
been partitioned into its own file and has the capability of being
compiled into an executable subroutine," 72 and that the source
code is "of such a strategic level as to warrant" continued con-
trol.17' The State Department also concluded that the "public
domain" exception to the ITAR'7 ' did not apply and-most bizarrely
of all-that its decision was consistent with the First Amendment.
175
ii. "Classified at Birth"
The Inventions Secrecy Act 176 gives the Commissioner of Pat-
ents the authority to issue patent secrecy orders. Even if the
government has no ownership interest in the invention, the orders
block the issuance of a patent and place the application under seal.
If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Department of
Defense states that publicizing the invention would be detrimental
to the national security, the patent will be withheld "for such period
as the national interest requires."' 77  Willful disclosure of an
invention covered by a secrecy order is a criminal offense.
7 8
While the application of the Inventions Secrecy Act to privately
on encryption software, U.S. software developers are concerned about losing their
foreign market shares).
171 See Letter from Martha Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip R. Karn, Jr. (Oct. 7, 1994) (ODTC Case CJ 081-94) (on
file with author). The source code was published in Applied Cryptography. See e.g.,
SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 519-32 (listing the source code for the IDEA cipher).
171 See Letter from William B. Robinson to Phil Karn, supra note 118.
172 Letter from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Phillip R. Karn,Jr. (May 11, 1994), available online URL ftp://
ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR-export/KarnSchneiertexportcase/
floppy_2nd.response.
' Letter from Martha Harris to Philip R. Karn, Jr., supra note 170.
174 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5) (1994); see also Rubinstein, supra note 162, § 3
(describing the limited reach of the public domain exception).
"7s See Letter from Martha Harris to Phillip R. Karn, Jr., supra note 170.
16 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (codified as "Secrecy of Certain
Inventions and Filing Applications in Foreign Country").
'"Id. § 181.
178 See id. § 186.
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created cryptographic devices has sometimes occasioned pub-
licity, 179 most devices covered by secrecy orders are invented at
government expense.
1 80
The existence of a number of high-level cryptographic algo-
rithms in public circulation, some patented,' 8' some not, suggests
that the Inventions Secrecy Act has been far from successful at
preventing the spread of strong cryptography.
8 2
2. How Clipper Works
"Here, here, here be my keys; ascend my chambers;
search, seek, find out."
183
The Escrow Encryption Standard is designed to provide users
with communications that are secure against decryption by all third
parties except authorized agents of the U.S. government. Before a
Clipper Chip is installed in a telephone, 8 4 the government will
permanently inscribe it with a unique serial number and a unique
encryption key. The government will keep both of these numbers
on file. In order to reduce the danger that the file might be stolen
or otherwise compromised, the chip's unique encryption key will be
split into two pieces, each held by a different "escrow agent." The
escrow agents will be required to guard the segments and release
them only to persons who can demonstrate that they will be used
for authorized intercepts. Reuniting the pieces of a chip's unique
key gives the government the capability to decrypt any Clipper
conversations.
'1
7 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 354-58 (describing the national publicity
surrounding the NSA's issuance of secrecy orders to two inventors of cryptographic
devices).
180 See id. at 355-56 ("Of the three hundred or so secrecy orders issued each year,
all but a very few are either on inventions the government has originated itself and
already classified, or on inventions somehow connected with the government.").
"8! RSA is an example of a high-level cryptographic algorithm in circulation which
has been patented. The issue of the validity of algorithmic patents is outside the
scope of this Article.
182 Cf. Ferguson, supra note 162, at 659-61 (examining how the First Amendment
limits effective regulation of scientific research and publication).
183 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR act 3, sc. 3, 11. 149-51
(HJ. Oliver ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1971).
184 The text uses the Clipper Chip, which is designed for use in telephones, as an
example. Similar procedures apply to the Capstone Chip and Fortezza PCMCIA card,
although those also include circuitry supporting the Digital Signature Standard and
data exchange such as electronic mail.
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a. A Tale of Three Keys
From the user's point of view, the Clipper Chip is a black box:
pick up your Clipper-equipped telephone, dial another Clipper-
phone, push a red button to initiate the security feature, wait a few
seconds for the two chips to synchronize, read off the character
string displayed on the telephone to the other party to confirm the
security of the conversation,1 8 5 and start the conversation.' 6
The conversation is scrambled with a classified algorithm called
SKIPJACK, which took the NSA ten years to develop, and which the
government certifies as secure for the foreseeable future.8' What
" This prevents a "man-in-the-middle" attack by which the eavesdropper, armed
with two Clipper telephones, intercepts the signal, decrypts it, records it, and then
reincrypts it. In the event of such an attack, the two users will have different session
keys (one with each of the attacker's phones), and will thus see different character
strings appear on their readouts. See OTA INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, at
65 (Box 2-7).
"B Well, that is the theory anyway. One preliminary report suggests that the
AT&T 3600c, a $1300 Clipper-equipped telephone, is difficult to use:
The hackers who bought the things had quite a hard time getting them to
work at all. There were troubles getting it set up so that it would attempt
to go into secure mode, and trouble getting it to do so reliably once a pair
of phones that worked were found....
To make the unit go into secure mode, one person pushes a red but-
ton .... Then the modems do their thing, making modem noises for about
20 seconds (your time may vary; AT&T manual said 10 seconds.) Once
connected, the sound is very weak. We in the conference had trouble
hearing when the earpiece was right next to a microphone. There was also
a roughly quarter second delay (presumably this is for A/D conversion +
encryption) in talking. This is a longish delay, roughly equal to an overseas
satellite conversation.
Posting from Adam Shostack to Cypherpunks Mailing List (Aug. 15, 1994) (on file
with author) (describing a demonstration of the AT&T 3600c at the 1994 HOPE
(Hackers on Planet Earth) Conference).
"" SKIPJACK is a single-key cipher similar to DES but with an 80-bit key. In a
single-key cipher the sender and the receiver use the same key to encrypt and decrypt
the message. Originally, the NSA intended SKIPJACK for government communi-
cations systems. See Key Escrow Initiative Q&A, supra note 134, at 2. The current
estimate is that SKIPJACK should remain secure against brute-force attacks, despite
continual increases in computing power, for at least 30 years. See Ernest F. Brickell,
et al., SKIPJACK Review Interim Report: The SKIPJACK Algorithm 1 (July 28,1993),
available online URL http://www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/Clipper/skipjack-
review.html [hereinafter SKIPJACK Interim Report] ("[T]here is no significant risk
that SKIPJACK will be broken by exhaustive search in the next 30-40 years.").
Not only is the SKIPJACK algorithm used by the Clipper Chip classified, but it
is burned into the chip in a fashion "which is highly resistant to reverse engineering
(destructive or non-destructive) to obtain or modify the cryptographic algorithm."
FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6004. NIST's description of its "state of the art" anti-
reverse engineering design mentions three techniques: the use of nonmetallic links
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happens during those few seconds before the conversation begins,
and why, are the essence of EES and the source of controversy.
From the government's point of view, EES relies on three keys:
the session key,' 88 the chip key, and the family key. The session key
is what SKIPJACK uses to encrypt and decrypt the conversation.
Every conversation has a new session key, and any third party
seeking to eavesdrop on the conversation would need to have the
session key to decrypt the conversation. Oddly, the Clipper Chip
does not select the session key; indeed, the Clipper Chips do not
care how the telephones do this.
Suppose Alice wants to have a secure conversation with Bob.
Alice calls Bob, then pushes the red button. At this point, the two
Clipperphones have to agree to a session key according to a method
selected by the manufacturer. The maker of the Clipperphone is
free to use as secure a method as she likes. The two Clipperphones
might, for example, use a supersecure method of agreeing on the
session key which is so safe that two strangers who have never met
before can agree on a session key in public while being overheard,
and yet anyone who overhears what they say will still be unable to
work out what the key is. 8 9 Assume that Alice and Bob use
telephones that have this supersecure selection method built in.
Once the two telephones agree on the session key, each phone feeds
the key to its Clipper Chip.19 As soon as the Clipper Chips are
to hold the "write once" information programmed on to the chip which it claims
"cannot be investigated externally"; the addition of "ghost logic" which is additional
random or intentional circuits with no purpose other than to confuse analysis; and
"false heat dissipation methods." National Inst. of Standards and Technology,
Reverse Engineering Protection, 3 FIPS 185 Docket at tab 3. NIST also noted that
reverse engineering tends to destroy the device being examined, and that because
every chip will have differences, these differences also provide a layer of protection.
See id.
Nevertheless, one commentator on the proposed FIPS concluded that, based on
his review of the literature and his experience in teaching a class in reverse engineer-
ing at MIT, "[p]hysics tells us that we can find out what is in these chips. Others
WILL perform this analysis. The only question is when. I believe it is 3-9 months."
Comments of Thomas F. Knight, Jr., 2 FIPS 185 Docket.
1"' A session key is the sequence of bits allowing decryption that will be used for
only a single communication, one e-mail, or one telephone call. See infra text
accompanying notes 790-91.
189 One such supersecure method is the Diffie-Hellmah Key Exchange. See infra
text following note 792.
190 Both Clipper Chips in a telephone conversation use the same session key to
encrypt and decrypt their messages. The original Clipper proposal envisaged two
keys, one for each chip in a telephone conversation, but NIST revised the standard
to require only a single key. The NIST revision came in response to a comment it
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told the session key, they begin the Clipper telephone session. The
first step in a Clipper telephone session is to undermine the
eavesdropper-proof creation of the session key by transmitting the
session key in encrypted form for the benefit of any public servants
who may be listening.
At the start of every Clipper session, a Clipper Chip sends a
stream of data called a Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF). 9 '
Unless Bob's Clipper Chip receives a valid LEAF from Alice's chip,
Bob's chip will not talk with it." 2 As can be seen from the Figure
on page 756, the LEAF is built in layers. At the center lies the
session key. The chip encrypts the session key with the unique chip
key. It then appends the sending chip's serial number and a
checksum, then reencrypts the data with the family key, which is a
master key held by the government.'9 3
received which noted that a two-key system would limit law enforcement executing
a wiretap on Alice to her side of the conversation unless it obtained a warrant for
every Clipper Chip that communicated with Alice's telephone. See FIPS 185, supra
note 14, at 6001. Capstone will generate its own keys. See MYKOTRONX, INC.,
CAPSTONE MYK-80: A NEW BREAKTHROUGH IN ENCRYPTION TECHiNOLOGY 1 (1993)
(sales literature, on file with author) (stating that the MYK-80 features "Message
Encryption Key generation").
191 The chips also send each other an "initialization vector" of unspecified length,
which NIST defines as a "mode and application dependent vector of bytes used to
initialize, synchronize and verify the encryption, decryption and key escrow func-
tions." FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6004.
" In a two-way real-time communication, the two chips send each other a LEAF,
and each chip performs a check to ensure that the other LEAF is valid. In one-way
communications, like e-mail, there is only one chip sending one LEAF, which will
later be checked by the receiving chip. The difference is significant. If only one chip
sends a LEAF, then a wiretapper will need to obtain the chip unique key for every
chip which calls the line being tapped, potentially resulting in the compromise of a
large number of chips. By contrast, if the LEAFs go both ways, the wiretapper is
indifferent as to who started the conversation because she always has one LEAF she
can decipher.
The exact makeup of the LEAF is classified. See FIPS 185, supra note 14, at
6004. It is known, however, that it consists of the 80-bit session key which has been
encrypted with the unit key, a 32-bit serial number unique to each Clipper Chip, and
a 16-bit checksum. See National Inst. of Standards and Technology, Technical Fact
Sheet on Blaze Report and Key Escrow Encryption 1-2 (June 2, 1994). A checksum
is a "computer technique for ensuring the integrity of an identifying number." JOHN
M. CARROLL, COMPUTER SECURITY 334 (1977).
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FIGURE
Anatomy of a LEAF
Encrypted with family key known to government
Checksum
Encrypted with unique chip key
Chip serial number
Session key (unique number
(changed every burned into chip)
conversation)
Family key-shared by all chips, key known to government.
Chip key-unique to each chip, split between escrow agents, and indexed by chip serial number.
Checksum-a computation using the session key and other data as inputs.
In short, eavesdroppers seeking access to the session key must
use two keys to decrypt the LEAF: the family key (which is common
to all chips) and the chip key (which is different for every chip).
Assuming that the family key will be in fairly wide circulation,
194
the security of the Clipper Chip stands or falls on the security of the
master list of chip keys. This list, or the two lists of key segments,
would be of enormous value to any attacker, such as a foreign
government bent on industrial espionage. The way in which the
keys are created, and the method by which they are held and
released, are critical elements of the user's security.
When a public servant engaged in a lawful wiretap first comes
across a Clipper session, she records it, including the LEAF. The
public servant must now acquire the family key if she does not
already possess it. According to NIST, the family keys will not be
transmitted to law enforcement personnel, but will instead be stored
" Supporters of the Clipper Chip challenge this assumption. Because the family
key will be in circulation only by means of a special circuit board which will be
inserted into a personal computer operated by law enforcement agents, supporters
of the Clipper Chip argue that its distribution will be relatively limited. See, e.g.,
Dorothy E. Denning & Miles Smid, Key Escrowing Today, IEEE COMM., Sept. 1994, at
58, 58 (emphasizing that the family key is secret and only accessible to authorized
government officials).
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in special circuit boards capable of being installed in ordinary
PCs."9 5 Once decrypted with the family key, the LEAF reveals the
serial number of the Clipper Chip and also reveals the encrypted
session key. The public servant must then contact the two escrow
agencies, giving them the chip's serial number and a legally valid
reason for the wiretap, usually in the form of a warrant from a state
court, a federal court, or the special Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) court."' The requestor must "certify that
[the] necessary legal authorization for interception has been
obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these commu-
nications." 19 7 How this certification operates when the legal basis
19s See Clipper Chip Hearings, supra note 169, available in Westlaw, USTestimony
Database, 1994 WL 231122, at *4 (statement ofJo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (describing the decrypt
processor). As this Article went to press, the law enforcement community had access
to one of the two existing decrypt processors, although Clipper-equipped telephones
are currently being shipped to government purchasers. See Telephone Interview with
Miles Smid, Security and Technology Group Manager, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (Feb. 9, 1994).
" See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Authorization Procedures for Release of Encryption
Key Components in Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to Title III (Feb. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter Title III Authorization Procedures] (establishing procedures by which
escrow agents could release keys in response to requests pursuant to Title III), in
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Key Escrow Encryption: Announce-
ments-February 4, 1994 (Feb. 15, 1994) (information packet accompanying press
release) (on file with author) [hereinafter Key Escrow Announcements]; U.S. Dep't
ofJustice, Authorization Procedures for Release of Encryption Key Components in
Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to FISA (Feb. 4, 1994) [hereinafter FISA
Authorization Procedures] (same, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988)), in Key Escrow Announcements, supra;
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Authorization Procedures for Release of Encryption Key
Components in Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to State Statutes (Feb. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter State Authorization Procedures] (same, pursuant to state statutes or Title
III), in Key Escrow Announcements, supra.
The Attorney General's procedures for release of key escrow components require
that the request for key components include the agency and individual conducting the
wiretap, as well as the termination date of the period for which the intercept will be
authorized. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption
Announcements 2 (Feb. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Attorney General's Key Escrow
Announcements], in Key Escrow Announcements, supra.
U.S. foreign intelligence agencies have the authority to listen in on all forms of
electronic communication, including telephones, without seeking a warrant if the
communications are between foreign powers or are signals (other than spoken
communication) from a foreign country, embassy, or consulate to another foreign
party. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988); see
also Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and
First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
793, 811-13 (1989) (describing FISA procedures).
197 State Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at 1; Title III Authorization
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is "exigent circumstances" (which is determined by the same officer
who would be requesting the key segment), is not explained,
19 8
perhaps because warrantless wiretaps based on exigent circum-
stances are relatively rare.9 9 There remains some doubt as to how
the NSA and other agencies in the national security community will
obtain keys. It is notable that in a recent meeting involving the FBI,
the NSA, and AT&T's Bell Labs, the "the NSA did not answer a
question as to whether the national security community would
obtain keys from the same escrow mechanism for their (legally
authorized) intelligence gathering or whether some other mecha-
nism would exist for them to get the keys."
200
The escrow agents have no duty to make any independent
inquiries as to the adequacy of the certification before releasing the
key segments. ° I Once satisfied that the wiretap request appears
legitimate (in that it comes from someone authorized to make a
request and contains her certification that adequate legal authority
exists), the escrow agents are required to disclose the key segments
for the key for which the serial number was submitted. The public
servant requesting the key fragments puts them together and uses
Procedures, supra note 196, at 1; FISA Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at
1. 19' The Attorney General's procedures require that requests for key segments be
made by the principal prosecuting attorney of a state or political subdivision, or by
the responsible person in an agency. See State Authorization Procedures, supra note
196, at 2. This requirement overlaps with the authority for emergency wiretaps in
Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1988).
'99 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 30 (1978) ("Law
enforcement officials have been reluctant to use [the emergency eavesdropping]
authorization for fear it is unconstitutional."); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4 .2(g) (1984) ("There has been virtually no use of this
emergency power.. .. "). But see CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING §§ 30-30f(Supp. 1993) [hereinafter FISHMAN SUPPLEMENT] (describ-
ing various procedures for emergency wiretaps which have been used in life-
threatening situations).
" Posting from Matt Blaze to Cypherpunks Mailing List (Feb. 2, 1994) (on file
with author) (reporting surprising frankness on the part of NSA spokespersons at a
meeting discussing key escrow).
20 The Department ofJustice, however, is required to ascertain, after the fact, that
the legal authorization existed for Title III wiretaps and FISA wiretaps. See Title III
Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at 2 (stating that the "Department of
Justice shall" ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance);
FISA Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at 2 (same). Strangely, the Justice
Department has no such obligation when the key segment is requested by a state or
local police force. See State Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at 2 (stating
that the "Department ofJustice may" inquire into the authorization for electronic
surveillance).
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the reconstituted chip key to decrypt the session key. Armed with
the decrypted session key, the public servant can at last decrypt the
conversation. Because the presence of the Clipper Chip has no
effect on the applicable constitutional and statutory rules, the public
servant remains obligated to minimize the intrusion.
20 2
In summary, a public servant might decrypt an EES message as
follows:
Public servant
(1) intercepts the message, including the LEAF (128-bit
LEAF encrypted with the family key);
(2) decrypts the LEAF with the family key (32-bit chip ID,
80-bit session key encrypted with chip key, 16-bit
checksum);
(3) contacts her escrow agents, reports the chip ID, and
avers existence of the legal authority for the wiretap;
(4) receives two 80-bit key segments;
(5) XORs20 the key segments to produce an 80-bit chip
key;
(6) decrypts the encrypted session key with the chip key;
(7) decrypts the entire message with her decrypted
session key.
b. The Escrow Agents' Critical Role
The Department of Commerce's NIST and the Treasury
Department's Automated Systems Division will be the two escrow
agents who will create and hold the key segments.0 4 Both escrow
agencies will participate in the creation of each Clipper Chip's
unique chip key. After raw Clipper Chips emerge from the factory
202 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
203 XOR is a binary operation by which two binary numbers are compared a bit
at a time. If both bits have the same value then XOR returns zero; if the two bits dif-
fer, XOR returns one. Both segments are thus equally necessary to retrieve the key,
and neither segment alone provides the holder with any more information about the
value of the key than would be possessed by a person who held no segments at all.
An example, using a hypothetical 1-bit key divided into two 1-bit segments, A and
B, may make this clearer. Even if you know that segment A is 1, you still have no
more information about the key's value than does anyone else. If segment B is 0, the
key is 1 (because 1 XOR 0 = 1); but if segment B is 1, then the key is 0 (because 1
XOR 1 = 0). Similarly, someone holding segment B but not A is equally uninformed
as to the key's actual value.
o See Attorney General's Key Escrow Announcements, supra note 196, at 1.
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they will be taken to a secure, compartmented information
facility, °5 which is the vault-like room that the government uses
when handling classified documents. Each of the escrow agents will
provide a list of random numbers which, when combined, will
provide the numbers from which the keys will be generated. °6
After the keys are generated, the escrow agents will be given a
disk containing lists of chip serial numbers and an associated 80-bit
number which represents half the information needed to recreate
a chip's key. Both key segments must be combined to retrieve the
chip key, and neither segment alone provides the holder with any
information as to the chip key's contents.
207
Although the escrow agents do not check the bona fides of any
requests for key fragments, they do require a substantial amount of
paperwork before releasing a key. The escrow agents are also
required to keep detailed records of key segment requests and
releases. The existence of this paper trail should provide a
significant disincentive to rogue wiretapping requests by agents in
the field. Similarly, NIST has announced an elaborate system of
safeguards to protect each Clipper Chip's unique key. The scheme
205 Currently a company called Mykotronx is the only supplier authorized to
produce Clipper Chips. The secure, compartmented information facility is located
at Mykotronx. See Key Escrow Initiative Q&A, supra note 134, at 6. This may impose
barriers to entry for potential competitors.
206 NIST has devised a fairly elaborate procedure for the key generation process.
Someone working for each of the escrow agents will type 80 characters into a
computer, which will store the characters, the amount of time between the keystrokes,
the date, and the time. The computer will then feed these values into NIST's secure
hash algorithm to produce a number. For a discussion of the secure hash algorithm,
see Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180, Secure
Hash Standard (SHS), 58 Fed. Reg. 27,712 (1993); Proposed Revision of Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180, Secure Hash Standard, 59 Fed. Reg.
35,317 (1994) (correcting a technical flaw and confirming the algorithm's security
reliability). See also Dorothy E. Denning, The ClipperEnctyption System, AM. SCIENTIST,
July-Aug. 1993, at 319, 321-22 (describing how two escrow agents and a computer are
needed to create the unit key, thus increasing public confidence that the failure of
one escrow agent cannot compromise the system); Denning & Smid, supra note 194,
at 60-61 (describing how escrow agents generate a key number and a random seed
number for use in each programming session). Currently, the system is able to
program about 120 Clipper Chips per hour, although NIST contemplates switching
to a higher volume system at some future date. See id. at 64.
The procedure for generating the random numbers is important because anyone
who knows which pseudorandom number generator was used and who also knows the
"seed" could use this information to recreate all the keys without going to the trouble
of consulting the escrow agents.
207 Technically, the two 80-bit segments held by the escrow agents are XORed to
produce the actual key. See Denning & Smid, supra note 194, at 64-65.
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involves complex rationing of information and mutual monitoring
by the escrow agents from the moment the Clipper Chip is created.
Further security attends the inscription of the key upon a Clipper
Chip, its subsequent division into two key segments, and ultimate
safeguarding by the two escrow agents.
208
The security precautions introduced by NIST in late 1994 are
complex. To the nonspecialist they appear sufficient to prevent
security breaches at the time the keys are "burned in" and to
prevent surreptitious copying or theft of the key list from the
escrow agents. But no amount of technical ingenuity will suffice to
protect the key fragments from a change in the legal rules govern-
ing the escrow agents. Thus, even if the technical procedures are
sound, the President could direct the Attorney General to change
her rules regarding the escrow procedures. Because these rules
were issued without notice or comment, affect no private rights, and
(like all procedural rules) can therefore be amended or rescinded at
any time without public notice, there is no legal obstacle to a secret
amendment or supplement to the existing rules permitting or
requiring that the keys be released to whomever, or according to
whatever, the President directs. Because the President's order
would be lawful, none of the security precautions outlined by NIST
would protect the users of the EES system from disclosure of the
key segments by the escrow agents. Nothing in the EES proposal
explicitly states that the NSA will not keep a set of keys; indeed, the
only way to acquire a set of EES-compliant chips is to have the
device that incorporates them tested and approved by the NSA.
Similarly, although the specifications for the decrypt processor call
for it to delete keys when a warrant expires and to automatically
send a confirmation message to the key escrow agents, the interim
model (there is only one) in use by law enforcement organizations
relies on manual deletion. °9
208 The procedures were devised in collaboration with the Department ofJustice,
the FBI, NIST, the NSA, the Department of the Treasury Automated Systems
Division, and Rapid System Solutions, Inc. See id. at 58.2
09 See OTA INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, at 65 n.5 (Box 2-7) (citing
presentation by NIST Security Technology Manager Miles Smid in June 1994).
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c. Limited Recourse for Improper Key Disclosure
The escrow system lacks legal guarantees for the people whose
keys are generated by the government and held by the escrow
agents. Indeed, the Attorney General's escrow procedures state that
they "do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive
rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveil-
lance."2 10 In short, the government disclaims in advance any
reliance interest that a user of an EES-equipped device might have
in the government's promise to keep the key secret. 2n A victim
of an illegal wiretap would have a cause of action under Title III
against the wiretapper,2 1 2 but, it appears, no remedy against the
escrow agents, even if the escrow agents acted negligently or failed
to follow their own procedures. 213 The Attorney General's proce-
210 Title III Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at 3; FISA Authorization
Procedures, supra note 196, at 3; State Authorization Procedures, supra note 196, at
3. The government is completely correct to warn users of EES that their rights to
exclude illegally seized or tainted evidence in any criminal proceeding are unchanged
by EES.
21 Traffic analysis using pen registers (which record the numbers called by a
telephone) and trap and trace devices (which record numbers calling the telephone)
do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-
46 (1979). Under Title III, however, both pen registers and trap and traces require
a court order, although an actual warrant is not required. See 18 U.S.C §§ 3121-3123
(1988); Criminal Procedure Project, Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1991-1992, 81 GEO. LJ. 853, 952-54
(1993). Because decrypting the LEAF with the family key involves listening to at least
a few seconds of the conversation, the act of intercepting and decrypting the LEAF
constitutes wiretapping. This is so even though the information thus gathered is no
better than could be obtained by a trap and trace device or a pen register. Perversely,
however, even though the decryption of the LEAF is a wiretap, it may not violate the
Fourth Amendment if the telephone user has no reasonable expectation of privacy
for the LEAF. Whether a chip user would have for her LEAF a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the term is used in Fourth Amendment cases, is not as clear
as it should be. The difficulty arises because the user is aware that the government
has the information needed to decrypt the LEAF. Although the government has
promised to use that information only in specific circumstances, the government
cannot be estopped and is therefore free to renege. See e.g., Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,434 (1990) (holding that payments from the
Federal Treasury may only be made if authorized by statute, and that erroneous
advice given to a claimant by a government employee does not therefore estop the
government's denial of the claim); Heckler v. Community Health Servs., Inc., 467 U.S.
51, 63 (1984) (noting "the general rule that those who deal with the Government are
expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government Agents
contrary to law"); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (holding
that claimants' lack of knowledge of regulations published in the FederalRegister does
not prevent those claimants from being bound by such regulations).
212 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988).
"' If the agent knowingly released a key improperly, the agent might be a co-
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dures themselves are merely directives. They are not even legisla-
tive rules, which might be subject to notice and comment restric-
tions before being rescinded. A future administration could, if it
wanted, secretly2 14 instruct the escrow agents to deliver copies of
the keys to an intelligence or law enforcement agency, or even
White House "plumbers," thereby violating no law or regulation (the
plumbers, though, would violate Title III when they used the
information).215 Because the chip-unique keys were voluntarily
disclosed to the government, the chip's owner might lack a
"legitimate" (that is, enforceable) expectation of privacy in the
information.
216
If the intercepted communication were an e-mail or a file
transfer, rather than a telephone call, the chip owner subject to an
illegal or inadvertent disclosure by the escrow agents may be in a
particularly weak position if the information ever makes its way to
court: many Title III protections granted to voice communications
do not apply to transfers of digitized data.
217
Shortly before the 103d Congress adjourned, Congressman
George Brown introduced the Encryption Standards and Procedures
Act of 1994,218 which would have waived the sovereign immunity
of the United States for "willful" but unauthorized disclosures of key
fragments by its officials-and excluded liability in all other circum-
stances. 219 In the absence of similar legislation, however, there
conspirator or abettor of the illegal wiretapper.
214 If the executive order were not classified, it would presumably have to be
disclosed pursuant to the Adminstrative Procedures Act. See Adminstrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1988) (requiring agencies to make publicly
available instructions to staff that affect members of the public).
215 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1988) (codifying the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, which makes it illegal to trespass into federal computer systems).
Section 1030(a)(4) proscribes the use of federal computers to defraud. Section
1030(a)(5) makes illegal any unauthorized access to a computer system used in
interstate commerce, as well as the alteration or destruction of records. This last
provision applies only to those acting without authority. See § 1030(a)(5). Thus, the
"plumber" would violate the statute, but arguably the escrow agent would not.21, See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) ("[A] person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.").217 See infra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986).
2's H.R. 5199, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
219 Id. § 31(h)(2). The Encryption Standards and Procedures Act of 1994, if
enacted, would have provided:
The United States shall not be liable for any loss incurred by any individual
or other person resulting from any compromise or security breach of any
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may currently be no monetary remedy even for a "willful" disclo-
sure.
II. THE ESCROWED ENCRYPTION PROPOSAL-LEGAL,
POLICY AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
The Clinton Administration introduced EES through a proce-
dural back door that relies on market power to prevent a substantial
increase in the communications privacy of Americans, an outcome
not authorized by any statute. EES used a standard-setting
procedure but failed to set an intelligible standard. The procedure
violates the spirit, although not the letter, of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).
The Administration is spending large sums of money on a
controversial project in the absence of congressional authorization.
This policy cuts out the legislature, and indeed the public, from the
decision to proceed with EES.220 Only Congress can intervene,
because, as things currently stand, no one has standing to sue. The
Administration's use of a standard-setting procedure to make
substantive policy sets an alarming precedent of rule making with
highly attenuated accountability.
A. EES: The Un-Rule Rule
1. FIPS 185: A Strange Standard
An appreciation of both the novelty and the danger of the
Administration's regulatory approach requires some understanding
of the regulatory device that NIST used to introduce EES. The
Constitution gives Congress the power to "fix the Standard of
Weights and Measures."22 NIST (formerly the Bureau of Stan-
dards) is the agency charged with this responsibility. Federal
encryption standard established under subsection (b) or any violation of this
section or any regulation or procedure established by or under this section
by-
(1) any person who is not an official or employee of the United States;
or
(2) any person who is an official or employee of the United States,
unless such compromise, breach, or violation is willful.
Id.
20 Some have argued that the process also violates the Computer Security Act of
1987. See infra part II.A.3.
22 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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Information Processing Standards (FIPS) are standards and
guidelines intended to improve the federal government's use and
management of computers and information technology, and to
standardize procurement of those goods.2 22 FIPS are also used to
announce national norms in areas of changing technology where
NIST believes industry would benefit from the existence of a
standard. Officially, the only bodies required to conform to FIPS
are agencies within the federal government (and in some cases
government contractors), although in practice they are often
adopted as de facto national standards by industry and the pub-
lic.22 The private sector finds FIPS attractive because they allow
NIST issues FIPS pursuant to § 11 (d) of the Federal Property and Administra-
tive Services Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 379 (the Brooks Act), as amended by the
Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724. Relevant parts
of the authority are codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and 15
U.S.C. § 27 8g-3 (1988). Arguably, neither of these statutes gives either NIST or the
Secretary of Commerce the authority over telecommunications required to issue FIPS
185, because neither statute mentions telecommunications equipment. See National
Bureau of Standards Act of 1901, 15 U.S.C. §§ 271-278h (1988) (describing NIST's
powers prior to Computer Security Act of 1987); Computer Security Act of 1987, 15
U.S.C. § 27 8g-3 (1988) (giving NIST power to develop "standards, guidelines, and
associated methods and techniques for computer systems" and to make standards for
the "cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive information in Federal computer
systems," and defining the latter to include "automatic data processing equipment"
(ADPE)); Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C.
§ 759(d)(1) (1988) (giving the Secretary of Commerce authority to "promulgate
standards and guidelines pertaining to Federal computer systems"); Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949,40 U.S.C. § 759(a)(2) (1988) (definingADPE
to include "any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that
is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement,
control, display, switchinginterchange, transmission, or reception, of data or informa-
tion").
NIST, however, obtained a delegation of authority from the General Services
Administration (GSA) to issue a FIPS relating to telecommunications system, although
the GSA itself argued that the delegation was unnecessary. See Letter from Francis
A. McDonough, Assistant Commissioner, Federal Information Resources Manage-
ment, General Services Administration, to Michael R. Rubin, Deputy Chief Counsel,
NIST (Jan. 28, 1994) (included in volume 3 of the official record of FIPS 185); see also
41 C.F.R. § 201-20.303(b)(2)(i)(B) (1993) (stating, per GSA regulation, that NIST has
substantial telecommunications authority, which is arguably based on an incorrect
reading of the Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591,
§ 101(m), 100 Stat. 3341-335).
22 See Department of Commerce, Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 59 Fed.
Reg. 20,135, 20,136 (1994) [hereinafter Agenda of Regulations] (noting that FIPS
"apply only to the Federal Government" and that in FIPS' development, NIST "works
closely with private industry standard-setting organizations"); Mitch Ratcliffe, Security
Chips Trigger Alarm: Clipper and Capstone Open Digital Back Door, MACWEEK, Apr. 26,
1993, at 1, 1 (stating that FIPS often become de facto standards because the U.S.
government is the largest computer customer in the world).
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conformity with, and sales to, the government, and because the
standards themselves often have technical merit, or at least reflect
a technical consensus of the many public and private interests that
NIST routinely consults before it promulgates a FIPS.224 EES is
FIPS 185.25
One of the more serious complaints about FIPS 185 is that it
fails to set a standard. One member of the NIST Computer Privacy
and Security Advisory Board went so far as to submit a comment
calling the FIPS "content-free."221 Most FIPS describe a conform-
ing device or procedure in sufficient detail for the reader to
understand what it is; FIPS 185 does not. Instead, it states,
"Implementations which are tested and validated by NIST will be
considered as complying with this standard."2 ' FIPS 185 requires
the use of the SKIPJACK encryption algorithm and a LEAF creation
method.22 ' But the standard does not define those terms because
the specifications for both are classified. Instead, FIPS 185
unhelpfully notes:
Organizations holding an appropriate security clearance and
entering into a Memorandum of Agreement with the National
Security Agency regarding implementation of the standard will be
provided access to the classified specifications. Inquiries may be
made regarding the Technical Reports and this program to
Director, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade
229
For an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of standards, see Stanley M.
Besen &Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardiza-
tion,J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1994, at 117,117-18 (asserting that firms manipu-
late standards for competitive advantage); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1994, at 93, 93-95
(warning that pervasive standards lead to inefficient market outcomes in "systems
markets" characterized by products that require other conforming products to
function). But see SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An
Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1994, at 133, 133-35 (arguing that
the negative effects of standards identified by Katz and Shapiro are infrequent, if they
exist at all).
"4 See, e.g., USACM Position on the Escrow Encryption Standard, COMM. ACM, Sept.
1994, at 16, 16 (reporting a press release by the Association for Computing
Machinery stating that "[i]ncreasingly, the standards set through the FIPS process
directly affect non-federal organizations and the public at large").
" See FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6002.
26 Id. at 5999.
27 Id. at 6003.
22 See id.
Id. at 6005. Apparently, individuals who are not members of organizations, or
organizations that do not already supply products or services to the government, need
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Nor does the standard explain what sorts of devices it covers. It
merely states that "[v]arious devices implementing this standard are
anticipated. The implementation may vary with the application.
The specific electric, physical and logical interface will vary with the
implementation." 230  Admittedly, FIPS 185 at least has the good
grace to acknowledge that it is "not an interoperability standard. It
does not provide sufficient information to design and implement a
security device or equipment. Other specifications and standards
will be required to assure interoperability of EES devices in various
applications."231
In sum, FIPS 185 says something to this effect: "Various
electronic devices will contain classified components that will
provide escrowed encryption using a classified algorithm. If you ask
nicely, we may let you use one in your design, and we will tell you
whether we approve of your device and whether we will let you
produce it." This is a strange sort of standard.
2. An End-Run Around Accountability
Such an unorthodox standard is the result of an even more
unorthodox procedure. FIPS 185 is not just a standardless
standard; it is an un-rule rule which seeks to coerce the public by
wielding federal market power to generate a de facto standard
without providing any real administrative accountability. Despite
conforming to the notice and comment procedure of § 553 of the
APA, 2 2 and being duly published in the Federal Register,233 FIPS
185 is not a legislative rule because it does not seek, at least on its
face, to bind the public.234  Nor, despite being on its face an
not apply.230 Id.
231 Id. at 6001.
232 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1988). There is no reason other than long-standing
practice by the NBS and NIST to believe that a notice and comment procedure was
actually required. But see American College of Neuropsychopharmacology v.
Weinberger, [1975 Developments] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) § 38,025 (D.D.C.
July 31, 1975) (holding that publication in the Federal Register combined with the
complexity of the rules themselves meant that the rules in question were subject to
the notice and comment procedures of § 553 of the APA).
" Publication in the Federal Register is only required if the President should
disapprove or modify a FIPS. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(d)(1) (1988).
' A legislative rule is an exercise of power delegated by Congress to an adminis-
trative agency. It can create, modify or remove legal duties, rights or exemptions.
Agencies may make legislative rules through formal or informal rule making. Formal
rule making is rarely used. Informal rule making ordinarily requires publication of
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announcement, is FIPS 185 a nonlegislative rule as the term is
usually understood." 5  Familiar types of nonlegislative rules
include interpretative rules, statements of policy and "publication




Interpretative rules set forth an agency's understanding of a
statutory provision, ajudicial or administrative decision, or another
rule, 3 7 and FIPS 185 clearly does not provide any of these. Nor
is FIPS 185 an example of what Peter Strauss has called "publication
rulemaking" 2 8 in which agency staff, acting pursuant to APA
a notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register, a request for comments, and then
a reasoned attention to those comments before the final rule is promulgated in the
Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1988) (detailing the rule-making
procedures for administrative agencies).
Most FIPS which affect federal procurement are mandatory in the sense that only
federal agencies, but not the public, are required to adhere to them. See Agenda of
Regulations, supra note 223, at 20,136; see also FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,347
(reaffirming FIPS 46-1 "for Federal Government use"); cf. Delegation ofAuthority for
Waivers for Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), and of Procedures for
Waivers for FIPS, 54 Fed. Reg. 4322 (1989) [hereinafter Waivers for FIPS]
(establishing waiver procedures for agencies seeking exemptions from FIPS's
requirements). FIPS 185 states, however, that it is "totally voluntary," even for federal
agencies. FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 5998.
" A nonlegislative rule is a rule which does not exercise a power delegated by
Congress to an administrative agency. It cannot create, modify, or remove legal
duties, rights, or exemptions. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and
Regulatoy Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 383 (defining nonlegislative rules as those
which "do not exercise delegated lawmaking power," but only "provide guidance to
the public and to agency staff and decisionmakers"); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public
Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64
GEO. L.J. 1047,1048 (1976) (using the term "nonlegislative rules" to refer to rules not
promulgated under the direction of the legislature and not in compliance with the
APA's notice and comment procedures). If FIPS 185 is a rule at all, it is formally a
nonlegislative rule in the sense that it does not attempt to create any legal obligations
that bind the public.
FIPS 185 is barely a rule within the APA's definition because the only way in
which it constitutes "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988), is that it allows other agencies to
substitute EES products for DES products. See FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 5999
(suggesting, but not mandating, that federal managers use EES instead of DES).
236 FIPS 185 is far too formal to fall into the miscellaneous category of agency
products. This category includes press releases, informational publications, letters,
etc. Such informal documents are not published in the Federal Register, which
contains only documents "having general applicability and legal effect." Industrial
Safety Equip. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf. Brock v.
Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that the
Federal Register, unlike the Code of Federal Regulations, also contains "policy statements"
that have no legal affect).
237 See Asimow, supra note 235, at 383.
238 PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
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§ 552(a)(1)-(2), publish technical guidelines, staff manuals, or
standards (such as IRS Revenue Rulings) that inform the public of
the agency's likely position in future enforcement, application-and-
approval, or benefit/reimbursement cases. 2 9 Nor is FIPS 185 a
statement of policy. 240 Nothing within the four corners of FIPS
185 establishes or explicates a policy, unless giving federal agencies
the option to purchase certain devices constitutes a policy.
241
On its face, FIPS 185 is a minor internal housekeeping regula-
tion. Whether anyone, inside or outside of the government,
chooses to comply with it is entirely up to her, although FIPS 185
states that use of EES by nonfederal government organizations "is
encouraged." 242 In form, EES is a description of something, as
well as a grant of permission for agencies to use that something
instead of other things they are currently using. Yet despite
explicitly disclaiming any intention of legally binding the public,
FIPS 185 is part of a strategy to coerce the public by use of the
government's market power to create a de facto national standard.
At the same time that the Department of Commerce promulgated
EES, the Department of Justice announced that it was buying 9000
Clipper-equipped telephones, using money from its Asset Forfeiture
Super Surplus Fund, 248 a fund comprised of profits from RICO,
UNITED STATES 157 (1989); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41
DUKE L.J. 1463, 1467 (1992) (noting that "publication rulemaking" is typically effected
by agency staff without participation by the agency's head).
211 Cf Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311,
1333-40 (1992) (discussing nonlegislative documents on which agencies rely for these
categories of cases).
240 For the APA exception for policy statements, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A), (d)(2)
(1988).
241 Prior to FIPS 185, agencies that did not procure waivers were required to use
DES for sensitive nonclassified information. See FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,348.
"Sensitive information" is defined as:
[A]ny information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modifica-
tion of which could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of
Federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under
section 552a of Title 5 [United States Code] (the Privacy Act), but which has
not been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order or an Act of Congress to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy.
15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(d)(4) (1988).
242 FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6003.
243 See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: Public
Encryption Management 2 (Apr. 16, 1993), in "Key Escrow" Information Packet, supra
note 20.
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drug, and other asset forfeitures.2 44 Expenditures from the Asset
Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund require no congressional appropria-
tions. The effect is to cut Congress out of the decision-making
process on an issue which may eventually affect the privacy rights of
most Americans. One need not be an opponent of EES to believe
that a decision with significant potential effects on communication
privacy should have been left to the legislature.
The Department of Defense, too, is considering buying millions
of EES-compliant devices,2 45 although this purchase may require
congressional approval. The government's market power as a bulk
purchaser suggests that, all other things being equal, producer
economies of scale will allow EES-compliant devices to be the
lowest-cost hardware-based civilian cryptography products available.
In addition, EES products will have the significant advantage of
being able to communicate with the government's telephones,
something that any competing technology will lack.246
The Clinton Administration also announced that it will exempt
EES products from the export ban in the ITAR.247 If the ITAR
244 See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (listing the financial sources
of this fund). The Attorney General has discretion to use this fund for law
enforcement purposes and is not required to return money in the fund to the
Treasury. Legitimate uses of the fund include paying informants, equipping
government vehicles for law enforcement functions, and purchasing evidence. See
§ 524(c)(1). The fund is substantial, with about $1 billion in the pipeline at any time,
including money due to be paid to state law enforcement agencies. See William P.
Barr, Attorney General's Remarks, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Nov. 15, 1992, in
15 CARDozo L. REV. 31, 33 (1993). The expected income alone from the Assets
Forfeiture Fund in 1987 was estimated at $150 million. See DavidJ. Fried, Rationaliz-
ing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOCY 328, 365 n.167 (1988) (citing
Budget Appropriations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1986)).
245 The Pentagon plans to purchase about two million Capstone PCMCIA cards
for the Defense Message System. See Messmer, supra note 16, at 20; see also OTA
INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, at 127 n.29 (citing Clinton Brooks, Special
Assistant to the Director, NSA, May 25, 1994, for the statement that the Pentagon is
using Tessera (now renamed Fortezza) cards in the Defense Message System).246 See Dorothy E. Denning, The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime, NEwsDAY (N.Y.),
Feb. 22, 1994, at 35 (noting that "[t]he Justice Department has ordered $8 million
worth of Clipper scramblers in the hope that they will become so widespread and
convenient that everyone will use them").
247 Travelers desiring communications security while abroad should take note that
exemption from export control does not equal exemption from the paperwork
attendant to even a temporary export license. Temporary export licenses for
exportable secure telephones or other telephone security devices require a shipper's
export declaration (SED) which must be acquired before the trip and presented (in
duplicate) to Customs officers upon export and re-import. Unfortunately, Customs
officials who handle passengers have no familiarity with this form, do not know where
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are revised in this manner, EES products will become the only U.S.-
made exportable products offering strong encryption, disadvan-
taging U.S-based competitors further.248  These efforts have
already had an effect: the day that the Administration announced
its plans for Clipper, AT&T announced that its new secure tele-
phone, the 3600, would not use a DES device as originally an-
nounced, but would use Clipper instead.249
The current Administration makes no secret of its hope that the
combination of federal standard-setting, federal purchasing power,
and fine-tuning of export control will allow it to impose a de facto
standard on the public, even though there is no statutory authority
for the standard, and even though Congress has never appropriated
a penny to support the standard. In so doing, NIST has pioneered
a new type of un-rule. It is a rule that the Administration indeed
hopes and intends to have a "practical binding effect," 25' but not
because the rule announces to the public how the agency will act in
the future, nor because the agency intends to act in compliance with
the rule, nor because the rule describes safe harbors for compliance
it can be obtained, and are not necessarily willing to sign the SED because this
function is allocated to the cargo department. At best, attempts to follow the
regulations impose a minimum of an hour's delay in each direction, and probably
more. See E-mail from Matt Blaze, Senior Research Scientist, AT&T Bell Laborato-
ries, to Michael Froomkin (Jan. 6, 1995) (on file with author) (relating an unsuccessful
attempt to go through regular channels and concluding "it just isn't possible for an
individual traveler to follow all the rules").
.48 See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement of the Press
Secretary 2 (Feb. 4, 1994) (explaining that the Department of State "will streamline
export licensing procedures for [these] encryption products), in Key Escrow
Announcements, supra note 196; U.S. Dep't of State, Statement of Dr. Martha Harris,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs: Encryption-Export
Control Reform (Feb. 4, 1994) (detailing reforms of the licensing process), in Key
Escrow Announcements, supra note 196.
249 See Dorothy E. Denning, Encryption and Law Enforcement § 5 (Feb. 21, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Although government procurement
regulations are designed to award contracts to the lowest conformingbidder, without
regard to past services rendered on other matters, cynics may find this action to be
evidence of AT&T's desire to remain in the government's good graces. Paranoids
may point to then-NSA Director Lincoln D. Faurer's statement in 1981 that "our
intention is to significantly reward those DOD suppliers who produce the computer
security products that we need." BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 362. Or, it may be that
AT&T believed this was the patriotic, or commercially sensible, thing to do.
2-' Anthony, supra note 239, at 1328; see Robert A. Anthony, "Wel, You Want the
Permi, Don't You?" Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 37 (1992); cf. Asimow, supra note 235, at 382 (suggesting that
postadoption public participation is the best way to deal with practically binding
nonlegislative rules).
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with existing rules.251 Rather, by issuing the rule (if a rule it be),
the agency hopes to set in motion a train of events that will coerce
the public's compliance.
NIST's use of a FIPS in this manner is an interesting reversal of
the usual circumstance of a nonlegislative rule that an agency
intends to be binding.25 2 In the ordinary situation, an agency has
chosen not to use the notice and comment procedure that charac-
terizes informal rule making under APA § 553, and has simply
issued the rule, perhaps labeling it "interpretative" or "policy guid-
ance." A party seeking to challenge the rule attempts to demon-
strate that the rule is actually legislative and thus invalid without
notice and comment. The aggrieved party argues that it was
entitled to be consulted on the rule and that the agency may not
deprive the party of its right to make comments. Once the
comments are duly docketed, the agency has a duty to take them
seriously and may not reject them without giving nonarbitrary rea-
sons.253 In the classic case, the agency responds by denying the
substantive import of its rule and arguing that, because the rule
breaks no new ground, notice and comment are not necessary.
With FIPS 185, NIST has turned this process on its head. A
proposed version of FIPS 185 was published in the Federal Register,
and NIST solicited comments. 25 4 It received hundreds. 255 NIST
accepted a few, but rejected many others on the disingenuous
grounds that because the standard was entirely voluntary, it could
cause no harm. 25  NIST thus invoked the formally voluntary
251 But cf. Anthony, supra note 239, at 1328-29 (suggesting that most nonlegislative
documents with a "practical binding effect" achieve this end via one of the three
means described in the text).
252 These are sometimes called "non-rule rules." Anthony, supra note 250, at 32
n.2 (defining "non-rule rules" as those that meet the APA's definition of "rules" but
are not promulgated through legislative rule-making procedures).
25. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
33, 34 (1983) (emphasizing the duty of administrative agencies to consider all
important aspects of a problem and to "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action").
251 See A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed
Encryption Standard (EES), 58 Fed. Reg. 40,791 (1993).
215 See FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 5998 (stating that comments were received from
"22 government organizations in the United States, 22 industry organizations and 276
individuals").2
1 See id. NIST ignored comments from five industry organizations and 200
individuals who stated that guarantees were needed to assure that EES would not be
a first step towards prohibition of other forms of encryption. NIST responded that
the standard was voluntary. See id. Eight industry organizations and 181 individuals
said that it was premature to adopt EES as a standard until policy decisions on
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nature of the FIPS as justification for dismissing the concerns of
commentators who saw FIPS 185 for what it was, and what NIST
itself surely understood it to be: an attempt to coerce the public
through market means. NIST simply failed to address the merits of
many important complaints, including those challenging the
security, necessity, or wisdom of its proposal, with the result of
significantly devaluing the opportunity to comment.257 Yet, unlike
most agencies that fail to address the merits of comments received
on a proposed rule, NIST likely has little to fear fromjudicial review
of its decision because there appears to be no one with standing to
challenge its actions.
Even a competing product manufacturer would be unlikely to
have standing to protest a procurement order for products
conforming to FIPS 185.25' As a plaintiff, such a competitor
might be able to argue that had it not been for the permission to
purchase the items granted in FIPS 185, the procuring agency might
have purchased the plaintiffs devices instead. Such a claim would,
however, be risky at best. The plaintiff would have to mount a
convincing case regarding causation, somehow demonstrating that
but for FIPS 185, the plaintiffs products would have conformed
with the agency's requirements; 25 the plaintiff would also need to
encryption had been made. NIST responded that the standard was voluntary. See id.
at 5999. Seven individuals proposed alternate technologies that they believed would
be more cost effective than EES. NIST responded that the standard was voluntary.
See id. at 6000.
1 Section 553's notice and comment requirements reflect Congress's "judgment
that... informed administrative decisionmaking require[s] that agency decisions be
made only after affording interested persons" an opportunity to communicate their
views to the agency. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,316 (1979). By requiring
.openness, explanation, and participatory democracy" in the rule-making process,
notice and comment assures the legitimacy of administrative norms. Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
25' By bringing the case as a protest to a specific contract award, ideally one in
which the competitor had made a tender of goods which conformed to the
preexisting standard, the competitor might be able to distinguish Control Data Corp.
v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981). In Baldridge,
the D.C. Circuit held, effectively, that no one has standing to sue to overturn a FIPS
outside of the bid protest context because the public is outside the "zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by" the Brooks Act. Id. at 290. Bid protests of this sort
go initially to the Board of Contract Appeals of the General Services Administration.
See 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Contract Disputes Act of 1978,
41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
259 To have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "injury that fairly can be traced
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41-42 (1976); see also Valley Forge Christian College
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show that the agency would have been unable to obtain a waiver
from the preexisting requirement that it use a DES product to
protect sensitive information." ° Without an extraordinarily good
factual basis, this barrier is probably insurmountable, leaving the
would-be plaintiff without the direct personal stake in the case
necessary for standing.
One other possible strategy for the plaintiff would be to claim
"reputational" injury to its product or firm on the grounds that the
FIPS would cause customers other than the government to reject its
nonconforming products. Those employing this strategy could then
try to invoke Meese v. Keene261 to overturn the no-standing-to-
challenge-a-FIPS rule of Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge.262
Otherwise, it is very difficult to imagine who might have
standing to sue to overturn FIPS 185. A party seeking relief would
have to argue that the FIPS was not as harmless as NIST claimed,
and that the replies to comments were therefore defective. Just as
NIST was able to ignore critical comments on its draft FIPS by
saying that the standard was optional and hence harmless,263 so
too could it argue that because the standard is nonbinding, no one
has a legal right to demand that a court review it.
264
Should the Administration's attempt to combine technical
standard-setting authority with market power succeed, however,
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473
(1982) (applying the "injury in fact" element of the standing requirement).
260 Cf 40 U.S.C. § 759(d) (1988) (creating waiver power); Waivers for FIPS, supra
note 234, at 4322 (permitting delegation of waiver power).
261 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987) (holding that plaintiff office-holder's allegation that
his constituents would be "influenced against him" by government action labeling
films he sponsored as "political propaganda" sufficed to create standing).
262 655 F.2d 283, 295-97 (D.C. Cir.) (applying the zone of interest test to hold that
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a FIPS), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981).
263 See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 134, 419 U.S. 428, 442-48
(1975) (determining that an agency process without binding effect, even if it leads to
significant practical consequences, is not reviewable under APA § 551); Industrial
Safety Equip. Ass'n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the
joint publication and dissemination of a "Guide" by the National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health and the EPA, branding petitioner's wholly EPA-compliant
protective device much less safe than a competitor's device, was not a reviewable
action, nor a legislative rule: the Guide "established no rule that the regulated
industry must obey"); American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 755 F.2d 1292,
1296-98 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a report was an "educational undertaking"
and did not "impose an obligation, determine a right or liability or fix a legal
relationship," and was therefore not reviewable agency action, despite allegations of
revenue loss to parties resulting from the report).
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many parties will be justly aggrieved. Makers of competing products
will lose market share, and perhaps may be driven out of their
market altogether. Individuals who might have preferred non-
escrowed encryption, if it could be obtained at or near the same
price as an EES device, may find that option closed to them. Such
a policy will establish a new and undesirable process by which the
government will likely be able to avoid the APA in a small, but
significant, class of cases.2 65 Current law does not recognize any
of these injuries, save perhaps the claim of lost market share, as
legally cognizable.2 6' A major decision as to the degree of privacy
to be afforded to U.S. citizens will have been made without effective
congressional or popular participation.
Placing all FIPS, or all standard-setting relating to high technolo-
gy, under the APA would be one way of ensuring that the executive
branch can never again use standard-setting to manipulate the
market for high technology items, at least not without judicial
review for reasonableness. Although this change would vaccinate
against the disease, it would also have undesirable side-effects.
Neither nonbinding national technical standards nor the govern-
ment's internal procurement standards should be litigated. 211 If
a manufacturer is dissatisfied because a national or procurement
standard more closely conforms to a competitor's product than its
own, the proper place to fight that battle is the marketplace, not a
court. EES is a special case because the technology at issue has
social implications far beyond the ordinary FIPS, and because the
government is seeking to use its purchasing power to coerce the
market to achieve an end other than reliability, ease of use, or
technical excellence. It would be a pity if prevention of such special
cases were to force so disruptive a change on a system which
ordinarily seems to work reasonably well.
268
26 See supra notes 232-41 and accompanying text (questioning, in the context of
the APA, the government's seeming nonaccountability regarding FIPS).
266 Cf Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982) (holding that "psychological"
injury is insufficient to confer standing).
267 This is not to suggest that abuses of the standard-setting process are not
properly actionable. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492,503-07 (1988) (denyingNoerr antitrust immunity to parties who manipulated
the standard-setting process of a private association without official authority).
26 "[S]tandards are essential to the achievement of full competition and to the
saving of large sums of money by the Government." Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge,
655 F.2d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981). On the benefits of
standardization, see Michael A. Epstein, Standards and Intellectual Property, in
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Trying to find an avenue for judicial review of a coercive but
formally voluntary FIPS is probably more trouble than it is
worth.26 The greatest procedural problem with FIPS 185 is not
the absence of judicial review but the attempt to evade congres-
sional participation in a decision that may have major social conse-
quences for many years. The solution to this problem is logically,
if not politically, simple. If the executive branch did not have funds
available with which to purchase thousands of EES-equipped
devices, it would have to go to Congress for the money. Congress
could then debate the issue and, regardless of what it decided, the
process would conform with the values of openness, explanation,
and representative democracy which the un-rule rule undermines.
To prevent further abuses of the FIPS procedure, either the Justice
Department's Asset Forfeiture Fund should be returned to the Treas-
ury, or its terms should be narrowed to make it clear that its pro-
ceeds cannot be used to attempt to influence product markets."'
3. Did NIST's Cooperation with the NSA over FIPS 185
Violate the Computer Security Act of 1987?
NIST's relationship with the NSA is poorly documented.7 1
Clipper's critics argue that NIST's adoption of EES in FIPS 185
violated either the letter or the spirit of the Computer Security Act
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/ANTITRUST 1993 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3903, 1993), available in
WESTLAW, TP-All Database.
2.9 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978), presents a particularly great hurdle by its holding that
courts cannot impose on an agency procedural requirements not found in the APA.
270 Narrowing the terms of the Asset Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund is very much
a second-best solution. Not only would suitable amendments to the authorizing
legislation be difficult to draft, but the terms of the fund are already narrow enough
to force money to be spent in inappropriate ways. See generally Alison R. Solomon,
Comment, Drugs and Money: How Successful Is the Seizure and Forfeiture Program at
Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 EMORY L.J. 1149, 1166-91 (1993)
(examining the benefits, drawbacks, and management of federal asset forfeiture
programs as law enforcement and revenue-raising tools).
271 NIST takes the position that all the interesting information is classified or
confidential. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) filed a FOIA
request to obtain documents relating to the NSA's role in FIPS 185. CPSR's
challenge to the denial of their request was dismissed with prejudice on summary
judgment in Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility v. National Inst. of
Standards & Technology, No. 92-0972-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 11,1994). CPSR is currently
appealing the district court's summaryjudgment ruling. See Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility v. National Inst. of Standards & Technology, No. 94-5153
(D.C. Cir. filed June 27, 1994).
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of 1987272 (Act), because, even though the Act was designed to
ensure civilian control of computer security issues, NIST effectively
and illegally ceded its powers to the NSA. 273 NIST and the NSA
have refused to make public any information regarding their
discussions that would show whether NIST complied with the Act.
Consequently, it is currently impossible to make an informed
judgment as to NIST's compliance with the Act.27 4 All that can be
said pending litigation is that NIST has not proved that it complied
with the Act.
275
The claim that NIST violated the Act draws much of its force
from the legislative history of the Act and from NIST's subsequent
close relationship with the NSA, which arguably violates the spirit
of the Act.276 In 1984 President Ronald Reagan issued National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 145, which put in motion a train
of events leading to the Act. NSDD 145 granted the NSA sweeping
powers to make policy and develop standards for the "safeguarding"
of both classified and unclassified information in civilian agencies
and in the private sector.2 77 This transfer to the NSA of authority
2 Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 271,
272, 27 8g-3 to g-4, 278h (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)).
275 See Telecommunications Network Security: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
-munications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 133-35 (1993) (prepared testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Director of Washington
Office, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility); see also Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment and in
Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment at 3-7, Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility v. National Inst. of Standards and Technology
(D.D.C. filed May 18, 1993) (No. 92-0972-RCL) [hereinafter CPSR Motion]
(suggesting that, contrary to the intent of Congress, NIST may have retained "surface"
control of the development of DSS, but allowed the NSA to develop the technical
guidelines).
274 Nor is it clear, if the Act were violated, who would have standing to complain.
See supra text accompanying notes 258-64.
275 See supra note 271 (discussing CPSR's lawsuit against NIST).
276 One slight complication is that NIST's authority to promulgate FIPS 185,
insofar as it relates to the Clipper Chip itself(as opposed to Capstone), probably does
not derive from the Computer Security Act. The Act relates to computer systems and
related equipment, not telephones. NIST's authority to promulgate a telecommunica-
tions standard that applies beyond modems derives from a delegation of authority
from the GSA. See supra note 222. The discussion in the text undoubtedly applies
to more directly computer-related devices such as the Capstone Chip and the Fortezza
PCMCIA card.
277 H.R. REP. No. 153(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 6 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3120, 3158. For a summary of NSDD 145, see Renae A. Franks, Note,
The National Security Agency and Its Interference with Private Sector Computer Security, 72
IOwA L. REV. 1015, 1020-24 (1987).
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over civilian and especially private information was the precise evil
that the Act was designed to cure.278 The legislative history states
that Congress believed that the NSA's "natural tendency to restrict
and even deny access to information" disqualified it from that
role, 279 and Congress therefore rejected the NSA's suggestion,
made in testimony to a House committee, that the Act should
formally place the NSA in charge of all government computer
security.
8°
Nevertheless, the Act does not require a watertight separation
between NIST and the NSA. Instead, the Act directs NIST to
"draw[] on the technical advice and assistance" of the NSA "where
appropriate."281 NIST is also directed to "coordinate closely" with
several other agencies, including the NSA, to avoid duplication of
effort 2 2 and to use the NSA's computer security guidelines to the
extent that NIST, not the NSA, determines they should apply.
283
Soon after the Act became law, NIST and the NSA signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) setting out a detailed
regime of cooperation regarding computer and telecommunications
security issues. 2 4  With one exception, the MOU appears to be
designed to create interagency consultation and to prevent
duplication of effort, as required by the Act. That exception,
though, is not trivial: NIST agrees to submit "all matters" regarding
"techniques to be developed for use in protecting sensitive
information" in its purview to review by a Technical Working Group
comprised of equal numbers of the NSA and NIST staff in order "to
ensure they are consistent with the national security of the United
States." 2 5  If the two agencies are unable to agree, then either
agency can refer the matter to both the Secretary of Commerce and
278 See H.R. REP. No. 153(I), supra note 277, at 22, 25-26, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3137, 3141 (noting that "[g]reater emphasis should be given to
cooperation between the military and civil agencies as well as the private sector in
setting computer security and training goals," and stating that, although the NBS
(now NIST) should work closely with other agencies such as the NSA, the NBS/NIST
should retain "final authority" over the development of guidelines).
2
19 Id. at 21.
280 See id. at 7.
281 Computer Security Act § 2(b)(1).
212 Computer Security Act § 3(b)(6)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(b)(6)(A) (1988).
281 See Computer Security Act § 3(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(c)(2) (1988).
21 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Director of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency
Concerning the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 100-235 (Mar. 23, 1989), reprinted in
SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 442-44 [hereinafter the NSA-NIST MOU].
285 Id. at 444.
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the Secretary of Defense, from where it may go to either the
National Security Council or the President for an ultimate decision.
Meanwhile, "[n]o action shall be taken on such an issue until it is
resolved."
2 8 6
It is clear that NIST and the NSA have had extensive contacts
regarding EES.2 87 Whether these contacts, and in particular the
actions of the Technical Working Group, amount to a violation of
the Act depends on whether EES was referred to the Technical
Working Group, and on how the NIST-NSA relationship worked.
The Act clearly requires NIST to make its own decisions; 288 there
is no statutory authority for NIST to let the NSA make decisions for
it. Just as clearly, the Act requires NIST to consult with the NSA,
although it directs NIST to decide when consultation is appropri-
ate.
2 89
There is no reason, with or without the Act or the MOU, that
NIST could not allow itself to be persuaded by the NSA, so long as
NIST were to keep the ultimate power of decision. 2 0 The MOU
2 86 id.
287 For example, according to a document dated March 26, 1990, obtained by
CPSR under FOIA, at one Technical Working Group meeting the NSA provided NIST
with a position paper, classified "TOP SECRET CODEWORD," that discussed "rea-
sons for the selection of certain algorithms." CPSR Motion, supra note 273, at 7.
2 See Computer SecurityAct § 2(b)(1) (stating that the "specific purposes" of the
Act include assigning to NIST, and no other agency, "responsibility" for standards
and guidelines for the security and privacy of federal computer systems that have
nonclassified information).
289 See id.
2 Agencies are allowed to choose to defer to other opinions, so long as they
make the final decision. See Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 201-02
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that an agency may accept recommendations from the GAO);
City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1025-27 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating
that the separation of powers doctrine requires administrative agencies to be open
to persuasion by congressional committees); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 759, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that
an independent agency may allow itself to be persuaded by the President or
Congress); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(noting that the GAO's significant experience in procurement contracts makes it a
persuasive source of information in procurement cases); A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v.
Resor, 445 F.2d 726, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (upholding the Army's adoption of the
Comptroller General's opinion to set aside the awarding of a bid);John Reiner & Co.
v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 442-43 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (holding it was not arbitrary or
capricious for an executive agency to defer to the GAO, an arm of the legislature, in
order to promote interbranch comity, even if at first the agency disagreed with GAO's
views), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); Henry Spen & Co. v. Laird, 354 F. Supp. 586,
588 (D.D.C. 1973) (allowing a procurement officer to be convinced by the Comptrol-
ler General, even when the latter lacks jurisdiction); United States ex rel. Brookfield
Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 100 (D.D.C.) (holding that a disbursement
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between the NSA and NIST does, however, suggest two scenarios
that would violate the Act. If the working group deadlocked on
some issue, or took votes in which the two NIST members were
outvoted four-to-two (or three-to-two), and if NIST changed its
policies as a result of either of these votes,29 then NIST would no
longer be in the position of allowing itself to be persuaded by the
NSA. Instead, the NSA would be dictating to NIST. This would
violate the Act. As the decision to proceed with EES clearly comes
from the highest levels of the U.S. government,2 92 in the absence
of firm information one cannot reject the deadlock scenario out of
hand. There is, however, some reason to doubt it.
The deadlock scenario was anticipated in a 1989 codicil to the
MOU.293 After members and staff of the House Committee on
Government Operations expressed concern about the apparent
grant to the NSA of an effective veto over NIST's decisions, NIST
and the NSA explained that although the Technical Working Group
had broad jurisdiction as a discussion forum, the appeals process
described in the MOU applied only to "proposed research and
development projects in new areas."29 4 This codicil, signed by
representatives of both agencies with the express intent of binding
their successors, distinguishes between "promulgation of standards
and guidelines" by NIST, which are not subject to appeal, 295 and
officer properly and prudently followed the advice of the Comptroller General), order
affd, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
2" A deadlocked vote does not in itself require NIST to change its mind.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine why an agency might choose to compromise
rather than involve the head of the entire department in a battle with the Secretary
of Defense. In any case, the MOU's involvement of the Secretary of Defense seems
contrary to the Act because the Act envisions no decision-making role for anyone
outside NIST. NIST is part of a chain of command that goes up through the
Secretary of Commerce to the President. Both the President and the Secretary of
Commerce are free to consult anyone in the Cabinet, if they desire, for advice, but
the Act provides no authority for NIST to turn over actual decision-making power,
even in shared form, to the Secretary of Defense.
' "The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Commerce
Department, and other key agencies were involved in this decision [to propose the
Clipper Chip]. This approach has been endorsed by the President, the Vice
President, and appropriate Cabinet Officials." Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House, Questions and Answers About the Clinton Administration's Telecom-
munications Initiative 1 (Apr. 16, 1993), in "Key Escrow" Information Packet, supra
note 20.
2" See Letter from NIST and the NSA to the Hon.John Conyers,Jr. and the Hon.
Frank Horton, House Comm. on Gov't Operations (Dec. 22, 1989), reprinted in OTA
INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, app. B at 201, 205-09.
294 Id. at 206.
25 Id. at 209.
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the "early stage in the standards research and development process-
usually years before a standard is promulgated,"296 from which
appeals are permitted.
Neither NIST nor the NSA have made public statements as to
the involvement of the Technical Working Group in the decision to
promulgate FIPS 185. Whether the agreement required NIST to
refer EES to the Technical Working Group before issuing FIPS 185
is unclear. But it appears that under the distinction set out in the
1989 codicil to the MOU, FIPS 185 would have been within the
jurisdiction of the Technical Working Group, but outside the
appeals procedure. Thus, if the 1989 codicil controlled, the
deadlock scenario could only have applied if NIST preferred an
alternative to EES but was persuaded to use EES against its better
judgment. Alternately, because SKIPJACK was developed by the
NSA, it is entirely possible that the entire EES proposal originated
in the NSA, and that by the time the NSA disclosed SKIPJACK to
NIST, the NSA had decided that neither SKIPJACK nor EES was a
"proposed research and development project[] in [a] new area[]"
under the terms of the codicil.297 Both NIST and the NSA assert
that the appeals procedure has never been used.29 The agencies
contend that the lack of appeals is evidence of the success of their
cooperation."' Whatever the facts, NIST owes the public, and
Congress, a clearer explanation of its relationship with the intelli-
gence community. Congress is entitled to an explicit reassurance
that NIST remains in complete control of security for civilian
federal computer systems as required by the Act. The House and
Senate committees with oversight over NIST should force it to
provide these assurances. If NIST is unable to do so because it has
allowed its judgment to be suppressed by the NSA's veto, then
Congress will need to revise the Computer Security Act to create
stronger incentives for NIST to preserve its jurisdiction-perhaps
even instituting penalties for noncompliance
00
2m Id. at 208.
297 Id. at 206.
29 See OTA INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, at 14.
2 See id. at 14-15 (discussing the NSA's advisory role in working with NIST).
in Cf. id. at 16-18 (proposing seven options for congressional oversight and action
on cryptography).
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4. Who Should Hold the Keys?
The Administration does not intend to give the escrow agencies
the sort of permanence or legal authority that derives from
legislation, much less the autonomy that attaches to an independent
agency or a nongovernmental actor.3 0 1  This decision is very
unfortunate given the crucial role that the escrow agents play in
generating and safeguarding the keys. As ordinary administrative
agencies within the executive branch, the escrow agents fall within
the regular civilian chain of command and have no recourse if
legally ordered to grant access to the keys to the NSA, the FBI, or
future White House "plumbers." The heads of both escrow agencies
serve at the pleasure of the President. The absence of any formal
regulations that would impose delays, along with the absence of
publicity as the rules are changed, prevents even a delaying action
of the kind contemplated in Nader v. Bork.. 2 and United States v.
Nixon.30 3 Under current rules, the terms under which the escrow
agents work can be modified, waived, or amended at any time
without public notice, although the public might be able to find out
about unclassified changes or waivers after the fact via the Freedom
of Information Act.
30 4
Ideally, the escrow agents would be as incorruptible as possible,
possessed of a clear charter setting out their positive and negative
duties, insulated from pressure from the law enforcement and
intelligence communities, and outfitted with secure facilities to store
the list of key fragments (which may, if EES catches on, become one
of the most valuable items of information held by the U.S. govern-
01 See Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, supra note 31, at 7 (critiquing
guidelines set forth by the Clinton Administration for the Information Infrastructure
Task Force).
s 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that the ActingAttorney General
violated Justice Department regulations in firing Watergate Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox without first changing the rules giving the prosecutor limited tenure
in office or finding that Cox acted with "extraordinary impropriety").
418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (rejecting the argument that an action brought by a
Special Prosecutor against the President was nonjusticiable because both parties were
officers of the executive branch); see Michael Herz, United States v. United States:
When Can the Federal Government Sue Itsel?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 893, 952-53
(1991) (noting the limited ability of the President to control executive and indepen-
dent agencies). See generally Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87
HARv. L. REv. 629 (1974) (examining agencies' ability to depart from existing
regulations).
-'- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); ef. APA § 552(a)(2)(c) (1988) (requiring agencies to
disclose changes in regulations that will affect such disclosures).
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ment). They must also be trusted by the public, or the public will
not participate in the EES scheme. With the exception of the
secure facilities, the list of necessary attributes describes a body
resembling the federal judiciary. Not surprisingly, some noted
cryptologists have suggested that the judiciary hold the keys.
305
No doubt the judiciary could acquire the technical competence and
equipment required to generate and secure the keys.
Whether judges could constitutionally hold one or more key
fragments is a close question.-" 6 It is clear that Congress could
not hold the keys, nor could any congressional agent.0 7 Holding
keys is an executive function. It would involve judges in the law
enforcement process at a time when there is no case or controversy
and, as regards the large majority of the keys, no prospect of one.
Because holding keys is an executive function, the judiciary (or
an agency such as the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
which is responsible only to judges) can constitutionally hold the
keys only if the function is "incidental" to its Article III func-
tions.0 ' If the task is more than "incidental," then the principle
of separation of powers requires that it be undertaken by the
executive branch or by private citizens. 309  The court taking
" See, e.g., Silvio Micali, Fair Public-Key CQyptosystems, in ADVANCES IN
CRYPToLoGY-CRYPTO '92, at 113, 116 (Ernest F. Brickell ed., 1993).
' Others see the issues differently. See, e.g., Letter from Johnny H. Killian,
Senior Specialist American Constitutional Law, Congressional Research Service, to
Joan D. Winston, Office of Technology Assessment 1 (March 3, 1994) (concluding
that "placing custody of one of the keys in a federal court or in an agency of the
Judicial Branch would almost certainly pass constitutional challenge"). In earlier
drafts of this Article, I argued that holding keys was outside the judicial function
because it was not "incidental" to any task specified in Article III. I am grateful to
Larry Lessig and other participants in the LEXIS Counsel Connect on-line cryptogra-
phy seminar for persuading me that there are two sides to the question.
" See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276-77 (1991) (holding that the participation of members
of Congress on a committee possessing the power to veto decisions regarding local
airports violated the doctrine of separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 727-32 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller General could not be considered
an executive branch official because Congress reserved the right to remove him by
legislation, and, therefore, he could not constitutionally exercise budget-cutting
powers given to him by the Deficit Control Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-33
(1976) (holding that members of Congress could not constitutionally appoint the
members of the Federal Election Commission).
'o See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 679 (1988) (stating that the Special
Division may constitutionally exercise power to determine jurisdiction of Special
Counsel only if this power is "truly 'incidental' to" its appointment power).
o See id. at 680-81 (noting that separation of powers ensures that "judges do not
... undertake tasks that are more properly accomplished" by other branches).
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custody of the keys would be in a position reminiscent of Hayburn's
Case,"'0 which has long stood for the proposition that neither the
legislative nor executive branches may assign duties to the judiciary
"but such as are properly judicial, and to be performed in ajudicial
manner."3 1 ' Unlike Hayburn's Case, however, the judges would not
be asked to decide anything until the government was granted a
search warrant. The court would presumably disclose the key
fragment(s) along with the ex parte order granting the warrant.
Judges already do a number of things that come close to holding
a key fragment, but each is distinguishable. Courts and their
adjuncts have for many years exercised a wide variety of ancillary
powers such as rule making, and the appointment and supervision
of court personnel, which are "reasonably ancillary to the primary,
dispute-deciding function of the courts." 12  Courts have also
supervised grand juries for many years.3 1 3  More recently, Con-
gress has given the judges and courts additional responsibilities,
including membership on the Sentencing Commission,3 1 4 and the
selection and supervision of independent counsel. 15 Indeed, the
granting of- warrants (and the record-keeping which follows) are ex
parte proceedings, clearly within the Article III jurisdiction of the
courts. Taking custody of a key in advance of any adversary or even
any ex parte proceeding, with the knowledge that most keys will
never be subject to such a proceeding, goes beyond any of these
precedents. Perhaps the closest analogy is the court's marshal who
is instructed to keep order even though there is no reason to believe
Si' 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
s.. Id. at 410 n.t (reporter's note quoting from the judgment of the Circuit Court
for the District of New York, a panel that included Chief Justice Cushing riding
circuit); see United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 50-51 (1852) (relying on
Hayburn's Case); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123 (citing Hayburn's Case and Ferreira for
the proposition that "executive or administrative duties ofa nonjudicial nature may
not be imposed on judges holding office under Article III of the Constitution");
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 591 (1949) (Jackson,
J., plurality opinion) (noting that courts properly are not asked to "participate in any
legislative, administrative, political or other nonjudicial" functions).
3 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 111 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ).
313 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988) (discussing federal judicial
control of the disclosure of federal grand jury matters).
"' The membership ofjudges on the Federal Sentencing Commission was upheld
against a separation of powers challenge in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
371-412 (1989).
... The Supreme Court upheld thejudiciary's role in the selection and supervision
of independent counsel, in regards to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, in
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 684.
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that any particular person will seek to disrupt the court's function-
ing. Even the marshals are an imperfect parallel, however, because
their activities impinge only on persons who come into contact with
the court or with court personnel; holding key fragments could
affect the privacy of many who have no other contact with the
judicial system.
Whether the functions of protecting keys from disclosure and
disclosing keys to facilitate wiretaps are sufficiently ancillary to the
judicial function of issuing wiretap orders and warrants as to be
constitutional is ultimately a matter of taste. The existence of the
FISA court,3 16 whose sole jurisdiction is to receive and rule on
petitions for foreign-intelligence-related surveillance, adds some
support to the argument that holding a key fragment would be
incidental to Article III functions, because the act of holding the
keys is only a little more ancillary to traditional judicial functions
than are the FISA court's actions.
317
As a quick fix, the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of
the Treasury should each immediately issue separate regulations,
published in the Federal Register, defining the role of the escrow
agents in their respective agencies and making clear that the escrow
agents have a legal duty to protect the keys from all release except
as specified in the rules. In the longer term, Congress should pass
legislation vesting the escrow function in independent agencies
specifically created for that purpose."' Although opinions differ
as to the degree of tenure in office that the Constitution allows
Congress to confer on the heads of independent agencies,3 19 there
316 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988); see also supra note 196 and accompanying
text.
317 See Letter from Johnny H. Killian to Joan D. Winston, supra note 306, at 1-3
(discussing the probable constitutionality of placing custody of keys in the federal
judiciary).
... The proposed "Encryption Standards and Procedures Act of 1994" falls far
short of this objective because it allows the President to designate any technologically
qualified agency to hold key segments, so long as such agency lacks the authority to
conduct wiretaps. See H.R. 5199, supra note 218, § 31(d)(1)-(2).
3'9 Compare Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1377, 1389-1400 (1994) (describing the unitary executive theory, which suggests
that there is onlylimited congressional power to restructure the executive department
because the President is vested with the power to control and direct subordinate
officials in their execution of statutory provisions) and Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV.
L. REv. 1155, 1155-71 (1992) (same) and Kevin H. Rhodes, A Structure Without
Foundation: A Reply to Professor Froomkin, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1406, 1416-17 (1994)
(same) with A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U.
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is no debate that independent agency status represents an attempt
to shield a function from political manipulation, and that the
officers of an independent agency have at least political insulation
from dismissal by a President who finds them insubordinate.
Alternate structures, in which EES-product users can choose to
lodge their keys with any one of a number of private escrow agents,
might provide even greater security to users, but at the price of
some additional complexity. One can imagine a system in which
private escrow agents would apply to the Attorney General for
certification as suitably secure and perhaps post bond to ensure that
they would deliver up keys when legally ordered to do so. Although
this system might satisfy both the user's desire for security and the
government's desire for certain access, it introduces practical
problems. The government will still need to keep a master list of
chip serial numbers in order to know which escrow agent has the
key. Furthermore, a private escrow agent would have to charge a
fee, to be paid either by the chip user or the taxpayer. There is also
no particular reason to believe private escrow agents would be less
corruptible than the Justice Department, although if key fragments
were distributed among many different escrow agents, the harm
caused by compromise of any given database would be lessened. 2
B. Unresolved Issues
In testimony to the haste with which the Administration
launched the EES program, important implementation issues remain
unresolved.
L. REV. 1346, 1347-49, 1366-69 (1994) (arguing that the Constitution gives Congress
broad power to structure the President's control over the executive department) and
A. Michael Froomkin, Still Naked AfterAll These Words, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1420, 1427-
30 (1994) (same) and A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency
Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787 (1987) (same).
320 Even more complex, and elegant, solutions exist. See, e.g., Silvio Micali, Fair
Cryptosystems 7-8 (Aug. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Micali
proposes a scheme in which the key can be broken up into any number of parts, and
in which every part of the key is required to decrypt the message. See id. at 7.
Micali's scheme includes a number of elegant but complex refinements, notably a
scheme for making the keyholder "oblivious." Id. at 18, 40-41. By "oblivious" Micali
means that even the trustee need not know the identity of the person whose key has
been requested by the government. See id. at 18. In this way the trustees are unable
to notify the person whose communications are being wiretapped. See id.
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1. Requests From Foreign Governments
The National Security Council is currently considering under
what circumstances, if any, foreign governments would be given the
U.S. family key. 2 ' What if, for example, Great Britain, a friendly
government, wished to decrypt a conversation in which someone
had used a Clipper-equipped telephone to place a call from London
to New York, or from Paris to London? Or suppose a friendly
foreign government stated that it would outlaw the use of Clipper-
equipped telephones unless it were given the family key and
promised that requests for specific chip keys would be honored? 22
At the moment, no policy exists to answer these questions. Giving
a foreign government the family key puts it one step closer to
decrypting all Clipper traffic; this weakens the security that Clipper
is supposed to provide.32 3 Refusing to share information with
foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies risks disrupting
working relationships. Even a compromise solution, in which the
U.S. offers to decrypt messages on a case-by-case basis, might be
unpopular both with Clipper users and foreign governments.
Indeed, some intelligence-sharing treaties may require either that
the tools for decrypting EES traffic be shared with some foreign
intelligence agencies, or that the U.S. do the decryption on
demand.3 24
The proposed Encryption Standards and Procedures Act would
have authorized the President to release keys to foreign govern-
ments when she "determines that such access and use is in the
21 See Telephone Interview with Lynn McNulty, Associate Director, NIST (Aug.
5, 1994).
32 France, for example, prohibits the use of unregistered cryptographic algo-
rithms. See JAMES P. CHANDLER, ET AL., NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
INST. & GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN
LAWS AND REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF COMMERCIAL ENCRYPTION
PRODUCTS FOR VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS § 2.7.1 (Jan. 1994).
323 Recall that, according to the FBI, industrial espionage by friendly foreign
governments is a growing threat to U.S. businesses. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
12" The NSA has long-standing and close relationships with some of its foreign
counterparts. See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 309-37 (discussing BRUSA and UKUSA
agreements with UK, Canada, Australia). The texts of the agreements, which date
back to 1947, remain classified. John Gilmore has filed a FOIA request seeking
information as to these agreements. See Posting from John Gilmore to USENET
Group sci.crypt (Dec. 10, 1993) (on file with author). The NSA has yet to provide
significant documents in response to this request. See Telephone Interview with Lee
Tien (July 27, 1994) (notes on file with author) (Tien represents Gilmore in his FOIA
request).
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national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States." 25 Nothing in the draft legislation would have required
that the owner of the chip ever be notified that her security has
been permanently compromised. It is interesting to speculate
whether a company that suffered a loss due to the release of
commercially sensitive information in this manner would have a
takings or a tort claim against the United States.
2. Clipper Abroad?
Unlike other modern encryption products, Clipper-equipped
products will be exportable. Presumably, U.S. businesses using
Clipper at home will welcome the opportunity to use the same
products in their foreign subsidiaries. Whether other foreigners
would wish to buy a product that comes with a guarantee that the
U.S. government can listen in seems more doubtful.
There are two strategies, however, that the Administration might
use to boost foreign sales. The first would be to share the family
key with foreign governments and perhaps also allow those govern-
ments to be the escrow holders for certain chips. The alternative
would be to manufacture some chips with a different family key,
perhaps even a different family key for each foreign market. The
alternative family key could be disclosed to the foreign government
without compromising the security of the U.S. chips, but two chips
with different family keys would not be able to communicate in
secure mode because they would not recognize each other's LEAFs
as valid.
The globalization of commerce means that sensitive commercial
(and, increasingly, personal) communications cross national borders.
Even if EES becomes the de facto U.S. standard, it is unlikely to
meet with wide acceptance abroad as long as the family key and the
chip unique keys are held by the U.S. government. Why, after all,
should non-U.S. buyers acquire a product designed to make
eavesdropping by the U.S. government relatively easy? 26 Whether
525 H.R. 5199, supra note 218, § 31(e)(2)(B).
S26 One newspaper reported as follows:
The US plan for a Clipper chip ... has raised fears among European
businesses that sensitive information would no longer be secret if it were
vetted by the CIA [or] the FBI ....
... [T]he European organisation representing users of computer
security has rejected the Clinton initiative as "totally unacceptable."
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non-U.S. buyers choose a similar product with a different family key
or a different system entirely, the result will be to make secure
communications between a U.S. party and a non-U.S. party more
difficult. If, as the FBI suggests, the U.S. has the most to lose from
industrial espionage,1 7 EES may hurt U.S. business more than it
hurts anyone else.
3. What Level of Protection Do LEAFs Have Under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act?
The contents of an ordinary conversation on the telephone, even
one that is not encrypted, are a "wire communication" and hence
entitled to the highest statutory protection provided by Title III, as
well as the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. It is clear that
an encrypted voice communication, even one digitized by a Clipper
Chip, remains a "wire communication" for Title III purposes.
3 28
By contrast, an "electronic communication"-digitized data-receives
a lower level of statutory protection, although it is still illegal to
intercept it without a judicial order, and the Fourth Amendment
still applies with full force. A LEAF on its own, without a conversa-
tion following it, would only be an electronic communication, not
a wire communication.
3 29
A LEAF followed by a wire communication presents a complicat-
ed problem under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
•.. [T]he Information Security Business Advisory Group (Ibag), warns
European governments to ignore overtures from the US government aimed
at restricting access to the information superhighway to users who use
encryptions that the government agencies can decode.
Leonard Doyle, Spooks All Set to Hack It on the Superhighway, INDEPENDENT (London),
May 2, 1994, at 10.
3
27 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
328 See S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 ("The conversion of a voice signal to digital form for
purposes of transmission does not render the communication non-wire."). A wire
communication is an "aural transfer" made in whole or in part by wire, cable, or
other like connection (for example, a telephone call). 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1988).
"Aural transfer" means "a transfer containing the human voice at any point between
and including the point of origin and the point of reception." § 2510(18).
" The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), defines an
"electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce, but.., not includ[ing]... any wire or oral communication." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(12).
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1986 (ECPA).- The sensible argument that the LEAF is an
integral part of the conversation, and thus really within the umbrella
of the wire communication that follows, hits a snag due to the
ECPA's definition of the "contents" of a wire communication.
Where formerly Title III had defined the contents of a wire
communication as including any information "concerning the
identity of the parties to such communication,"'3 1 the ECPA
deleted the quoted words, leaving the contents of a wire communi-
cation defined as only the "substance, purport, or meaning" of the
communication.3 2 Fitting a LEAF within that definition requires
a stretch. The LEAF itself contains none of the "substance, purport,
or meaning" of the encrypted conversation-just information about
the identity of the chip needed to acquire those things.
If a LEAF were found to be an electronic noncommunication
legally severable from the wire communication that follows it, the
LEAF would enjoy a lower level of statutory protection than if the
LEAF were treated as part of the content of the wire communica-
tion: (1) Law enforcement officials would not need a warrant to
intercept and record a LEAF, but only the more routine judicial
orders required for pen registers;3 3 (2) under the ECPA, any
Assistant U.S. Attorney would be allowed to seek a court order to
intercept a LEAF, not just the specially designated high-ranking
members of the Justice Department who have authority to seek a
wiretap warrant; 3 4 and (3) the statutory exclusionary rule applica-
ble to wire communications would not apply.3 Without the
" A LEAF followed by an e-mail does not present the statutory problem discussed
in this subsection because both the LEAF and the e-mail are electronic communica-
tions under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). The Fourth Amendment analysis, however, does
apply to a LEAF preceding an e-mail message.
331 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
332 id.
3S See FISHMAN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 199, § 7.3.
31 See id. § 42.1 (Supp. 1993). This difference is more significant than it may
sound. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-29 (1974) (holding that
warrant application initialed by Attorney General's executive assistant, apparently
without the Attorney General's knowledge, was invalid).
sss The statutory exclusionary rule appears at 18 U.S.C. § 2515; see also
§ 2511(1)(d) (making it unlawful to use the contents of any wire or oral communica-
tion obtained in violation of the statute). Unlike the constitutional exclusionary rule,
the statutory rule reaches private action, applies in civil and regulatory proceedings
as well as in criminal cases, and is unaffected by the growing body of exceptions the
Supreme Court has placed on the constitutional exclusionary rule, such as good faith
exceptions, the eventual discovery exception, and the exception for use in rebuttal.
See § 2515. I am indebted to Charles C. Marson for pointing this out to me.
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statutory exclusionary rule, the victim of an illegal interception of
a LEAF would have a civil remedy (and the interceptor would face
possible criminal prosecution), but no right to suppress evidence
would exist unless the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
applied. 3 6
If a LEAF is severable in this manner, it is not as clear as it
should be that the LEAF would enjoy any protection under the
Fourth Amendment. Because decrypting the LEAF with the family
key involves listening to at least a few seconds of the conversation,
the act of intercepting and decrypting the LEAF is a wiretap of an
electronic communication even if the information thus gathered
(the identity of the other chip) is no greater than could be had with
a trap and trace or a pen register. Traffic analysis using pen
registers (which record the numbers called by a telephone) and trap
and trace devices (which record numbers calling the telephone) does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.3 7 Under Title III, howev-
er, both methods require a court order, although an actual warrant
is not required."3 8 Despite being a wiretap, the interception of a
LEAF might not violate the Fourth Amendment if the telephone
user has no reasonable expectation of privacy for the LEAF.
An EES chip user should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, as the term is used in Fourth Amendment cases,33 9 in her
LEAF, but the question is not as free from doubt as it should be.
The difficulty arises because the user is aware that the government
has the information needed to decrypt the LEAF. Although the
government has promised to use that information only in specific
circumstances, it is just a promise, and as the government cannot be
estopped, it is usually free to renege, although in some circum-
stances this action might amount to a denial of due process.
"s See § 2520 (providing for damages and injunctive relief in civil actions).
Congress deliberately omitted an exclusionary remedy. See S. REP. No. 541, supra
note 328, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3577; FISHMAN SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 199, §§ 252.1, 253. I am again indebted to Charles C. Marson for pointing this
out to me.
s-7 See supra note 211.
s See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3123 (1988); supra note 211.
s9 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding that by
voluntarily conveying information to a bank and its employees, the respondent did
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353
(1967) ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which hejustifiably relied while using the
telephone booth .... ").
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A reasonable expectation of privacy requires both a subjective
expectation of privacy and an "objective" recognition that the
expectation is reasonable.34 A Supreme Court that can hold that
one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone
numbers one dials,3 41 or in the checks one allows to be cleared by
one's bank, 4 2 because the information has been disclosed to
others, is capable of holding that emitting a LEAF with knowledge
that the government can decrypt it puts the LEAF in the same
position as the telephone number dialed. 43
A LEAF on its own is not worthless, although it is worth less
than a session key. A large-scale eavesdropper armed with the
family key could collect LEAFs. Because each LEAF contains the
chip serial identifier, it allows a large-scale eavesdropper to conduct
traffic analysis344 without having to gain access to a telecommuni-
cation provider's equipment to set up thousands of trap and traces
or pen registers. If satellite or microwave telephone signals are
being monitored, the LEAF-monitoring method of traffic analysis is
undetectable.145  Furthermore, if one is trying to collect all the
calls from a particular machine in an attempt to decrypt them,
decrypting the LEAF allows one to know which calls to record and
file for future reference. Of course, if the eavesdropper has a
warrant, in most cases all of this and more is easily obtained from
the telephone service provider.3 46 It would be monstrous, though,
to have a rule that said the government could acquire the LEAF for
traffic analysis after falsely promising the American people that EES
340 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
" See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
312 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that a depositor had no legitimate
expectation of privacy, and hence no protectable Fourth Amendment interest, in
copies of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank because the depositor, by
writing the checks and making the deposits, had taken the risk that "the information
[would] be conveyed.., to the Government").
143 For an argument that Miller should be reversed on the theory that the Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), creates a reasonable expectation of
privacy in bank records, see Bercu, supra note 90, at 407-09.
s" See supra text accompanying note 155 (noting that intelligence agencies learn
important information by tracking who calls whom).
" Because telephone traffic carries with it switching information regarding the
destination of the call (information that is used by the service provider's routing
system), a sophisticated eavesdropper may in any event have access to some of this
information with less effort.
6 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
§ 103(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4279, 4280 (1994) (requiring telephone-service providers to
make systems wiretap-ready).
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would be secure. A court construing both the objective and
subjective prongs of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
would have a moral obligation to take this into consideration.
C. Voluntary EES Is Constitutional
Even if EES is unreasonable either on general principles or as
the term is used in the context of the APA, it is still not unconsti-
tutional. The Constitution allows many unreasonable things,3
47
and actions that might violate the APA if made by rules within its
purview are not necessarily unconstitutional if achieved by other
means. So long as it remains purely voluntary, EES creates no
fundamental constitutional problems.
EES involves five distinct government actions. First, the govern-
ment launched the program by making the classified SKIPJACK
algorithm available to a manufacturer of EES-compliant products.
Second, the government announced FIPS 185.348 Third, it is pur-
chasing large numbers of EES-compliant products for its own use.
Fourth, it is encouraging others to use EES products. Fifth, it is
setting up the two escrow agents who will hold the keys. As a
group, these five actions amount to attempting to create a voluntary
national key escrow system. Individually and collectively these
activities are constitutional.
The NSA controls access to the SKIPJACK algorithm and the
details of the LEAF. 49 To date it has made the design of the
chips available to one manufacturer, Mykotronx, Inc."' ° FIPS 185
indicates that only organizations already holding security clearances
need apply for access to the classified specifications for SKIPJACK.
A party lacking such a clearance might have a legitimate grievance
if she were unable to obtain such clearance for the purpose of
-4 See, e.g., Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 223 (1930) (allowing seizure
of absconding husband's property without prior notice); Henry P. Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 396 (1981) (arguing that, contrary to
arguments of "due substance" theorists, the Constitution does not protect some
external concept of morality and does not guarantee perfect government).
"' The legal issues raised by publication of FIPS 185 are discussed above, see supra
parts II.A.1-3, and will not be repeated here.
... See FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6004 ("The National Security Agency maintains
these classified specifications and approves the manufacture of devices which
implement the specifications.").
" The only members of the public who have had access to the inner workings of
SKIPJACK are a committee of five outside experts who were asked to examine
SKIPJACK so that they could opine on its security. See SKIPJACK Interim Report,
supra note 187.
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manufacturing EES-compliant microcircuitry. 5 Indeed, if poten-
tial competitors to the NSA's chosen manufacturer were denied
access to the information they needed to compete with Mykotronx,
they could plausibly allege an equal protection violation or a
violation of procedural due process. The government has no
obligation, however, to make the algorithm available to anyone who
asks.
352
The government is free to purchase goods and services to meet
its needs.35 3  Choosing to purchase EES-compliant devices does
not, in itself, create any constitutional issues. Such purchases are
constitutional even if they work as an indirect subsidy to producers
who are able to lower their unit costs. The government could
constitutionally provide direct subsidies if Congress chose to do
SO."' Nor is the denial of market share to non-EES products
unconstitutional, even if it has the effect of raising their costs.
The government's cheerleading for EES is also constitutionally
permissible. So long as no one is threatened with sanctions for
failing to adhere to EES, the government is entitled to make its case
to the nation for why we would all benefit if we accepted a limit on
our privacy.
3 55
351 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (holding that absent
explicit authorization from either the President or Congress, an executive agency may
not create a security program that deprives a civilian of employment without an
opportunity to challenge an adverse determination of security clearance); Adams v.
Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 235, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding no due process violation
when an applicant for security clearance is afforded a noncustodial interview and is
able to cross-examine witnesses supplying adverse testimony, and when the agency
follows clearly enunciated standards and makes adequate findings with respect to such
standards), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
352 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1988) (criminalizing the unauthorized disclosure of
cryptographic information).
353 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 n.12 (1980) (describing the
government's "'unrestricted power... to fix the terms and conditions upon which
it will make needed purchases'" (quoting Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113,
127 (1940))).
3' Congress thus far has made no such choice in this case. Congress has given
the Attorney General discretion to spend monies in the Asset Forfeiture Super
Surplus Fund. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (describing the Fund).
Conceivably, a court might imply a limit to this delegation and might find that the
attempt to determine industrial policy in its use of the Fund exceeded the implicit
limit. Because there appears to be no one with standing to sue, this must remain
speculation.
3-' See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 479-80 (1987) (holding that government
labeling of environmental films as "political propaganda" is permissible government
speech); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699-708
(1970) (stating that government has the same freedom of speech as individuals);
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The government has the authority to act as an escrow agent,
56
although there is some question from where the money to pay for
the escrow agents would come. Preliminary estimates put the cost
of the escrow agents' activities at $16 million per year.5 7 These
expenses may require a separate appropriation by Congress,
although both NIST and the Justice Department have funds which
arguably might be tapped for this purpose.""
Nor is the program as a whole unconstitutional. Even if EES
becomes widespread, everyone in the U.S. remains free to use any
alternative, subject only to restrictions on his or her ability to export
the cryptosystem to foreign correspondents.35 9 It remains feasible
and legal to preencrypt a message with an ordinary, non-escrowed
cipher, feed it to an EES-compliant device, and make even EES
communications potentially unintelligible to eavesdroppers armed
with the chip unique key. 6 ° Indeed, the very ease with which EES
MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: PoLmcs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERIcA 301 (1983) (stating that courts "create more problems than
they solve" when they attempt to limit government expression); Steven Shiffrin,
Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 622 (1980) (encouraging application of a
balancing test when analyzing government subsidies such as election funding and free
speech); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theomy of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 917 (1979) (arguing for
legislative rather than judicial control of government speech); cf. Beth Orsoff, Note,
Government Speech as Government Censorship, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 229, 234 (1993) ("[AIIl
government criticism carries with it an implied threat. Thus, the test should be
whether the average reasonable person receiving the government criticism would
perceive it as a threat, not whether the government official can legitimately execute
the threat."). By this standard, cheerleading for Clipper seems to be permissible,
although I have qualms about speaking for "the average reasonable person." If,
however, the government pressured AT&T into abandoningits plans to manufacture
a DES-based secure telephone and to substitute a Clipper telephone instead, then the
cheerleading stepped over the line to impermissible coercion.
I See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 272(c)(22) (1988) (catchall provision for authorized NIST
activities).
357 See FIPS 185, supra note 14, at 6000.
3 sTheJustice Department has available the Asset Super Surplus Forfeiture Fund.
See supra note 244 and accompanying text (describing the Fund). NIST has a cost
recovery fund and a working capital fund. See 15 U.S.C. § 278b (1988).
3'9 Seesupra text accompanying note 165 (discussing the prohibition of the export
of cryptographic software and hardware).
'0 Preencrypting a message with an ordinary, non-escrowed cipher, then feeding
it to an EES-compliant device preserves the user's ability to make it appear that the
message complies with EES while, in fact, partially subverting it. A casual inspection
of the message will reveal a valid LEAF, and decrypting the LEAF with the family key
will reveal a valid chip serial number. Decrypting the message with the session key
obtained from the escrow agents, however, will reveal nothing more than a new
ciphertext. Eavesdroppers remain able to do traffic analysis by logging the serial
numbers of chips as they communicate, but they cannot hear or read the message
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can be circumvented raises the possibility that the government
might some day require key escrow as the price of using strong
cryptography.
D. Voluntary EES Is Unlikely to Displace Un-Escrowed Cryptography
As we have seen, the Administration's stated motives for EES are
not entirely consistent. The government's "hard sell" depicts non-
EES encryption as a threat that needs to be avoided."6 1 By con-
trast, the "soft sell" treats EES as part of a package deal that the
government offers to those who desire government-certified encryp-
tion.362 EES is officially voluntary, yet has been introduced in a
manner which the government hopes will induce, even coerce, the
public to choose an EES system over any alternative.3 63 In the
Administration's view, it is unreasonable to object to a plan that
protects users from communications interception by everyone
except the government. At worst, the Administration argues, under
EES the user bears no greater risk of government interception
(authorized or not) than do unencrypted callers.36 4 Supporters
also point to the need to help law enforcement in the fight against
dangers such as terrorism.
3 65
Perhaps the most often repeated objection to EES is that
because people remain free to use alternatives, EES can never
achieve its stated objective of maintaining law enforcement access
to private encrypted communications. Clipper's critics suggest that
it can catch only stupid criminals. The government has had three
responses to this argument. The least subtle response has been that
without cracking the additional cipher.
FIPS 185 prohibits the postencryption of an EES message. Because FIPS 185 is
only a nonbinding standard, it remains legal to postencrypt output from a Clipper or
Capstone Chip, making the LEAF unintelligible to even a public servant armed with
the family key. Although it is legal, it is also fairly pointless: if you are going to use
another system on top of Clipper/Capstone, why bother using the latter at all?
Because postencryption violates FIPS 185, an EES-compliant device will refuse to
decrypt a postencrypted message, making postencryption of limited utility.
61 See supra text following note 139; supra text accompanying note 152.
362 See supra text accompanying note 141.
s3 See supra text accompanying notes 242, 246.
" Although forceful, this argument ignores the difference between illicit govern-
ment surveillance that requires an intrusion into the home or office, and illicit
surveillance that does not. If the White House "plumbers" who committed the
Watergate burglary had been able to wiretap the Democratic National Committee
from the outside, there would never have been a "third-rate burglary" detected by an
alert security guard, and President Nixon would have completed his second term.
365 See supra text accompanying note 143.
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criminals are often dumber than one thinks. 66 A more subtle
response is that Clipper may at least postpone the perhaps inevita-
ble adoption of an alternative cryptosystem that the government
cannot easily decrypt. 6 7 The most subtle response notes that a
secure communication requires compatible equipment on both ends
of the line.168  If Clipper becomes the de facto standard, the
existence of a few other devices on the margin will have a negligible
effect on the government's ability to monitor electronic communica-
tion when it feels required to do so.
The government's policy centers on its hope that EES will
become the market standard. Yet EES will not likely triumph in the
marketplace, even with the advantage of massive government
orders, because many people find something deeply distasteful
about being asked to buy a product that comes ready-made to be
wiretapped, even if the wiretapping is designed to be conducted
only in limited circumstances by duly authorized bodies. In light of
likely technical developments, a "threat assessment" of the
government's potential surveillance capabilities makes the thought
of wiretap-ready communications even more disturbing. This is
especially true considering the history of government abuse of civil
rights and the possibility, however remote, that government policy
might change even as escrowed chip keys remain fixed. In any case,
for e-mail, alternatives to EES already exist which are cheaper, more
flexible, and appear to offer more complete privacy.3 69 Non-EES
" "You shouldn't over estimate the I.Q. of crooks." Stewart A. Baker, Data
Encryption: Who Holds the Keys?, Address Before the Fourth Conference on
Computers, Freedom and Privacy 8 (Mar. 24, 1994) (transcript on file with author)
[hereinafter Baker Talk]. Indeed, criminals often use ordinary telephones, which can
be wiretapped.
S67 As Stewart Baker, then the General Counsel of the National Security Agency,
put it:
The concern is not so much what happens today when people go in and buy
voice scramblers; it is the prospect that in five years or eight years or ten
years every phone you buy that costs $75 or more will have an encrypt
button on it that will interoperate with every other phone in the country
and suddenly we will discover that our entire communications network,
sophisticated as it is, is being used in ways that are profoundly anti-social.
That's the real concern, I think, that Clipper addresses. If we are going to
have a standardized form of encryption that is going to change the world we
should think seriously about what we are going to do when it is misused.
Id. at 9.
3'8 See Denning, supra note 206, at 322.
9 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing how to get military-grade
cryptography on the Internet).
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voice products are also becoming available.
70
1. Why EES Worries People
In addition to the fundamental objection that the government
should not expect Americans to facilitate the decryption of their
private communications, opponents of EES have raised numerous
technical and practical objections to the plan. Critics of EES take
what appears to the government to be an absolutist stand, refusing
to trust anyone with the key needed to decrypt their communica-
tions.3 71 To these critics, the government's protestation that EES
adds nothing to current authority because federal law enforcement
agencies need the same court order to obtain a wiretap on an EES-
equipped phone as on an ordinary telephone, makes no impression.
The critics believe either that current rules provide insufficient
privacy or that the government cannot be trusted to follow the
rules.
a. Preserving the Status Quo Prevents a Return to the Status Quo Ante
The status quo that EES seeks to preserve was not always the
status quo. At the time Americans adopted the Bill of Rights,
private communications were far more secure than they are today.
Before the invention of the telephone, the radio, and the long-
distance microphone, one could have a secure conversation by going
for a quiet walk in an open field. Correspondents could encrypt
letters in ciphers that no government could break.7 2 Modern
170 A program called AquaFone (so named because the imperfect voice quality
makes it sound as if the user is speaking under water) is now available from Cogon
Electronics of Culpeper, Virginia. The program uses RSA encryption under license
from RSA Data Security, Inc., and sells for $129. The hardware requirements are
minimal, as the two parties to the conversation need only a personal computer, a
sound card, and a modem. The company markets a demonstration disk via its 800
number.
Phil Zimmermann, the creator of the popular shareware encryption program
PGP, and a development team are currently working on a voice version of the PGP
encryption program, nicknamed "Voice-PGP." The program will be released early in
1995, although the actual name has not yet been selected. See Telephone Interview
with Philip Zimmermann (Dec. 6, 1994) (notes on file with author).
"71 The classic line, now almost a battle cry, isJohn Barlow's proclamation, "[Y]ou
won't pry my fingers from its private key until you pull it from my cold dead hands."
Steven Levy, Crypto Rebels (June 1994), available online URL http://wwn.cggnus.com/
gnu/crypto.rebels.html.
" The Vigenbre cipher, which was well-known by the 17th century, was still
considered unbreakable at the time of the American Revolution. See KAHN, supra
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communications have expanded the circle of people to whom we
speak, but this fact alone does not mean that communications
should necessarily be more vulnerable. Only recently, it was
difficult for the government to trace incoming calls, even pursuant
to a court order, because the telephone company used slow
mechanical tracing devices. Having overcome that problem, the FBI
now seeks legislation to keep it from becoming difficult again."I
Nor does the possibility that more criminals will avoid detection if
the privacy available to individuals were to be increased necessarily
mean that choosing to increase privacy is unwise. The Bill of Rights
already includes many provisions that prefer to provide protections
to all citizens at the cost of providing benefits to the guilty.'7 4
What this means is that some value judgments must be made, and
that someone will have to make them.
Where once people only had to worry about eavesdroppers they
could see, today an eavesdropper could be anywhere that a
telephone signal happens to reach. Modern encryption seems
note 6, at 214-21. Indeed, Scientific American wrongly described the cipher as
uncrackable as late as 1917. See id. at 148. For a fascinating discussion of Thomas
Jefferson's creation of a cryptosystem still good enough to be used by the U.S. Navy
in 1967, see id. at 192-95.
s' See Nelson, supra note 138, at 1139-42 (describing preliminary draft of digital
telephony legislation, requiring the alteration of electronic communications
equipment to enable the government to maintain its current wiretapping capabilities).
s74 The individual's right to remain silent harms the prosecution; England recently
abridged the right for that reason. See CriminalJustice and Public Order Act, 1994,
ch. 33, §§ 34-37 (Eng.) (providing that courts may draw adverse inferences from the
silence ofsuspects). As a result of this legislation, the warning to be given to suspects
upon arrest has been tentatively redrafted to read:
You do not have to say anything. But if you do not mention now something
which you later use in your defence the court may decide that your failure
to mention it now strengthens the case against you. A record will be made
of anything you say and it may be given in evidence if you are brought to
trial.
Jason Bennetto, New Police Caution Alarms Legal Experts, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug.
20, 1994, at 4 (quoting the draft text of the revised caution to suspects). Whether
this change will ever take effect-or survive judicial review if it does-is open to
question because the European Court of Human Rights recently ruled that the right
to remain silent is guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights
(formerly known as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms), Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221. See Funke v.
France, 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1993) (holding that Article 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right against self-incrimina-
tion); Ying H. Tan, Use of DTI Interviews Unfair, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 30,
1994, at 30 (reporting the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights
in Saunders v. United Kingdom).
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poised to re-create the functional equivalent of the privacy available
in the late 1790s and to apply it to devices like telephones and
modems, which are increasingly replacing face-to-face contact and
letter writing.375 EES would prevent this return to the status quo
ante, at least when the government is the eavesdropper.
Widespread adoption of Clipper and massive wiretapping ability
would make traffic analysis more feasible for a hypothetical
government oblivious to the need to obtain warrants. If Clipper is
widely used, communications encrypted by other means signal that
the user may have something to hide. Indeed, for this reason some
privacy advocates encourage the routine use of strong cryptography
in all communications in order to provide a cloaking effect for all
personal communications. If everyone makes a habit of using
strong cryptography, the presence of an encrypted message will
never be probative of a guilty conscience or a need for secrecy.
s76
b. EES Does Not Preserve the Status Quo
EES is designed to be inflexible, and this inflexibility will impose
costs on some users. Each chip's unique key is permanently
branded onto it. If for some reason that key should be compro-
mised, the user has no choice but to throw away the chip and buy
a new one. This inflexibility is designed to make it impossible for
users to select keys that are not held by the government.8 77 Under
Title III, the government must notify persons who were the subject
of an authorized wiretap. 378 This duty is unaffected by EES, but
" The important difference between the 18th and 20th centuries is that rapid
communication is possible over much greater distances.
176 See, e.g., PGPT User's Guide, supra note 73 (maintaining that the encryption
habit increases the supply of privacy, a public good, to everyone).
-7 "It is very important to change keys frequently to minimize" the problem of key
compromise. SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 27. In a software-based cryptographic
system, changing the key is as easy as pressing a button. The Clinton Administration
has repeatedly said that it would be pleased to consider software-based escrow systems
if they could be designed in a way that prevented users from using non-escrowed
keys.
S378 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1988) (requiring that "[w]ithin a reasonable time
but not later than ninety days after" the termination of a wiretap, the persons named
in the wiretap order and "such other parties to intercepted communications as the
judge may determine in his-discretion that is in the interest ofjustice," must be given
notice of the wiretap and of the fact that communications were intercepted; and
providing that upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to allow access
to such portions of the intercepted communications for inspection as the judge
believes to be warranted by the interests of justice).
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the consequences change. Previously there was little a citizen
needed to do after receiving notice that her phone had been
tapped, but now she must consider whether the disclosure to law
enforcement officials of the chip unique key in her telephone means
that she should replace it, at a cost,379 or whether she should trust
government assurances that all records of the key kept outside the
escrow agents have been destroyed.8 0
Two telephones communicating via Clipper Chips use the same
session key; thus, when Alice and Bob are talking, a public servant
with a warrant for Alice's telephone does not need to know Bob's
chip key to decrypt the conversation. Knowing Alice's chip key will
suffice because Alice's LEAF will provide all the information
needed. Except for the fact that he is overheard talking to Alice,
Bob's security is unaffected by a wiretap of Alice's line.
But if Alice and Bob are using e-mail to communicate and Cap-
stone Chips381 to do their encryption, both Bob and the public
servant are in a different position. Capstone is designed to allow
Alice and Bob to use public key encryption for their session
keys." 2 Bob's Fortezza card knows Alice's public key, but not her
private key or her chip key, so the only LEAF it is able to generate
is one that relies on Bob's own chip key. This creates a lot of work
for a public servant tapping Alice's line. Every time she gets an e-
mail from a new correspondent, the public servant must decrypt its
LEAF with the family key and then go to the escrow agents and
request the chip unique key for the new person. If Alice communi-
cates with many people who use Fortezza cards, the public servant
may wind up holding a large, and rather valuable, collection of chip
keys.
Because the wiretap order mentions only Alice, the court that
issued the order has discretion to decide whether each of the people
whose session keys were disclosed should be notified of that
There is no comparable notification duty for those wiretaps governed by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988).
The EES proposal requires no additional reporting to the subjects of such wiretaps.
379 In practice, replacement is likely to require getting a whole new telephone
because one of the aims of the EES program is to make it difficult to obtain chips to
reverse engineer.
so Upon the expiration of the authority for a wiretap, the public servants are
supposed to destroy the key information stored in the Decrypt Processor. See
Denning & Smid, supra note 194, at 68.
Capstone is the e-mail version of Clipper, based on the Fortezza chip.
Capstone provides both encryption and digital signatures. See supra note 16.
"82 See Capstone Chip Technology, supra note 16.
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fact."'8 Although nothing in Title III or the Attorney General's
rules requires it, Bob deserves to be told.
Bob's Fortezza card will provide his digital signature as well as
encryption for his e-mail. Disclosure of the digital signature key to
anyone who might even be tempted to sell or make use of it would
represent an enormous risk to Bob. Anyone holding Bob's key to
his digital signature could masquerade as him and authenticate any
transaction or correspondence (for example, in a raid on Bob's
electronic bank account) with a digital signature that Bob would be
powerless to disavow. Fortunately, current plans for Fortezza call
for separate keys for message encryption and for digital signa-
tures. 4 Furthermore, although Bob is powerless to change the
chip unique key used to encode his e-mail's LEAF, Fortezza will
allow him to change the key to his digital signature. Thus, Bob's
ability to uniquely identify himself remains secure.
c. The Status Quo May Not Be Stable
The biggest divide between the two sides to the EES debate
concerns what they consider relevant. The Clinton Administration,
as one would expect, operates on the assumption that government
officials can be trusted to act legally.-" 5 The government therefore
measures the social consequences of its proposals by the effect on
the government's lawful powers and the citizen's lawful rights.
Critics of EES, however, tend to discount this approach. Instead,
they undertake a threat analysis of the EES proposal.8 6 It may
seem a little silly to conduct a threat analysis of a cryptographic
proposal by a government that has the raw physical power to do far
worse things than spying on its citizens, but in fact threat assess-
ment enjoys a grand tradition. The Framers of the Constitution did
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
s See Letter from Dorothy Denning, Professor and Chair, Computer Sciences
Department, Georgetown University, to Michael Froomkin 3 (Sept. 17, 1994) (stating
that the Tessera/Fortezza card stores separate keys for signatures) (on file with
author).
' "[I]t must be presumed that federal officers will adhere to the law .... "
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
' Threat analysis is a long-established intelligence approach in which one assumes
the worst about everyone and attempts to measure their capabilities for harm without
regard to their likely or actual motives. See, e.g., ANDREW COCKBURN, THE THREAT:
INSIDE THE SOVIET MILITARY MACHINE 6 (1983) (describing American threat
assessment of the Soviet Union's military capabilities).
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not assume that "men were Angels.""' They conducted a kind of
threat analysis of government and decided that it could only be
trusted if centralized power were divided in a manner that set
interest against interest so as to protect the governed. 8 s The
impulse to rely as much as possible on structures that force proper
behavior by government officials, and as little as possible on simple
trust, is as old as the nation.3 89
Some of these threats to the status quo are political. For
example, one glaring risk in the current EES proposal is that the
escrow procedures exist entirely within the purview of the Attorney
General, and could be changed at any time without any warn-
ing.
390
Some threats consist of individual or official malefaction. In this
age of spy scandals, it is always possible that the escrow agents,
through negligence or corruption, may allow someone to acquire
the full list of key segments.3 9 ' The method by which keys are
generated for the EES chips may lend itself to subversion of the
escrow scheme from the moment the keys are generated. Although
hedged with elaborate safeguards, all keys are generated by a single
computer in a secure facility closed to public inspection. Because
users are not in a position to monitor the key-generation procedure,
they must trust that the published safeguards are being observed.
Even if the risk of surreptitious subversion of the generation process
were small, the risk to communications security would be greater
than if the keys had never been escrowed.
-"7 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
388 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 30 (1977) (discussing Federalist No.
51, in which Madison justified the separation of powers as necessary to control the
abuses of government).
'" So too, of course, is the counterbalancingimpulse that government is pointless
if it is not effective. See e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819) (rejecting a strict construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause in favor of
a construction recognizing broad discretion in the means Congress may adopt to
achieve its legitimate ends).
"0 Taking the keys out of escrow and using them might constitute a taking under
the Fifth Amendment. In addition, if the government promises the public secure
communications, and then attempts to go back on its promise, there may be grounds
for arguing that the government violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment by its bait and switch tactics.
s91 "Key management is the hardest part of cryptography, and often the Achilles
heel of an otherwise secure system." SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at xvi. For examples
of Cold War NSA security breaches, see KAHN, supra note 6, at 690-97.
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Some threats to the status quo are mathematical. Critics argue
that a classified algorithm such as SKIPJACK-one that has not been
exposed to merciless attack by academic cryptologists-is less likely
to be secure than one subject to full peer review and thus might
contain an intentional, or even unintentional, "back door" that
would make it vulnerable to sophisticated mathematical attack."9 2
The government's response is that SKIPJACK's security is certified
by the NSA 93 and by independent outside experts.9 4 The gov-
ernment classified SKIPJACK not out of fear that publicity might
expose the algorithm to attack, but to prevent users from enjoying
the fruits of its research and development while at the same time
avoiding participation in its key escrow system. The Administration
argues that SKIPJACK is so strong that, were people able to use it
without escrowing their keys, they would undermine the goal of easy
government access to encrypted messages that EES is designed to
achieve.39 5 Some critics remain unsatisfied by this explanation.
They argue that because EES is voluntary, the government should
not attempt to require compliance with the escrow procedure as a
condition of using SKIPJACK.396 The Administration's response
is, in effect, that if users wish to use a government-certified
algorithm, they should be prepared to take the bitter with the sweet.
Some threats, perhaps the most realistic, are technological.
Changes in technology are likely to make electronic eavesdropping
easier, more effective, and cheaper for the government. 9 7 All
other things being equal, a rational government would react to these
changes by increasing the use of electronic eavesdropping. As
government eavesdropping becomes more affordable, the reason-
able citizen's desire for countermeasures ought to become greater
as well.
-" See infra note 767 and accompanying text (discussing the cryptological com-
munity's mistrust of secret algorithms).
so See Key Escrow Initiative Q&A, supra note 134, at 2-3.
The SKIPJACK algorithm was reviewed by a panel of five distinguished outside
experts who gave it their interim seal of approval. See SKIPJACK Interim Report,
supra note 187, at 1, 7.
... See, e.g., Baker Talk, supra note 366, at 6-10 (noting that communications
protected by SKIPJACK cannot be intercepted without access to the escrow keys).
39 See, e.g., DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 31, at 4.
397 See Robert Garcia, "Garbage In, Gospel Out": Criminal Discovey, Computer
Reliability, and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1053 (1991) (noting that
"changes in technology are likely to increase the use of electronic eavesdropping
significantly").
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The technological threat appears more ominous if one tries to
forecast what the government may be able to do a decade from now.
Currently, all the wiretapping technology in the world is useless if
there is no one to listen to the conversations. The physical and
economic limit of what is currently achievable is demonstrated by
the East German Ministry for State Security, the Staatsicherheit or
Stasi, which at its peak was probably the most sophisticated and far-
reaching internal surveillance organization ever created. Out of a
population of 17 million, the Stasi had 34,000 officers, including
2100 agents reading mail and 6000 operatives listening to private
telephone conversations, plus 150,000 active informers and up to 2
million part-time informers.398 Together they produced dossiers
on more than one out of three East Germans, amounting to one
billion pages of files.399 There are fifty-nine times more tele-
phones in the United States than there were in East Germany and
about fifteen times as many people.40 The people (and machines)
in the United States make about 3.5 trillion calls per year.4" Even
if every telephone service provider in the United States were to
record every conversation in the country, the government could not
make use of the tapes because it lacks the human resources
necessary to listen to them. Even if political constraints could not
prevent the growth of an American Stasi, the financial constraints
are currently insurmountable.
40 2
The cost may soon shrink dramatically. EES, the Digital
Telephony initiative,403 and advances in computer power, com-
bined with the increasing links among federal databases 40 4 and
118 See Steven Emerson, Where Have All His Spies Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 16, 16, 19; see also Stephen Kinzer, German Lawmakers Back Steps
to End Spy Taint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A6 (stating that the Stasi had "about
85,000 agents and several million part-time informers").
399 See Emerson, supra note 398, at 19, 30.
4' See Ferdinand Protzman, German Overhaul Is Led by Phones, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1992, at DI (reporting 1.8 million telephones in East Germany before unifica-
tion-one for every 10 citizens); see also 1993 U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note
38, at 563 (reporting 141.2 million telephone lines in the United States and an
average of 9.773 billion telephone conversations per day).
401 See 1993 U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 38, at 563.
41 In 1993, the average cost of installing and monitoring a wiretap on a single
subject (including those who may have had more than one telephone) was $57,256.
See WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 145, at 5.
411 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994); supra note 138 and accompanying text. For a discussion of an
earlier version of the Digital Telephony initiative, see Nelson, supra note 138.
40 The government has already connected the databases of the Customs Service,
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advances in voice recognition protocols, suggest that soon the
physical constraints on widespread, government-sponsored eaves-
dropping may disappear. Voice recognition already allows comput-
ers to pick out a particular speaker's voice from the babble of
communications; 40 5 combined with the power to search for partic-
ular words in all messages, this advance in technology will provide
a powerful surveillance tool to any government willing to use it.
Computers can monitor communications twenty-four hours per day,
and they do not collect overtime. In the absence of physical and
economic constraints, the only constrictions on omnipresent
automated telephone monitoring will be legal and political.4"'
2. Spoofing EES: The LEAF-Blower
EES suffered a glancing blow when a researcher at AT&T
discovered that it could be "spoofed," albeit with some effort.
407
The protocol that produces the spoofs quickly became popularly
known as the "LEAF-blower." 40  The process is too slow to be of
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the IRS, the Federal Reserve, and the State
Department. In addition, the Counter Narcotics Center, based at CIA headquarters,
"includes agents from the FBI, the DEA, the NSA, the Defense Department, the State
Department, and the Coast Guard." Garcia, supra note 397, at 1065. For an alarming
account of the sweeping information compiled by the Treasury Department for its
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the few legal controls
applicable, see Bercu, supra note 90. The existence of a large, and linked, database
is potentially alarming because the United States has relatively few data protection
statutes along the lines of the European and Canadian models. See Paul Schwartz,
Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal
Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J 1321, 1324 (1992) (stating that from an
international perspective, the American legislative response to computer processing
of personal data is incomplete); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK: ELECTRONIC DELIVERY OF FEDERAL
SERVICES 144 (OTA-TCT-578 1993) (warning that the "extensive use of computer
matching can lead to a 'virtual' national data bank, even if computer records are not
centralized in one location").
4. See John Markoff, A Spy Agency Gives Contract to Cray Computer, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1994, at D3 (reporting that Colombian police were able to track down drug-
cartel leader Pablo Escobar Gaviria by programming U.S.-supplied computers to
monitor cell-phone frequencies for his voice).
o See Garcia, supra note 397, at 1056 n.39 (collecting sources that detail
technological advances).
... See Blaze, supra note 16 (manuscript at 131) (announcing the discovery of a
method enabling cryptographic communication among EES processors without the
transmission of a valid LEAF).
" Spoofing has no effect on the security of the communication other than to
block access by eavesdroppers armed with the family key and the chip unique key.
See id. (manuscript at 138-39).
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much practical value in Clipper-telephone communications, but
might be applied by patient e-mail users of Capstone.
09
Recall that an EES-compliant device will only decrypt a message
that comes headed by what appears to be a valid LEAF. A "spoof"
replaces the real LEAF with a simulacrum, which appears valid to
the decrypting chip, and even an eavesdropper armed with the
family key, but is in fact meaningless. Because the actual session
key is negotiated before the LEAF is generated, the absence of the
true session key in the LEAF does not affect communications so
long as the LEAF passes the validity check. Because the decrypting
chip checks the LEAF against a 16-bit checksum, 410 which uses the
actual session key as one of its inputs, a spoof requires more than
just copying a LEAF off a previous transmission. A spoof is
computationally complex because the spoofer must use trial and
error to generate a LEAF with a phony session key whose checksum
equals that of the real session key. Each time the LEAF-blower is
used, an average of 32,768 LEAFs must be tried before one works.
Tests at AT&T on a prototype Capstone-based PCMCIA card
showed that, on average, more than forty minutes would be needed
to produce a valid-looking spoof.
411
A LEAF-blower allows a "rogue" EES device to communicate
with all other EES devices, without the recipient even knowing that
the sender has spoofed the chip. Because it can take up to forty-two
minutes to counterfeit the LEAF, however, the technique is likely to
remain primarily of interest only to very patient people. Interest-
ingly, NIST claims it was always aware that a LEAF-blower device
could be constructed. It found the risk acceptable, however,
because the technique was too slow to be of practical value.412
Furthermore, because the chip serial number contains a
field identifying the manufacturer as well as the chip, anyone who
decrypts a rogue LEAF with the family key will be able to recognize





410 See supra note 193.
411 See Blaze, supra note 16 (manuscript at 141). Blaze cautions that the test
machine was not optimized for speed. See id. (manuscript at 140). On the
probabilistic nature of this trial-and-error approach, see supra text accompanying
notes 123-24.4'12 See National Inst. Standards & Technology, supra note 193, at 1.
41S See Posting from David Koontz to Cypherpunks Mailing List (Aug. 25, 1994)
(on file with author).
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Thus, the way to feign compliance with EES remains preen-
crypting the message with some other system before using the EES
device. Preencryption is undetectable with the family key alone, but
is discernable only after the escrow agents have released the chip
unique key. Preencryption is relatively easy for e-mail, but it is
difficult to achieve for real-time voice communication. As a result,
an eavesdropper armed with the family key should be in a good
position to monitor compliance with EES even if she cannot decrypt
the conversation.4 14
E. What Happens If EES Fails?
The large number of government orders and the attraction of
SKIPJACK for those who need the security of a government-
certified cryptosystem means that EES is unlikely to disappear,
especially in its incarnation as the Fortezza PCMCIA card.415 It
has, however, engendered enough opposition to put its future in
doubt.4 6  The existence of other well-regarded ciphers such as
triple-DES4"7 and IDEA, 4 8 combined with public distaste for
wiretap-ready telephones, the many unanswered questions about the
proposal, the cost premium for a hardware (as opposed to a
software) cryptosystem, the inflexibility of EES, and the lack of
interoperability with foreign cryptosystems will likely combine to
render EES if not stillborn, then at least stunted.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to speculate as to how the
government will react if EES fails to become the standard.
Assuming the government does not come up with a wholly new
system to replace EES, two options exist:4 1 (1) do nothing; or (2)
""' This monitoring capability might become particularly significant in the event
that the government attempts to make key escrow mandatory.
415 See supra note 245 (noting large Defense Department orders of EES-compliant
devices).
416 In a poll of one thousand Americans, two-thirds found it more important to
protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct
wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it. See
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Who Should Keep the Keys?, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 90. Doubt
about the Clipper has already become part of popular culture. See, e.g., D.G.
Chichester et al., Tree of Knowledge: Conclusion: Softwar, DAREDEVIL, Sept. 1994, at 1,
5 (describing Clipper Chip as a "suspicious tool"); People Are Talking About: Big
Donut, VOGUE, Sept. 1994, at 172, 172 (asking: "How to cope?" with the Clipper
Chip).
417 See supra text accompanying note 131.
418 See infra note 791.
41 In either case, the government may choose to augment the hardware-based EES
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forbid the use of unescrowed cryptography. The former option is
implicit in the "soft sell" policy that describes EES as the price the
private sector must pay for using SKIPJACK. If the private sector
refuses EES, it forgoes SKIPJACK. That is its privilege, and no
further government action would be needed.
The latter of the two approaches is implicit in the "hard sell" for
EES. If widespread unregistered encryption can be used by "drug
dealers, terrorists, and other criminals," to quote the White
House,420 then the country cannot afford to do nothing. But with
unregistered cryptography already widely available, the only option
may be a "Digital Volstead Act."
421
The Clinton Administration considered banning unescrowed
encryption, 22 but then concluded that it would "not propose new
legislation to limit use of encryption technology."42 A future
administration might, however, reverse this decision, particularly if
an investigation into a high-profile crime, such as the terrorist
bombing of a major building or the management of a child
pornography ring, was found to have been seriously hampered by
the use of advanced cryptography. The current Administration has
carefully left that option open for its successors, noting that by
forgoing a ban on unescrowed encryption it is not "saying that
with a software key escrow standard. A software key escrow system seeks to achieve
the same ends as the Clipper Chip without requiring that users purchase expensive
and potentially inflexible hardware. Software-based systems are potentially more
vulnerable to reverse engineering, thus increasing the danger that the cryptosystem
might be converted to non-escrowed uses. Although adding software key escrow
would increase the consumer appeal of escrowed encryption, there is a good chance
that even this would not suffice to create a widely used standard.
420 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, supra note 292, at 1.
423 Hoffman et al., supra note 26, at 112 (comparing a ban on unescrowed
cryptography to the prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s).4" See e.g., Brock Meeks, Cyberwire Dispatch (Feb. 22, 1994), available online
URL gopher://cyberwerks.com:70/OOh/cyberwire/cwd/cwd.9402.22b (describing a
classified April 30, 1993 memo from the Assistant Secretary of Defense stating that
law enforcement and national security agencies "propose that cryptography be made
available and required which contains a 'trap door' that would allow law enforcement
and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered
communications"); John Mintz & John Schwartz, Chipping Away at Privacy?, WASH.
POST, May 30, 1993, at HI (describing the Administration's contingency plan to ban
unescrowed encryption).
423 LANCE J. HOFFMAN ET AL., CRYPTOGRAPHY: TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGY AND
POLICY 8 (1993) (quoting Memorandum fromJohn Podesta, Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary, The White House, toJerry Berman, Digital Privacy and Security
Working Group on Key Escrow Encryption Technology (July 29, 1993)).
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'every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable
commercial encryption product.'"4 24
The government is clearly willing to require that communica-
tions be made wiretap-ready, at least when it knows that its dictates
can be enforced. 25 It is also "apparent that the law enforcement
community is still looking for a way to meet its surveillance needs
in the age of digital communications."4 2 If EES fails, the law
enforcement and intelligence communities, at least, will seek to
preserve their capabilities. Legislation requiring that all strong
cryptographic programs use key escrow may be the only remaining
solution. As FBI Director Freeh commented, "If five years from
now ... what we are hearing is all encrypted" material that the FBI
is unable to decipher, then the policy of relying on voluntary
compliance with EES will have to change.4 27 "The objective is for
us to get those conversations whether they are .. . ones and zeros
[or] wherever they are, whatever they are, I need them."4 2 As a
result, Part III examines the legal problems that would flow from
hypothetical legislation making key escrow mandatory.
III. WOULD MANDATORY KEY ESCROW BE CONSTITUTIONAL?
A prohibition on the use of unescrowed strong cryptography for
telephone or electronic mail would require federal legislation'
29
Imagine a terrorist attack on a major public building in which the
conspirators protected their telephone conversations with unbreak-
able encryption. Aroused by such evidence of the dangers of
promiscuous private encryption, Congress might well pass a law
requiring that anyone using a strong cryptosystem to communicate
by any electronic means acquire a license from the government.
Licensed users of cryptography would either have to escrow all
424 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, supra note 292, at 2.
425 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the Digital Telephony
initiative).
426 DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 31, at 8.
42 Louis Freeh, Keynote Luncheon Address at the International Cryptography
Institute (Sept. 23, 1994) (excerpt on file with author).
428 Id.
4" See Memorandum from Robert D. Poling, Specialist in American Public Law,
American Law Division, Congressional Research Service 2-5 (Oct. 4, 1994) (discussing
current legal authority to mandate private use of the Clipper Chip, and noting that,
although the Computer Security Act allows the government to set cryptographic
standards for its computers, this authority applies only to the federal government's
computer systems and not to civilian computer systems) (on file with author).
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session keys or use a LEAF-equivalent so that the government could
determine the session key without informing the parties to the
communication that an investigation is in progress.
With a mandatory key escrow statute of this type, the govern-
ment would be asking all citizens to surrender their collective right
to technical countermeasures to the "progress of science in
furnishing the Government with means of espionage." 430 Manda-
tory key escrow could use a hardwired chip key like Clipper, or it
could be implemented through software designed to resist tamper-
ing by the user.411 Would such a statute be constitutional?
This Part provides a whirlwind survey of relevant First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendment doctrines, as well as evolving conceptions of
the constitutional right to privacy. The focus is analytic and
predictive, rather than prescriptive. This Part attempts to sketch
how courts, given the current state of the law, would be likely to
rule on the constitutionality of a mandatory key escrow statute. It
suggests that mandatory key escrow would reduce associational
freedoms, chill speech, and constitute an intrusive search. The
statute also might require a form of self-incrimination and would
infringe personal privacy rights. Under existing doctrines, however,
the analysis of the constitutionality of mandatory key escrow
legislation would turn on the court's balancing of the potential costs
to personal privacy against the perceived gains for law enforcement
and national security. On balance, private, noncommercial users of
encryption probably have a Fourth Amendment right to resist
mandatory key escrow and might have a First Amendment claim as
well. Whether commercial users or corporations would have such
410 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
43' Trusted Information Systems has proposed a software key escrow protocol to
NIST. See Telephone Interview with David Balenson, Senior Computer Scientist,
Trusted Information Systems (June 10, 1994).
Some of the constitutional questions discussed below arguably might be avoided
by focusing on standing. It might be said that because the chip (or commercial
software) is produced by a corporation, and it is the corporation that is required to
give the government the keys, the ultimate user thus lacks standing to complain (and,
in some cases, the corporation lacks the rights enjoyed by natural persons). Because,
however, much encryption occurs in software rather than hardware, and software
typically generates new session keys for each communication, and these keys would
not ordinarily be escrowed but for the legislation, the discussion in the text assumes
that it is the end-user, whether a person or a corporation, who will have to give the
government the information it seeks.
For ease of exposition, the text uses the phrase "chip key" to refer to any unique
identifying key that allows LEAF-like access to a session key, whether the "chip key"
is implemented in hardware or software.
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rights under current doctrines is less clear. Even the vitality of the
rights of private noncommercial users appears to be a distressingly
close question given the current state of civil rights doctrine and the
great importance courts accord to law enforcement and national
security. A description of a more holistic, less myopic, view of the
issue, as well as most recommendations, are deferred until Part IV.
The volume of relevant constitutional doctrine imposes a greater
and more harmful constraint on this discussion than the need to
summarize ruthlessly and put off (most) prescriptions until Part IV.
Even though constitutional cases establishing a right to some form
of privacy recognize that the right is grounded in the First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments," 2 the four areas remain doctrinally
distinct. Reflecting this separation for ease of exposition risks
survey at the price of synergy and synthesis. It is important to
remember that this is an area in which the whole is, or at least
should be, greater than the sum of its clause-bound parts.
A. First Amendment Issues
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble.""' Scholars debate whether the
First Amendment is a means or an end, and, if a means, then to
what end.4"4 Whether understood as protecting self-realization as
an end in itself or political expression as a means of preserving the
political process, conventional First Amendment doctrine offers
numerous obstacles to mandatory key escrow. None, strangely, is
insurmountable.
Mandatory key escrow affects public debate in three ways. First,
mandatory key escrow forces users of cryptography to disclose
432 The right to privacy also derives from the Third and Ninth Amendments. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (describing how the Third and
Ninth Amendments create "zones of privacy"). This Article does not discuss the claim
that the Second Amendment protects cryptography. That argument gains some force
from the ITAR's classification of cryptography as a "munition," although the extent
to which an administrative classification should have constitutional implications is
certainly debatable. The topic would, however, require a discussion of the federal
power to regulate weaponry that is beyond the scope of this Article.
"s U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
3
4 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing whether freedom of speech is a means to some end or is an end
in itself). For the view that the most important function of the First Amendment is
to promote and protect democracy, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1972).
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something they would prefer to keep secret, which amounts to
compelled speech. Second, it chills speech by persons who seek to
remain either secure or anonymous when speaking, whether for fear
of retribution or other reasons. Third, it chills the associational
freedom of persons who wish to band together but do not wish to
call attention to the fact of their association or to their participation
in a known association.
1. Compelled Speech
Mandatory disclosure of keys can be viewed as compelled
speech, akin to laws requiring disclosure of financial records by
charities and of market-sensitive information by publicly traded
companies. 43 5 The Supreme Court treats compelled disclosure of
noncommercial information as akin to a content-based restriction
on speech, demanding the strictest scrutiny." 6 To pass this test, a
regulation must be motivated by a compelling state interest, avoid
undue burdens, and be narrowly tailored.4 7 Thus, in Wooley v.
Maynard43 1 the Supreme Court struck down a New Hampshire law
requiring automobiles to display license plates bearing the state
motto "Live Free or Die."4"9 The statute was held unconstitutional
because the state required citizens to use their private property as
mobile billboards for the state's message, even though the state, by
allowing cars to carry disclaimers too, compelled no affirmation of
belief.
44 °
... Whether mandatory key escrow is compelled speech does not turn on how the
government gets the keys. Although under EES the keys are provided to the
government before the user buys the product, the user is still forced to send a LEAF
to use the encryption. Similarly, with software encryption, users will be required to
communicate the session key to the government in some fashion.
41 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) ("Mandating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the
speech."). Thus, compelled disclosures of fact enjoy the same protection as the com-
pelled expressions of opinion in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (hold-
ing that requiring cars to display license plates bearing New Hampshire's state motto
is unconstitutional), and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624,642 (1943) (holding that compellingindividuals to recite the pledge of allegiance
and salute the flag violates the First Amendment). But see R. George Wright, Free
Speech and the Mandated Disclosure of Information, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 475, 496 (1991)
(arguing that a less stringent standard would have been more appropriate in Riley).
437 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
4- 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
4
3
9 Id. at 713.
440 See id. at 720 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (stating that citizens are not "forced to
affirm or reject that motto").
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Mandatory key escrow differs from the issues in the leading
mandatory disclosure cases44 1 because the disclosure is not public.
Instead, the government says it will keep the chip key secret and will
decrypt the LEAF only for good cause. The Supreme Court has
stated that mandatory disclosure laws will be sustained only if there
is "a 'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation' between the
governmental interest and the information required to be dis-
closed."442 If the state interest in telling donors how charities use
their contributions is sufficient to justify a mandatory disclosure
statute,4 45 then the state interest in crime fighting and national
security should be sufficiently compelling too.444  Because the
government keeps the key in escrow, the rule is more narrowly
tailored than a public disclosure rule.44' The critical question
therefore is whether the burdens-forcing the user to utter a LEAF
or the equivalent and introducing doubt as to the security of what
might otherwise be a completely secure system-are worth the gain
to national security and law enforcement. This is a value judgment,
one that cannot be settled easily by doctrinal argument, yet one that
the courts would have to make to resolve the issue.44 6 As with
441 In addition to Wooley, these include Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring newspapers
to provide a right of reply to political candidates), and Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642
(finding a compulsory flag salute and recital of the pledge of allegiance unconstitu-
tional).
442 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (citations omitted); see also Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (holding that
disclosure of membership lists requires a "substantial relation between the
information sought and a... compelling state interest").
44' This was the issue in Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 781
(1988).
44' The Supreme Court described the protection of national security as a compel-
ling state interest in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964) ("That
Congress ... has power to safeguard our Nation's security is obvious and unargu-
able."). See generally Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1130 (1972) (surveying whether national security claims
justify the use of secrecy, surveillance, and emergency police powers). But see
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 789 F. Supp. 430,436 (D.D.C. 1992)
("[S]ecurity concerns do not, under the American system of ordered liberty, ipso facto
override all constitutional and privacy considerations. The purpose of national
security is to protect American citizens, not to overwhelm their rights."), vacated, 983
F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
"' See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (noting that
regulation is not narrowly tailored when a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not advance the state's content-neutral goals).
446 The Supreme Court's practice of balancing constitutional rights against public
needs has attracted considerable criticism. For a survey of the issues, see Symposium,
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many value judgments, reasonable people may differ on the
outcome; the less speculative the claim that harms will flow from
allowing promiscuous unescrowed encryption (that is, the more
terrorists who have managed to blow things up because they used
secure telephones), the more likely the courts would find that the
measure passed strict scrutiny insofar as it compels speech.44
2. Chilling Effect on Speech
"Few thoughts are more threatening to people who value auton-
omy than the thought of being constantly watched .... -44"
Because mandatory key escrow applies to all who use strong
encryption, regardless of what they say, it can be considered a
content-neutral regulation of speech and association.449 As such,
it is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny involving a balanc-
ing of interests. Because mandatory key escrow directly regulates
a mode of speech, the review will be more searching than it would
be if the statute had only an incidental effect on speech.
450
When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy: Reconciling Public Values and Individual
Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 707 (1994).
447 See TRIBE, supra note 434, § 12-24 (discussing the "public forum" freedom of
speech doctrine).44
8 SCHEPPELE, supra note 1, at 302; see also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE
SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 344-45 (1988) (describing the
phenomenon of "anticipatory conformity" among persons who believe they are being
observed).
44 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459-62 (1994)
(holding that a must-carry provision that distinguished between speakers solely by the
technical means used to carry speech is not a content-based restriction); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984) (allowing reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, provided such restrictions are not
content-based); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) (describingan antisign ordinance as content-neutral); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981) (holding a time, place, and
manner regulation on all solicitations at a state fair to be content-neutral).
The act of disclosing the key mightbe viewed as compelled speech, in which case
the compulsion would be subjected to strict scrutiny. See supra part III.A.1. Merely
recording public information may not rise to the level of a chilling effect on speech.
The Ninth Circuit rejected a Free Exercise challenge to warrantless government tape
recordings of public church services at which parishioners discussed smuggling
Central Americans into Arizona. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 694-96
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). Aguilar is inapposite, however,
because the chip key is not public.
4 See generally David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 491 (1988) (discussing the development of the less-exacting incidental
regulation doctrine for examining free speech concerns); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) (exploring the nature of content-
neutral review); Ned Greenberg, Note, Mendelsohn v. Meese: A First Amendment
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In practice, the Supreme Court balances the following factors:
(1) the extent to which speech is likely to be chilled; (2) the degree
to which the prohibition falls unevenly on a particular group as
opposed to society at large; and (3) the availability of alternate
channels of communication.4 5  It seems evident that speech will
be chilled, although exactly how much is uncertain.45 2 To the
extent that the prohibition falls unevenly on society, it will tend to
affect those with access to computers and scrambler telephones.
This is not the group whose speech the Court traditionally takes the
most care to protect, because wealthy and well-educated people
have the greatest access to alternative channels of communica-
tion.45 The critical issue is likely to be whether mandatory key
Challenge to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 369 (1990)
(distinguishingbetween regulations that incidentally restrict speech, which are subject
to a lower level of scrutiny, and those that directly curtail speech, which are subject
to a higher level of scrutiny).
451 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994) (applying the
balancing test); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (same); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (same); TRIBE, supra note 434, § 12-23, at 979
(stating that the Supreme Court's balancing test examines "the degree to which any
given inhibition ... falls unevenly upon various groups").
The discussion in the text assumes that a court would not find that mandatory
key escrow has shut down a traditional public forum. Although mandatory key
escrow most severely affects private conversation, it also affects USENET-which may
be a public forum or, in universities, at least, a series of linked public fora-and other
bulletin board services which may be considered private fora, cf. Allen S. Hammond,
IV, Regulating Broadband Communications Networks, 9 YALE J. REG. 181, 219 (1992)
(including "certain subscription technologies" within the definition of private fora),
by making anonymous posting of messages less secure. If a court were to find that
mandatory key escrow seriously inhibited a traditional public forum, the court would
likely find the statute unconstitutional. See TRIBE, supra note 434, § 12-24, at 987
(noting that the designation "public forum" serves as "shorthand for the recognition
that a particular context represents an important channel of communication in the
system of free expression").
4-2 On the use of computers for political speech, see Eric C.Jensen, Comment, An
Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the First Amendment, 39 FED. COMM.
L.J. 217, 218-24 (1987) (noting that the growth of various types of computer bulletin
boards "'brings back the era of the pamphleteer'" (quoting Lee Dembart, The Law
Versus Computers: A Confounding Terminal Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1985, at D3)).
Leaving aside the special case of anonymous speech, discussed below, see infra part
III.A.3, the extent to which encrypted speech (for example, on Clipper telephones)
is likely to be chilled is an empirical question on which it would be difficult to collect
evidence. It is hard to measure how many people will not use encrypted telephones
or e-mail if they are not confident the system is secure. It is harder still to measure
how their speech changes as a result. A court considering this issue is likely to
assume that the government will act legally and decrypt EES communications only
when authorized. Courts are unlikely to accept that reasonable people might
disagree, although whether they would, and how much, is the central empirical
question.
453 See TRIBE, supra note 434, § 12-23, at 979-80 (describing how the Court seeks
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escrow "'unduly constrict[s] the opportunities for free expres-
sion.' " '  Because a mandatory key escrow scheme promises to
release keys only with just cause, the Court would likely find the
constricting effect to be relatively minor. Ultimately, however, the
standard collapses into a balancing test in which distinguishing
"due" from "undue" content-neutral restrictions requires highly
contextual judgments.45 5
3. Anonymity and the Freedom of Association
"[L]ets hold more chat.
In private then.
I am best pleased with that."
456
Anonymity is "essential for the survival of [some] dissident
movements." 45 7 Identification requirements "extend beyond restric-
tions on time and place-they chill discussion itself."458 They also
can infringe the right of assembly.459 Cryptography allows unprec-
to avoid upholding communicative limits with a disproportionate impact on the poor,
because the poor have the fewest alternative communication channels).
45 City of Ladue, 114 S. Ct. at 2045 n.13 (1994) (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 58 (1987)); see also Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985) (noting that part of the test is whether an "incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest" (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968))).
4-5 Perhaps as a result, in a recent First Amendment case no fivejustices were able
to agree on a disposition, even though the Court unanimously agreed that the
intermediate standard applied. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (voting to
remand so that five justices would agree on a disposition of the appeal, despite his
belief that the Court should affirm). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitu-
tional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (discussing the implications
of Supreme Court "balancing").
46 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, LOVE'S LABOUR'S LOST act 5, sc. 2, 11. 228-29 (Richard
David ed., 1956).
4' TRIBE, supra note 434, § 12-26, at 1019; see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982) ("The Constitution protects against the
compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs."); Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (noting that the right to associate freely
promotes democracy); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (refusing to
permit compelled disclosure of political affiliation); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
65 (1960) (striking down a statute forbidding distribution of anonymous handbills);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (warning that forced
disclosure of affiliation with certain groups may inhibit freedom of association).
"' Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 628 (1976) (Brennan,J., concurring
in part).
459 See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-24 (1960) (holding, on
freedom of assembly grounds, that the NAACP did not have to disclose its
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edented anonymity both to groups who communicate in complete
secrecy and to individuals who, by sending electronic mail through
anonymizing remailers, can hide all traces of their identity when
they send mail to other persons.40 Combined with the ability to
broadcast messages widely using services such as the Internet,
anonymous e-mail may become the modern equivalent of the
anonymous handbill. Unlike the anonymous handbill, the anony-
mous remailer can allow two-way communication in which neither
party can determine the identity of the other party.46' By encrypt-
ing their return addresses using a public key belonging to the
remailer, all parties can carry on a conversation without revealing
their identities. If the parties use a series of secure remailers as
intermediaries, and if they encrypt the text of their messages, no
one will be able to connect the parties to the communication.
Cryptography thus enhances communicative privacy and anonymity.
Key escrow threatens this anonymity in two ways. First, and of
greater significance, it makes it possible for eavesdroppers armed
with the escrowed key to identify the ultimate source and actual
content of encrypted e-mail messages being sent out to anonymous
remailers. Second, key escrow makes it possible for eavesdroppers
armed with the escrowed key to identify the person to whom the
target of a wiretap is speaking; without the key, the only informa-
tion gleaned would be call set-up information, which merely
identifies the telephone on the other end of the conversation.
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has struck down
several statutes requiring public disclosure of the names of members
of dissident groups, 462 stating that "[i]nviolability of privacy in
membership lists).
o See Timothy C. May, The Cyphernomicon §§ 2.9, 8.5 (Sept. 10, 1994), available
online URL ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/tc/tcmay/cyphernomicon. A hypertext ver-
sion of this document is available from URL: http://www.apocalypse.org/pub/
nelson/bin.cgi/cypernomicon.
461 See id. § 8.5.
462 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91
(1982) (holding that the "Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of
political associations"); Hynes, 425 U.S. at 623 (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(asserting that a disclosure requirement puts an impermissible burden on political
expression); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,485-87 (1960) (holding invalid a statute
that compelled teachers to disclose associational ties because it deprived them of their
right of free association); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (voiding an
ordinance that compelled the public identification of group members engaged in the
dissemination of ideas); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958)
("It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups
engaged in advocacy may constitute.., restraint on freedom of association .... ");
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group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association."46 Nevertheless, the right
to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs can be overcome
by a compelling state interest."s  Thus, the Court held that
associational freedoms do not trump the application of statutes
forbidding discrimination in places of public accommodation. In so
doing, however, the Court reiterated that "the Constitution protects
against unjustified government interference with an individual's
choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private
relationships."465 As the Court stated in Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,4 66 two key issues affecting the
degree of constitutional protection to be afforded to an association
are the degree of intimacy and whether the relationship is conduct-
ed "in an atmosphere of privacy" or one where the group seeks to
"keep their 'windows and doors open to the whole world.'""'
Impediments to the right to choose one's associates, including
(presumably) publicity, can violate the First Amendment.46
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 145 (1951) (Black, J.
concurring) (expressing the fear that dominant groups might suppress unorthodox
minorities if allowed to compel disclosure of associational ties). But see Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 85 (1961)
(declining to decide whether forced disclosure of the identities of Communist Party
members was an unconstitutional restraint on free association); New York ex reL
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 77 (1928) (holding that a required filing of group
members' names with the state constituted a legitimate exercise of police power).
463 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
"' See Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976)
(upholding compulsory disclosure to FEC of names of persons donating more than
$10 to campaigns, and public disclosure of contributors of over $100); Griset v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 884 P.2d 116, 126 (Cal. 1994) (upholding state statute
banning political candidates from sending anonymous mass political mailings). In
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted,
114 S. Ct. 1047 (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court let stand a state statute forbidding
the circulation of anonymous leaflets pertaining to the adoption or defeat of a ballot
issue.
'6 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544
(1987); see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)
(stating that freedom of expression is a powerful tool used in the exercise of First
Amendment rights); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984)
(recognizing that an individual's First Amendment rights are not secure unless those
rights may be exercised in the group context as well); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citing examples of intimate associa-
tion).
4- 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
467 Id. at 544-45, 547.
46 See id. at 548 (stating that the protections of the First Amendment imply a right
to associate); see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City
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A requirement that group members communicate in a fashion
that is accessible to lawful government wiretaps is both less and
more intrusive than a requirement that groups publish their mem-
bership lists. It is less intrusive because no actual intrusion occurs
until and unless a warrant is granted allowing the government to
eavesdrop on communications. It is more intrusive because, once
the intrusion occurs, specific facts about individuals will be
disclosed in addition to the fact of membership in the group. Thus,
while a national security/law enforcement justification for a nar-
rowly tailored limit on associational privacy is likely to be at least as
compelling as the state's legitimate desire to root out invidious dis-
crimination, the countervailing interests are arguably greater also.
Groups seeking to change the social order in ways likely to be
resented by police and others in positions of power will have reason
to fear that state actors will find ways to access their keys. Indeed,
in Buckley v. Valeo4" 9 and again in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Committee47 ° the Supreme Court recognized that minor
political parties may be able to show a "reasonable probability" that
disclosure of membership information will subject those identified
to "threats, harassment, and reprisals"-including harassment from
the government.4 7 Ultimately, therefore, the courts again will be
left with an essentially nonlegal value judgment: whether the
interests supporting mandatory key escrow are sufficiently great to
justify the increased risk of harassment to political dissidents.
A challenge to mandatory key escrow as an infringement on the
freedom of association would increase its chances of success if the
challengers could demonstrate that mandatory key escrow closes off
a channel of anonymous communication that has no true alterna-
tive." 2 Indeed, no substitute exists for the anonymous remailer:
unlike anonymous leaflets, no one can see an e-mail being created,
and thanks to the anonymous remailer, no one can see it being
distributed, either.
of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981) (holding an ordinance limiting the amount of
money that may be contributed to certain political organizations to be an impermissi-
ble restraint on free association).
469 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
470 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982).
471 Id. at 99-101 (describing "massive" harassment of the Socialist Workers Party
by the FBI).
41 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994) (holding that flyers are
not a substitute for cheap and convenient signs in front of a house).
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On October 12, 1994 the Supreme Court heard arguments in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.4"' Like Talley, the McIntyre
case concerns the validity of a state statute that imposes a flat ban
on distribution of anonymous political campaign leaflets. The
decision in McIntyre may have a very significant impact on the law
surveyed in this subsection.
474
4. The Parallel to Antimask Laws
The simmering debate over antimask laws prefigures the debate
over mandatory key escrow, and demonstrates how close a question
mandatory key escrow could present.475  Mandatory key escrow
would make it an offense to communicate in a manner that shields
the identity of the speaker from the government. Similarly, strict
liability antimask statutes prohibit mask-wearing on public property,
except on designated holidays such as Halloween.476
In states with strict liability antimask statutes, demonstrations
and all travel by masked persons are illegal. Investigators of racially
motivated crimes credit antimask laws for preventing those
responsible from traveling in disguise. The prohibition on masked
rallies also makes it easier for police to make arrests, after the fact
if necessary, when demonstrations become violent. 77 Antimask
47- 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted 114 S. Ct. 1047 (1994).
474 Similar questions arose in Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 884 P.2d
116, 126 (Cal. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of a state ban on anonymous
political mailings).
' The parallel to mandatory key escrow is imperfect because antimask laws owe
their existence to efforts to curb a specific group, the Ku Klux Klan, see Oskar E. Rey,
Note, Antimask Laws: Exploring the Outer Bounds of Protected Speech Under the First
Amendment-State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REV.
1139, 1145 (1991), rather than a more generalized desire to catch criminals. The
existence of a specific animus aimed at one group may itself be a First Amendment
violation. See infra note 478 (listing cases in which courts expressed disapproval of
antimask laws on free speech grounds). Furthermore, most reported cases have
concentrated on whether mask-wearing constitutes symbolic speech rather than on
the associational freedom claims that would most likely be the centerpiece of a First
Amendment challenge to any mandatory key escrow plan.
476 See Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the
First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 821 n.17 (1991) (citing statutes from 10 states);
Rey, supra note 475, at 1144 n.43 (citing additional statutes). A related type of
antimask statute makes it a part of the offense to intend to interfere with the civil
rights of another. See Allen, supra at 821 n.16. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 241 makes
it a felony for two or more persons to go in disguise on public highways or on the
premises of another with the intent to prevent the free exercise and enjoyment of any
legal right or privilege by another citizen. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988).
4" See Allen, supra note 476, at 828-29.
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laws have been justified as a means of helping to prevent violence,
but this justification has met with a mixed reception by courts and
commentators.4 78  The Supreme Court of Georgia accepted that
the state interest in preventing crimes of violence and intimidation
associated with mask-wearing was sufficiently compelling to justify
an incidental infringement on First Amendment rights.4 79 On this
reasoning, mandatory key escrow would probably pass constitutional
muster also. Not everyone agrees, however, that First Amendment
guarantees can be compromised merely by reference to the history
of violence associated with mask-wearers. Some courts and
commentators believe that the First Amendment requires that there
be specific evidence that a particular masked person or demonstra-
tion presents a threat of violence before an antimask statute can be
applied without violating the Constitution.
4 80
Perhaps inhibited by the irony of having to rely on NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson,48 few Ku Klux Klan challenges to anti-
mask laws have been predicated on the right to associational
freedom of mask-wearing travellers and demonstrators. As a result,
only one state supreme court and one federal court have ruled on
an associational freedom challenge to an antimask law, and they
disagreed. 8 2  The constitutionality of antimask laws remains
47' Compare State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990) (rejecting challenge to
antimask statute) and Walpole v. State, 68 Tenn. 370, 372-73 (1878) (same) and
Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 398, 401 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (same) with
Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting
that the statute might have been held unconstitutional if petitioner had demonstrated
that unmasking himself would have restricted his ability to enjoy free speech and
freedom of association) and Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 91 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(granting temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of antimask law against
Iranian students demonstrating against Shah) and Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 150
Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding statute prohibiting wearing masks
in public overbroad and finding that state's fear that violence will result from the
mere presence of anonymous persons is "unfounded"); compare also Allen, supra note
476, at 829-30 (arguing for the validity and retention ofantimask laws) with Rey, supra
note 475, at 1145-46 (arguing antimask laws are unconstitutional). One way to
describe the cases cited above, of course, is that the KKK loses, but Iranian students
win.
479 See Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 551.
41 Compare Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 93-94 (requiring concrete evidence supporting
the prediction that violence will occur) with Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 580 (accepting
history of violence as sufficient evidence).
481 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
4
' The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an associational freedom argument
presented by the KKK in Miller. See 398 S.E. 2d at 552-53. Relying on associational
freedom, Judge Higginbotham granted a temporary restraining order preventing
enforcement of an antimask law against Iranian students in Ayan. See 462 F. Supp.
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largely unsettled, suggesting that the First Amendment aspects of
mandatory key escrow would present an equally close and disputed
question.
B. Fourth Amendment Issues
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." It also states that "no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause ... particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
4 3
Americans already acquiesce to substantial invasions of privacy
by government fiat, without a warrant. We disclose personal details
of our lives on tax returns. We consent to having our belongings
x-rayed, opened, and searched as our persons are scanned for metal
(sometimes followed by a pat-down) as a condition of being allowed
to board an airplane or enter some public buildings. The law says
the government may paw through a citizen's garbage without a war-
rant,48 4 and that she lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in
relation to telephone numbers dialed. 4 5 The police may fly over
her house in a helicopter at four hundred feet 8 6 and use special
cameras to photograph everything below. 48 ' The government may
at 92-94.
4 ' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for
trash collection); see also United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928-30 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that the warrantless seizure and reconstruction of 5/32-inch pieces of
shredded documents in the trash did not violate the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993); United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 589 (8th Cir.)
(permitting a warrantless search of garbage within the curtilage of the home because
the garbage was readily accessible to the public), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 135 (1992);
United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 400 (7th Cir.) (same) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
147 (1991).
"' See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (holding that the installation
and use of a pen register by a telephone company does not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). The rationale is that because people are
aware that the telephone company keeps this information for billing purposes, they
cannot reasonably expect that the information will be kept secret. See id. at 742. This
is neither necessarily true, nor timelessly true, nor beyond the ability of persons and
service providers to change by contract, but it is still the rule.
4 8 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
valid a warrantless aerial surveillance of a greenhouse from four hundred feet); see
also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,215 (1986) (holding valid a warrantless aerial
surveillance of a yard enclosed by a 10-foot fence).
487 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that
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use satellites to spy in her windows; 488 it may use heat-detection
gear to monitor heat emanations from her home; 4 9 it may use
dogs to sniff her luggage and her person. 90 Once the govern-
ment has arranged for an informant to plant a beeper on a citizen,
the government may use the signal to track the citizen's move-
ments.4 9 1  When national security is at risk, many procedural
warrantless aerial photography of a factory taken with a commercial camera from
navigable airspace does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
See Lisa J. Steele, Comment, The View from on High: Satellite Remote Sensing
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 317,327-33 (1991) (discussing
warrantless searches by satellite and the applicable constitutional implications).
489 See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.) (holding that a
warrantless use of infrared sensing devices did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because any defendant's subjective expectation of privacy in heat emanating from her
house is not one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (9th Cir.
1989) (considering the absence of heat a sign of suspiciously good insulation); United
States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1472 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that
thermal imaging does not constitute a "search"); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773
F. Supp. 220, 225-28 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding that warrants are not required for the
use of an infrared sensing device from navigable air space above defendant's house,
and noting that heat emanating from a house may be considered a sign that the
occupants are growing marijuana within), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States
v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); ef. United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530
(9th Cir. 1994) (remanding for a hearing on the "intrusiveness" of thermal imaging
in order to lay a factual foundation for a ruling on whether thermal imaging is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v.
Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205,209-10,212 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that defendants had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a building and its surrounding property, and
therefore thermal images that were not the product of naked eye observations
amounted to an illegal, warrantless search); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash.
1994) (holding that the use of an infrared thermal detection device to perform
warrantless surveillance of the defendant's home violated the Washington state
constitution's protection of defendant's private affairs and its protection against
warrantless invasion of his home, as well as the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution); cf. LisaJ. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless
Infrared Searches, 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 19 (1993) (arguing that a warrant should be
required for the use of infrared photography to determine activity within a dwelling).
4' See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705-07 (1983) (finding the use of
"canine sniff[s]" for narcotics detection to be inoffensive to the Fourth Amendment
unless the governmental interest is outweighed by the effect of the search on the
individual's liberty interest). For a review of the Supreme Court cases regarding
sense-enhanced searches such as dog sniffs, wiretaps, and overflights, as well as a
proposed reformulation of the warrant requirement that focuses on sense-enhanced
searches most susceptible to abuse, see generally David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of
Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563 (1990).
4" United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-18 (1984) (noting that, although the
monitoring of a beeper is not per se unconstitutional, such monitoring of a person's
home is a violation of the Fourth Amendment if the individual has a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
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protections that are required in the ordinary course of an investiga-
tion are suspended. For example, the government may, for reasons
of national security, break into some premises without a warrant to
plant a bug, whereas the same action in an ordinary criminal
investigation would require a warrant. 92 National security wiretap
requests go to a secret court that meets in camera and never issues
opinions.495
On the other hand, mandatory key escrow differs from each of
these examples in significant ways, especially as it affects private,
noncommercial use. Absent exigent circumstances such as fires, hot
pursuit, or the like, the Supreme Court has yet to approve a
282-85 (1983) (holding that police monitoring of signals does not constitute a search
if the police could legitimately monitor the same activities by other legal means). But
cf. Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment
Rights, 71 VA. L. REv. 297 (1985) (criticizing the Knotts and Karo decisions).
2 Warrantless wiretaps are authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 18 02(a) (1988). The President, acting through the Attorney
General, may authorize electronic surveillance for up to one year if the surveillance
is directed solely at communications between or among foreign powers, there is no
substantial likelihood of acquiring communication of U.S. citizens, and minimization
procedures have been followed. See id. Title 18 of the U.S. Code also permits
warrantless surveillance in emergency situations involving immediate danger, death,
or serious physical injury to any persons; conspiratorial activities threatening the
national interest; or conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime. See 18
U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1988).
4" All of the court's activities are classified. It is widely believed, however, that
the FISA court, as it is known, has yet to turn down a wiretap request.
The Attorney General's reports indicate that not one of the more than 4200 FISA
wiretap requests was turned down during the Court's first 10 years. See Cinquegrana,
supra note 196, at 814-15; see also ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 18. The Court did
turn down a request for authorization for a break-in, denying it on the dual
jurisdictional grounds that the Court lacked the statutory authority to issue such an
order and that the President has the inherent authority to order domestic national
security surveillance without need of a court order. See Cinquegrana, supra note 196,
at 823.
Congress recently authorized the FISA court to issue warrants for national
security break-ins and inspections of the interior of buildings by "technical means."
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, tit. VIII, sec.
807(a), § 301(5), 108 Stat. 3423, 3444 (1994) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1821).
This authority can be used against American citizens if the Justice Department
persuades the FISA court that the suspects are agents of a foreign power. See id.
§ 301(b), 108 Stat. 3423,3445; see also United States v. Humphrey, 629 F.2d 908,912-
14 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a warrantless search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because it was related to national security); In re Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential
Premises and Personal Property (F.I.S.C. 1981) (holding that a FISA order was not
required, and was at any rate unavailable due to lack ofjurisdiction, for a warrantless
national security break-in), reprinted in S. REP. No. 280, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1981).
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warrantless intrusion into a home occupied by an ordinary taxpayer,
much less one who has made efforts to shield herself from detec-
tion.494 Except for consent to x-rays and searches at airports and
public buildings, none of the examples above require the target of
the probe to take any action to aid the prober, much less to ensure
that the probe is successful; and this exception does not reach into
the home.
In principle, warrants are required for all domestic security
wiretaps. 49 5 The next subsections describe how the Fourth Amend-
ment also prohibits warrantless mandatory key escrow for private,
noncommercial uses of encryption.496 Commercial and corporate
uses, however, present a more difficult question. These uses may
not be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection against mandatory
key escrow.
1. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Give the Government
an Affirmative Right to an Effective Search
The government's residual prerogative under the Fourth
Amendment to make reasonable searches does not empower it to
require that people help to create the conditions that would make
such searches effective, even if the government has valid grounds
for the search. The Fourth Amendment does not create rights for
the government. It creates rights for the people.49 7  Congress's
414 The Supreme Court has allowed warrantless searches of homes occupied by
parolees, probationers, or welfare recipients. See infra text accompanying note 524.
Lower courts have sanctioned two additional exceptions to this rule. First, some
courts have approved warrantless national security break-ins (presumably, however,
the premises were not specifically designed to resist such break-ins). Second, as
described supra note 489, several lower courts have allowed warrantless infrared
inspections of properties, including at least one property that was carefully insulated.
495 See United States v. United States Dist. Court (The Keith Case), 407 U.S. 297,
314-21 (1972) (holding that a warrantless wiretap violated Fourth Amendment rights
and implicated First Amendment policies).
"' Fourth Amendment privacy in this context begins with the premise that people
have control over who knows what about them and "the right to shape the 'self' that
they present[] to the world." TRIBE, supra note 434, § 15-16, at 1389-90. This control
is protected by the Fourth Amendment freedom from unlawful searches and seizures.
See id.
497 "[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the
United States against arbitrary action by their own Government...." United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,266 (1990); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth Amendment serves
primarily to protect the right of privacy); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303-05
(1967) (same).
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power to criminalize conduct and the executive's power to enforce
the criminal laws of the United States stem from the grants of
power in Articles I and II of the Constitution, such as the Com-
merce Clause 498 and the Necessary and Proper Clause.499 Those
powers are, in turn, limited by the Bill of Rights, of which the
Fourth Amendment is a part.
The absence in the Fourth Amendment of an affirmative grant
of power to make effective searches, however, does not determine
whether the affirmative grants in Articles I and II give the govern-
ment the power to subject communications to nonconsensual
searches. It simply means that from a Fourth Amendment perspec-
tive, mandatory key escrow poses strictly traditional problems: Is
mandatory key escrow, which takes place without a warrant, a search
and seizure?.. If so, is it a reasonable warrantiess search or
seizure, or should a warrant be required?
2. Mandatory Escrow of a Key Is a Fourth
Amendment "Search or Seizure"
A search is a governmental invasion of a "reasonable expecta-
tion[] of [personal] privacy."0 1 Nonconsensual searches by the
418 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
499 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Technically, federal courts are involved solely
in the adjudication of crimes that the legislative authority has defined and to which
it has affixed punishments, because they cannot define common-law crimes. See
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that the circuit
courts of the United States cannot exercise common-law jurisdiction in criminal
cases). Note that Article II is also involved in a different type of enforcement because
some searches against agents of foreign powers operating either in the United States
or abroad can be conducted pursuant to the President's national security powers. See
50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1988) (granting the President a limited power to authorize
electronic surveillance for up to one year).
o For an argument that a mandatory key escrow scheme is a search, and thus
would violate the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, see Mark I. Koffsky,
Comment, Choppy Waters in the Surveillance Data Stream: The Clipper Scheme and the
Particularity Clause, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 131 (1994).
"0 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); see also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against
violations of subjective expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable). Items in plain view are not considered private. See Horton v. Califor-
nia, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("If an article is already in plain view, neither its
observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy."); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-66 (1971) (plurality opinion) (describing certain
circumstances in which police may, without a warrant, seize evidence in "plain view");
see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130,2136-37 (1993) (extending the Horton
rationale to items in "plain touch").
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government into matters for which individuals have a (subjectively




Not every acquisition of information by the government from
sources reasonably expected to be private is necessarily a search.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that unintrusive means
of piercing personal privacy, such as overflights"' or the use of
dogs to sniff for contraband," 4 are not searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Although wiretapping is also unobtrusive,
there has been no question since Olmstead v. United States50 5 was
overturned 0 6 that wiretapping constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search or seizure.
Not every search affecting matters reasonably expected to be
private requires a warrant. Examples of legitimate warrantless
searches include "regulatory searches," 5 7 searches incident to
valid arrests, 08 searches conducted under exigent circumstances
(such as the likely destruction of evidence),0 9 and border search-
'02 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (noting that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval byjudge or magistrate, areperse unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions" (footnotes omitted)); cf. Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, sec. 807(a), §§ 301-309, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443-
53 (1994) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829) (amending FISA to grant the
FISA court power to issue in camera, ex parte orders authorizing physical searches
and "examination of the interior of property by technical means" on a lesser showing
of need than would be required for a warrant); Benjamin Wittes, Surveillance Court
Gets New Powers, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at 1 (noting the ACLU's claim that the
extension of FISA court's power is "a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment").
"o See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
that aerial police surveillance of an individual's house from a helicopter flying at four
hundred feet does not offend the Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 (1986) (finding constitutional the aerial surveillance of a yard enclosed by
a 10-foot fence).
5' See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that the use of
canines in narcotics searches is not per se unconstitutional, but is subject to
reasonableness requirements).
5 277 U.S. 438, 468-69 (1928) (holding that the admission of evidence obtained
through telephone taps offends neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendment).
-o See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
o See infra text accompanying note 514.
'o See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U;S. 454, 457 (1981) (stating that "a lawful
custodial arrest creates a situation whichjustifies the contemporaneous search without
a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area").
o See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,295-96 (1973) (justifying a warrantless
search on the grounds that an arrestee will be "sufficiently apprised of his suspected
role in the crime to motivate him to destroy what evidence he [can]"); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-71 (1966) (concluding that the rapid depletion of
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es. 51 ° Absent a specific national security rationale directly related
to the conversation, the speaker, or exigent circumstances, however,
a warrant is required for a wiretap both under the Fourth Amend-
ment and under Title 111.511
A key is not itself a conversation, however, but the means to
decrypt one. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that absent
government action to force disclosure, a properly guarded key to a
cryptographic system would be an item of information for which the
user would have both a subjectively and objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.512 Indeed, the entire point of having a
cryptographic system is to increase or create privacy. This is
especially true in a public-key cryptographic system, in which the
private key is never disclosed.5 1 A requirement that keys (or the
means to decrypt them) be turned over to the government is thus
clearly a search or seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Fourth Amendment regulates both the issuance of search
warrants and the conduct of a valid search. Key escrow seeks to
preserve the government's ability to carry out a valid search by
taking action in advance of any warrant.
One can imagine many actions that the government might take
to preserve its ability to conduct valid searches. It might, for
example, require all citizens to live in glass houses by prohibiting
the use of any other building material. More reasonably, the
government might prevent banks from renting out safe deposit
boxes that would destroy the contents unless opened with the right
key. Or, the government might prohibit the construction of homes
with armored walls. Each of these hypothetical rules might raise
constitutional problems, but none of them is in itself a search.
alcohol in the human bloodstream justifies a warrantless blood-alcohol test).
510 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1985)
(noting that the longstanding tradition of conducting warrantless searches of persons
entering the United States reflects a concern for "the protection of the integrity of
the border"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (stating that
the need to make routine stops at border checkpoints in order to prevent the
entrance of smugglers and illegal aliens outweighs any intrusion on Fourth Amend-
ment interests); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 62-63 (1974)
(dictum) (stating that those "leaving the country may be examined as to their
belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment").
511 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also supra notes 502-06 and
accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement).
512 But see supra note 211 and text following note 338 (describing a reason to
doubt user expectations of privacy).
513 See infra Technical Appendix, part B (describing a public-key cryptographic
system).
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In contrast, a key is information that the government forces the
user to disclose. This distinguishes key escrow from other, closely
related, hypothetical situations in which the government might
make preemptive rules designed to make the execution of a valid
search warrant easier. The dissimilarity is, however, nothing more
than a weak and unreliable distinction between requiring an act and
proscribing alternatives to that act. The question then becomes
whether this search or seizure falls into any of the classes of
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
3. Mandatory Key Escrow as a "Regulatory Search"
Only the regulatory search exception to the warrant and
particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment seems at all
likely to apply to mandatory key escrow, but this single exception is
enough. The requirement that all users of strong cryptography
escrow their chip keys or other means to decrypt their session keys
closely resembles routinized searches, such as employee drug
testing, for which the Supreme Court no longer requires a warrant.
Unlike traditional law enforcement searches, which are designed to
find evidence of a crime, regulatory searches are "aimed at
deterrence of wrongdoing through fear of detection."" 4 Like the
warranfless, wide-ranging, regulatory searches approved by the
Supreme Court, the government's acquisition of keys will not
provide evidence of anything criminal. Rather, by requiring the
disclosure of keys, the government seeks to remove the shield of
strong cryptography from what it believes would otherwise be
socially undesirable uses.
The leading regulatory search case is National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab,5 5 in which the Supreme Court endorsed a
"' Craig M. Cornish & Donald B. Louria, Employment Drug Testing Preventive
Searches, and the Future of Privacy, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 95, 98 (1991).
515 489 U.S. 656 (1989); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)
(holding that random approaches to passengers in buses, conducted pursuant to
passengers' consent, are not per se unconstitutional); Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (classifying suspicionless sobriety checkpoints to
deter drunk driving as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Skinnerv. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (finding drug and alcohol tests
mandated by Federal Railroad Administration regulations reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347, 1347 (1977) (granting
stay of injunction against further warrantless searches of workplaces permitted under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993))). But see Camara v. Municipal Court,
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Customs Service program of mandatory employee drug testing.
5 16
The Court stated that "neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor,
indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable
component of reasonableness in every circumstance." 51 7 Instead,
"where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," one should
"balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Govern-
ment's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context."
5 18
It is difficult to imagine a case in which the government would
find it easier to plead "special needs," such as the need to prevent
the development of "hidden conditions" and the impracticality of
warrants for every key,5 19 than in its attempt to compile a database
of chip keys or session keys.5 20 Mandatory key escrow fits several
of the criteria enunciated in Von Raab. In particular, mandatory key
escrow is not designed to produce evidence for criminal prosecu-
tions (wiretaps do that, but they require warrants or other authoriza-
tion), but rather to deter crimes that might otherwise be furthered
by the use of encryption.521 The key's owner knows that the key
is being escrowed. In addition, if encryption becomes widespread,
a more particularized approach would be difficult if not impossi-
ble. 22 Finally, because the government only plans to use the key
segments for legitimate searches, it can argue that the cost to
personal privacy is low.1
21
387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (finding that the defendant had a constitutional right to
deny a housing inspector entry into a leasehold without a warrant in a nonemergency
situation).
516 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
5 17 
Id.
518 Id. at 665-66 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20).
519 Id. at 668 (offering hidden conditions and impracticality as examples of
"compelling" special needs) (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624).
20 The special needs standard has received strong criticism from academic
commentators. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553,554 & n.10 (1992) (summarizing criticisms).
521 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (explaining that the Customs Service's mandatory
employee drug testing program was not designed to further criminal prosecutions,
but to ensure that drug users did not ascend to certain positions in the service).
5' Cf United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (stating that
requiring particularized suspicion before routine stops on major highways near the
Mexican border "would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens").
52' "A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular
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On the other hand, although the courts have allowed warrantless
regulatory searches in the workplace, at airports, in prisons, at the
border, and in schools, none of the leading regulatory search cases
has involved a search that entered into the home, unless the home
was the scene of a fire or was occupied by a parolee, probationer,
or welfare recipient."' Indeed, in Camara v. Municipal Court
5 25
the Supreme Court refused to eliminate the warrant requirement
for routine searches that penetrated residential property hunting for
violations of the city's housing code.5 2 The Court characterized
the housing inspectors' intrusions into the home as too "significant"
to be allowed without a warrant 527-although the same Court then
went on to balance the interests at stake and concluded that
warrants could be issued with a lesser showing of need than that
traditionally required for probable cause.528
Mandatory key escrow would affect many different types of
users, including both business and personal users who send
messages both commercial and political. The regulatory search
precedents, particularly Von Raab, suggest that Congress might be
able to require mandatory key escrow for businesses and other
commercial users without implicating the Fourth Amendment as it
is currently understood. The broad sweep of the special needs
justification, however, is not easily confined to the market sector of
society, and there is nothing in the logic of Von Raab that requires
it remain there.
Although the Court decided Wyman v. James52 after Camara,
to date the Court has not extended the special needs justification of
Von Raab into the home. This suggests that private, noncommercial
class of searches requires 'balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.'" O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719
(1987) (citations omitted).
524 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9 (2d ed.
1992).
r-- 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
526 See id. at 534, 538-39.
527 See id. at 534.
528 See id. at 536-39. The Camera Court relied on several factors absent from the
mandatory key escrow scenario for its holding, including the "long history ofjudicial
and public acceptance" of housing code inspections. Id. at 537.
5- 400 U.S. 309, 316-18 (1971) (holding that a mandatory (and warrantless) home
visit by a welfare caseworker does not violate any of the welfare recipient's Fourth
Amendment rights). Thebreadth of the special needs justification becomes particu-
larly clear when one considers the means by which the Wyman Court permitted
warrantless intrusions into welfare recipients' homes. See id.
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users of encryption might not fall within any of the currently
specified special needs categories of the regulatory search exception
to the Fourth Amendment. As currently understood, therefore, the
Fourth Amendment probably prohibits warrantless mandatory key
escrow, at least for private, noncommercial users of encryption.5 3 °
C. Fifth Amendment Issues
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."3 '
The "'historic function'" of this part of the Fifth Amendment is to
protect a "'natural individual from compulsory incrimination
through his own testimony or personal records. '"'5 32 Currently,
there is a tension in the Supreme Court's treatment of the reach of
the Fifth Amendment. On the one hand, the Court interprets the
right narrowly, to apply to criminal defendants only.
33
[Although the Court] has often stated [that the Fifth Amendment]
protect[s] personal privacy, ... [the] Court has never suggested
that every invasion of privacy violates the privilege.... [T]he
Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied
the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition
or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve
compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some sort.53 4
On the other hand, the Court has never questioned the special
nature of some private noncommercial personal papers, such as
diaries, and has held that these retain their Fifth as well as Fourth
Amendment protection.5 5
With one exception, neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amend-
ment has ever been understood to allow the government to require
5' Given the plasticity of the special needs doctrine, it is possible that the Court
would extend the regulatory search exception to the home user of encryption.
Extending the logic of Von Raab to the home, however, would gut much of what
remains of the Fourth Amendment, and is a result to be avoided at all costs.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
532 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976) (holding that business
records are outside the Fifth Amendment privilege) (quoting United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
-"- "Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial." United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (citations omitted).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) (citations omitted).
55 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,459 & n.22 (1977)
(noting that the most personal of documents are entitled to special protection). The
protection is from subpoenas only, not search warrants.
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civilians, in peacetime, to structure their lives to make hypothetical
future searches by law enforcement easy. That exception, the
required records doctrine, is inapposite to mandatory key es-
crow.5"6 Instead, the Fifth Amendment is potentially relevant to
mandatory key escrow in two ways. The required disclosure of the
chip key resembles the required disclosure of a private paper, which
may have some Fifth Amendment protection, and the forced
utterance of a LEAF may be the type of incriminating testimony
proscribed by the Fifth Amendment.
1. The Chip Key as a Private Paper
In Boyd v. United States,53 7 the Supreme Court stated that
private papers are an owner's "dearest property.""'8 Relying on
both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court found that
allowing the state to compel production of that property would be
"abhorrent to the instincts" of an American and "contrary to the
principles of a free government."51 9 As recently as Bellis v. United
States,5 40 the Supreme Court reemphasized that the Fifth Amend-
ment protects "'a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought'-an inner sanctum which necessarily includes an individ-
ual's papers and effects to the extent that the privilege bars their
" The required records doctrine came into full flower in Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1948), which upheld a subpoena for incriminatory records that
were required under a wartime price control statute. Later cases made clear, howev-
er, that there are limits to the government's power to define records as "required"
and hence outside the protections of the Fifth Amendment. See Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39,48-49 (1968) (holding that a registration requirement violated the
Fifth Amendment because it materially increased the chances of prosecution); Grosso
v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64-67 (1968) (holding that a statute requiring the
reporting of, and payment of an excise tax on, earnings from wagering violated the
Fifth Amendment because it was inherently self-incriminatory). Other cases have cast
doubt on the firmness of these limits. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 434
(1971) (plurality opinion) (requiring that a hit-and-run motorist identify himself).
One thing beyond dispute, however, is that the government needs a court order to
get access to required records. Because the point of a mandatory key escrow scheme
would be to get access to the keys without a court order, the required records
exception is irrelevant.
537 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5-" Id. at 627-28.
"' Id. at 632. Judge Friendly criticized this statement as "ringing but vacuous"
because it "tells us almost everything, except why." Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 682
(1968).
0 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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compulsory production and authentication. " "4M Nevertheless, the
rule found "abhorrent" in 1886 is now practically the law.54
The Supreme Court has eliminated most Fifth Amendment
protections from incriminating documentary evidence sought by
compulsion. First, the Supreme Court narrowed the privilege so
that it applies only if the act of producing papers or records, by
itself, has a self-incriminatory communicative or testimonial aspect.
If the act of handing over the papers is noncommunicative-that is,
if it neither reveals the existence of the document nor authenticates
it-then the Fifth Amendment ordinarily does not apply.
543
Second, only natural persons can find shelter under the Fifth
Amendment, and only for papers they both own and control. Thus,
corporations can never claim the privilege, and neither can natural
persons with regard to corporate records, even if they created and
now control those records.54 4 Third, once papers are handed to
51 Id. at 91 (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)).
1
2 See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
48 U. P=Tr. L. REV. 27, 29 (1986) (examining the new framework used by the
Supreme Court in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to compulsory process for documents); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitu-
tionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REV. 945,
964-85 (1977) (detailing the modern approach to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
"S See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984) (finding that the act of
producing the documents at issue would involve testimonial self-incrimination, and
that requiring such production therefore violated the Fifth Amendment); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391,398-99 (1976) (holding that requiring relinquishment of
the documents at issue was not a Fifth Amendment violation because no testimonial
incrimination was compelled); see also Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor,J., concurring)
(contending that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the
contents of private papers of any kind").
In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561
(1990) (holding that a mother could not invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege
against a court order to produce the child she had allegedly abused), the Supreme
Court, analogizing the mother's care of the child to a required record, held that
producing a child was not testimonial, and therefore the Fifth Amendment did not
apply. Id. at 556-60. In light of this decision it is fair to ask whether the Fifth
Amendment applies to anything other than oral testimony.
" See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1988) (holding that a
custodian of corporate records may not withhold them on the grounds that such
production will incriminate him in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1976) (holding that a legal search of the petitioner's
office resulting in the seizure of voluntarily recorded business records authenticated
by a prosecution witness was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment); Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974) (holding that a dissolved law partnership had its own
institutional identity, and its records were held in a representative capacity; therefore
a grand jury subpoena for those records could not be ignored on Fifth Amendment
grounds); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694,698-99 (1944) (holding that an officer
of an unincorporated labor union could not refuse, based on Fifth Amendment
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another, the legitimate expectation of privacy needed to maintain a
claim under either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments disappears.
45
Fourth, records required to be kept for legal or regulatory purposes
are outside the privilege.146 Fifth, and only tangentially related to
documents, the Supreme Court has held that persons can be forced
to perform nontestimonial acts such as giving handwriting sam-
ples.547 Sixth, aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United
States do not ordinarily enjoy Fifth Amendment rights.5 48
The Court's narrowing interpretations notwithstanding, Boyd is
not completely toothless. Boyd has a residual vitality for nonbusi-
ness, nonfinancial, private papers and documents that are kept in
the home, if only because the Supreme Court has yet to compel
production of such a document.
5 49
2. Is a Chip Key or a Session Key "Incriminating"?
The hornbook rule is that testimony must be incriminating when
uttered in order to be entitled to protection under the Fifth
Amendment. The testimony must relate to past conduct and, if it
does not directly incriminate ("Yes, I did it") must at least create a
"substantial" and "real" hazard of prosecution for the Fifth Amend-
ment to apply.
550
The Fifth Amendment does not protect testimony that might
become incriminating through future conduct. In United States v.
protections, to produce the union's records); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 56-58
(1906) (holding that a witness who, because of statutory immunity, cannot invoke the
Fifth Amendment as to oral testimony cannot invoke it against the production of
books and papers).
" See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,335-36 (1973) (holding that petitioner
had no legitimate expectation of privacy when she handed her papers over to her
accountant); Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92-93 (same, when papers were handed to a partner
in a small law firm). The attorney-client privilege is an exception to this general rule.
54 See supra note 536 (discussing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)).
1 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). This rule has also been
applied to voice samples, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967), and
blood samples, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
"4 SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771, 782-83 (1950); cf. United States
v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 259 (D. Berlin 1979) (holding that friendly aliens have Fifth
Amendment rights when charged with civil offenses in a U.S. court outside the
territory of the United States). U.S. citizens abroad, however, do have Fifth Amend-
ment rights. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (rejecting the idea that "when
the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights").
549 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 524, § 8.12, at 701-02.
550 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968) (holding that requiring a
frequent gambler to report illegal gambling income created a reasonable basis for fear
of incrimination).
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Freed,55 1 the Supreme Court upheld a National Firearms Act
registration requirement against a Fifth Amendment claim that the
disclosed information might be used against the defendant if he
committed an offense with a firearm in the future.
5 5 2
Forced disclosure of a chip key and a session key fit uneasily
into this framework. The forced disclosure of a chip key55 3 before
the chip has ever been used to communicate cannot be incriminat-
ing because nothing has happened yet. Thus, mandatory key escrow
itself fits squarely within the Freed rationale. In contrast, the LEAF
raises a more delicate problem. Because the LEAF precedes the
actual conversation, forced utterance of a LEAF could be said to fall
within the Freed rationale also. But this is really too facile to be
credible. The encrypted session key within the LEAF is unique, and
it is directly tied to the conversation that follows it. In any case,
whether the LEAF is part of the conversation or not, it is an utter-
ance that creates a "substantial" and "real" hazard of prosecution if
the conversation that follows is an incriminating one, and a public
servant happens to be listening.5 4 On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court has emphasized that nontestimonial compelled
disclosures are not privileged, 555 and the LEAF itself is not testi-
monial, save insofar as it ties a particular conversation to a
particular pair of chips.
In summary, the Fifth Amendment may not protect disclosure
of a chip key against mandatory key escrow, but it protects
individuals against the routine warrantless use of that key to decrypt
the LEAF and, especially, to decrypt an incriminating communica-
tion. Because the stated purpose of escrowed encryption is to allow
the government to retain the abilities it currently has, and the
government accepts that a warrant is required to conduct a wiretap,
the Fifth Amendment imposes no significant restriction on a
551 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
552 See id. at 606.
... Recall that for the purposes of this discussion "chip key" means either the
hardwired chip's unique key in a Clipper Chip (which can lead the government to the
encrypted session key buried in a LEAF) or the information needed to decrypt the
equivalent information generated by a software package.
" See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951) (noting that a witness's
response is incriminating if it might furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute).
... See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988) (noting that a
communication does not become privilegedjust because "'it will lead to incriminating
evidence'" (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1166, 1172 n.2 (2d Cir.
1987) (concurring opinion))).
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mandatory key escrow proposal of the type hypothesized.
D. Privacy Issues
The constitutional right to privacy derives from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, although it
exceeds the sum of its parts.5 56 The right to privacy has at least
three components: (1) a right to be left alone; (2) a right to
autonomous choice regarding intimate matters; and (3) a right to
autonomous choice regarding other personal matters.557 There is
no question that mandatory key escrow would infringe on each of
these component rights. The question, already partly canvassed
above, 55' is whether the courts would consider the intrusions
reasonably related to a sufficiently compelling state interest to
justify the intrusion. As might be expected, the limitations on
mandatory key escrow arising from the right to privacy conform
closely to those derived from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amend-
ments from which the privacy right partly emanates. Privacy
jurisprudence is in some turmoil, however, and it is possible that
privacy will prove to be the most fertile area for legal adaptation to
the new challenges posed by increasing state surveillance power and
compensating private responses such as cryptography.
1. The Right to Autonomous Choice Regarding
Nonintimate Matters
The right to autonomous choice regarding nonintimate personal
matters is the most general component of the right to privacy.
More outward-looking than the right to be left alone, but more
wide-ranging than the right to autonomous choice regarding
intimate matters, this component relates to those important, individ-
ual, personal decisions that are fundamental without being intimate,
5m That at least wasJustice Harlan's view in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
499-500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that privacy derives not from
penumbras in the Bill of Rights, but from fundamental ideas of ordered liberty); cf
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (relying on penumbras in the Bill of Rights).
557 For a taxonomy of taxonomies, see TRIBE, supra note 434, § 15-1, and Ken
Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1335, 1340. For an
argument that the three strands of the right to privacy are actually inimical to each
other, at least in the eyes of their advocates on the Supreme Court, see generally
David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ.
L. REv. 975 (1992).
51 See supra parts III.A-C.
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such as the choice of friends, political party, vocation, and other
allegiances. 59 Disputes concerning this category, such as alleged
infringements of associational freedom, tend to be adjudicated
directly under the rubric of one or more amendments in the Bill of
Rights rather than by appeal to privacy principles. These aspects of
privacy law were canvassed above560 and will not be repeated here.
2. The Right to Be Left Alone
The right to privacy includes a generalized "right to be let
alone,"561 which" includes "the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters."56 2 This strand forms the basis for
many claims to a right to informational privacy. 6 Informational
559 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (holding the
federal government's denial of a resident alien's right to work unconstitutional under
the Fifth Amendment); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965)
(invalidating, under the First Amendment, a statutory requirement that persons
wishing to receive "communist propaganda" identify themselves to the post office);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (striking down a statute requiring
teachers at state-supported schools and colleges to list every organization they had
joined during the prior five years); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
462 (1958) (holding that the NAACP had the right to refuse to disclose its
membership list on behalf of its members' rights to prevent the State from
compelling them to reveal their affiliation with the group); see also, e.g.,John H. Ely,
Democracy and the Right to Be Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397,405 (1981) (arguing that
the right to be different is not constitutionally protected, but that the lack of
protection is not a problem because the right generally will be invoked by those who
do not need protection).
5" See supra part III.D.
5' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting);
see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (finding a constitutional right to
"receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth").
"~2 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (acknowledging the existence of
the right, but finding that it could be overcome by a narrowly-tailored program
designed to serve the state's "vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous
[prescription] drugs"); see Gary R. Clouse, Note, The Constitutional Right to Withhold
Private Information, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 536, 547-57 (1982) (collecting and dissecting
inconsistent circuit court cases dealing with the right to withhold private information).
The right to be left alone, however, is insufficiently compelling to prevent a large
number of physical intrusions to bodily integrity when the police seek forensic
evidence relating to a criminal investigation. See TRIBE, supra note 434, at 1331 nn.4-
11 (collecting cases); supra note 546 (same).
" See, e.g., Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Information-
al Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 155 (1991) (concluding that because most theories of
personhood assume personal information is a crucial part of a person's identity, there
must be a recognized "right to informational privacy based on personhood" and that
information is property protected by the Fifth Amendment); Clouse, supra note 562,
at 541-47 (tracing the development of the right to informational privacy, and noting
the Supreme Court's use of a balancing test to determine whether an individual's
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privacy is the area in which a right to privacy most easily translates
into a right to secrecy. In Whalen v. Roe"6 the Court allowed New
York state to keep a computerized list of prescription records for
dangerous drugs and to require physicians to disclose the names of
patients to whom they prescribed those drugs. 6 The decision
balanced the social interest in informational privacy against the
state's "vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous
drugs."566 Finding New York's program to be narrowly tailored,
and replete with security provisions designed to reduce the danger
of unauthorized disclosure, the Supreme Court held that the
constitutional balance tilted in favor of the statute.
567
Mandatory key escrow appears comparable in its intrusive effects
to the regulatory scheme upheld in Whalen, so long as the courts
hold the government to its promise that keys will remain secret and
will be released only pursuant to a warrant or to a very limited
number of other lawful orders. Without that proviso, mandatory
key escrow would verge upon unjustified data collection.5 6 The
warning in Whalen that the Court is "not unaware of the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks or other massive govern-
ment files"569 suggests, however, that informational privacy rights
may grow in response to new technological threats to privacy.
3. The Right to Autonomous Choice Regarding
Intimate Matters
A second component of the right to privacy is a narrow
individual right to make intensely personal decisions about certain
intimate associations without state interference. The Court has
constitutional rights have been infringed by a government-mandated disclosure of
information).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
'65 See id. at 593, 603-04.
566 Id. at 598.
567 See id. at 601-04.
m~ An extreme statute, requiring broad data collection combined with a require-
ment that reports be available to the public, was held unconstitutional in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). What
limits there might be to data collection and the safeguards required against disclosure
were issues left open in Whalen: "We ... do not[] decide any question which might
be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data-whether
intentional or unintentional-or by a system that did not contain comparable security
provisions." 429 U.S. at 605-06.
569 429 U.S. at 605.
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described certain decisions about intimate association and family-
and sex-related decisions as falling within a special privacy zone for
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education."570 The contours of this zone have
always been fuzzy, in part because of long-standing decisions
forbidding certain religious minority marriage practices 57 1 that
would logically appear to belong within the zone of privacy
described by cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird,
Paul v. Davis, and Roe v. Wade.5 7 2 The fuzziness currently is at an
all-time high because of the Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick57 5 and the continuing controversy concerning the right
.70 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,713 (1976); see also Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 618-22 (1984) (describing types of "personal bonds" and relationships
entitled to heightened constitutional protection); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494,499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (recognizing a right to choose which relatives
to live with); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152 (1973) (protecting the reproductive deci-
sions of women); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973) (recognizing the right
to make reproductive decisions without interference from a hospital committee);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,452-55 (1972) (protecting the procreative decisions
of unmarried opposite-sex couples); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(endorsing the right to engage in an interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (establishing the right of married opposite-sex couples
to make procreative decisions); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-54 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution protects the procreative decisions of
married opposite-sex partners); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(recognizing the right not to be sterilized); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have the right to determine the schoolingof their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (recognizing a parental
right to determine what language children may learn); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom
of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637-38 (1980) (arguing that divorce-the
freedom of disassociation-is a fundamental privacy right).
571 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,18-20 (1946) (rejectingan argument
that polygamous practices should be excluded from the prohibitions of the Mann
Act); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-67 (1878) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a statute forbidding polygamy). Both decisions remain
good law.
- See supra note 570 and accompanying text (discussing cases defining zones of
privacy). In addition, many states have laws prohibiting adultery that remain on the
books. These laws are not currently enforced, but there is reason to believe that if
they were enforced they could survive a constitutional challenge based on privacy
principles. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357,360 (Mass. 1983) (rejecting
constitutional attack against a Massachusetts adultery statute). But see MartinJ. Siegel,
For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 58-86
(1991/1992) (arguing that laws criminalizing adultery are unconstitutional).
" 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). The Supreme Court refused to extend the vision of
privacy set out in the cases above to protect the sexual choices of an unmarried same-
sex couple in Bowers and did so in a way that casts doubt on the entire strand of
privacy protection for intensely personal and intimate associations. Professor Tribe
describes the decision in Bowers as erroneous and unprincipled and predicts that it
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to abortion.
74
As applied, this second strand of privacy jurisprudence is
primarily directed at the preservation of personal autonomy,
575
and especially that autonomy relating to the sexual and reproductive
practices and values of the traditional family and the "traditional
unmarried couple."5 76 Secrecy has a role to play here too, because
sometimes secrecy is a prerequisite to the exercise of autonomy,
even (or especially) within the family.
577
Furthermore, electronic communications will increasingly
become a critical part of intimate association. In a world in which
the commuter marriage is increasingly common, electronic
communications such as the telephone, fax, and especially e-mail
(which is cheaper and less intrusive than a telephone, more private
than a fax, and often instantaneous) are increasingly becoming
the glue that holds marriages and other intimate relationships to-
gether.578 The current rule, which provides much greater privacy
protection to the bedroom than to the intimate, transcontinental,
interspousal e-mail, 79 may soon need revision.580  Such a revi-
will not be followed. See TRIBE, supra note 434, § 15-21. For a thoughtful
reformulation of privacy doctrines after Bowers, see Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 750-
807.
"" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2824-33 (1992) (allowing
certain state restrictions on abortion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991)
(allowing government to ban the use of federal public funds for abortions and related
activities).
571 On the psychological and moral importance of allowing individuals to make
voluntary choices in matters vitally affecting them, see BruceJ. Winick, On Autonomy:
Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1755-68 (1992); see also
Bercu, supra note 90, at 402-03 (asserting that "information privacy is essential to our
development and self-fulfillment as individuals").
5176 TRIBE, supra note 434, § 15-21.
17 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2831 (striking down a statutory
provision that required spousal notification prior to abortion, but upholding the
statute's informed consent and reporting requirements), overruling Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(invalidating the informed consent and reporting requirements of a statute restricting
abortions).
" E-mail also allows people to meet and exchange ideas, thus increasing their
chances of forming lasting relationships. See Steve Lohr, Therapy on a Virtual Couch,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, at C7 (interviewing psychiatrist and novelist Avodah Offit).
Indeed, in a few cases e-mail apparently has become a substitute for sex, as some of
Dr. Offit's patients have consulted her about their "E-mail love relationships." Id.
57' Butsee Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351-52 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that
a marital couple's right to bring a privacy challenge to a conviction under a Virginia
sodomy statute was waived due to the presence of an invited third party), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 977 (1976). The majority conceded, however, that the Lovisis "would [have]
remain[ed] protected in their expectation of privacy" if they had only spoken or
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sion should begin by reaffirming what remains of Boyd, particularly
as it applies to personal papers such as diaries.
8 1
E. What Next?
On balance, as the law stands today, private, noncommercial
users of encryption probably have a Fourth Amendment right to
resist mandatory key escrow. Whether commercial users or
corporations would have such a right under current doctrines is less
clear. Even the existence of the right for private, noncommercial
users appears to be a distressingly close question given the current
state of civil rights doctrine and the great importance that the
courts give to law enforcement and national security. The law in
this area has undergone great change in the past two decades, and
there is no reason to believe that the evolution has stopped.
The collapse of the distinction between home and office, fueled
in part by the growth of telecommuting, will place a further strain
on existing rules that attempt to distinguish between private,
noncommercial activities whose classical locus is the home, and less
private, more commercial activities whose traditional location was
the office. If the courts further erode the remnant of the zone of
privacy that still surrounds the home, the growth in freedom to
work at home will have come at a high price.
IV. IDEAS ARE WEAPONS
The Bill of Rights is predicated on assumptions about technolog-
ical limits that may soon be falsified. For example, the First
Amendment is premised on a theory of speech that never imagined
that scientific speech might become inherently dangerous.
8 2
Some have argued that the publication of advanced cryptographic
algorithms constitutes inherently dangerous speech. Although I
written about their activities to third parties. Id. at 351.
'o The even thornier problem of the intimate, international, interspousal e-mail
is beyond the scope of this Article. The question is complex because it will turn on
the citizenship of the parties, their location, and other factors.
'a' "Certain intimate personal documents-a diary is the best example-are like an
extension of the individual's mind. They are a substitute for the perfect memory that
humans lack. Forcing an individual to give up possession of these intimate writings
may be psychologically comparable to prying words from his lips." Alito, supra note
542, at 39.
'8 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 357-63 (quoting remarks of the NSA Director
Bobby Ray Inman); supra note 162 (collecting articles on governmental attempts to
suppress academic speech with arguably harmful consequences).
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think these arguments are misguided because the devices described
by the speech cannot directly hurt anyone, it is certainly possible to
imagine that one day someone will create a device that is easy to
build, runs on house current, and is incredibly destructive.
Publication of the plans for such a device might be dangerous
indeed, and arguably outside the First Amendment, at least as
originally conceived. In light of technical changes, "the Justices are
now faced ... with the difficult task of deciding just how high a
price our constitutional commitment to open, meaningful discussion
requires us to pay in terms of... competing concerns.
" 583
The Fourth Amendment also has implicit assumptions about the
limits of technology that will soon break down, if they have not
already done so.584 The Fourth Amendment was written, debated,
ratified, administered, and interpreted for its first two hundred
years on the basis of the assumption that there are physical limits to
the government's ability to make "reasonable" searches. Although
this presumption has begun to fray in the face of technical augmen-
tation of the public servant's ability to peer into private prop-
erty,5 85 the basic assumption that the police cannot be everywhere
at once remains unshaken. 8 6  This assumption may have to
change, and soon. If it does, our thinking about the Fourth
Amendment will need to change with it."8 7
' Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theoy, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 523, 525.
"' On a related point, consider that in colonial times, "nothing even remotely
resembling modern law enforcement existed." Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About
First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994).
a See supra notes 484-92 and accompanying text.
5' See supra notes 398-402 and accompanying text.
-'8 One counterargument contends that the technical change that really matters
is that the world is a more dangerous place than ever imagined in 1791. The size and
nature of the threat to the nation's existence, including nuclear, chemical, and
bacteriological weaponry, as well as systems for their rapid and/or surreptitious
delivery, means that national security interests require compromises of some rights
that might never have been imagined in 1791. Although this argument is powerful,
I think it mistaken for two reasons. First, it understates the degree to which the
fledgling United States was at risk from military and economic assault by European
powers. The new Constitution was adopted precisely because the country appeared
to be falling apart under the Articles of Confederation. The Spanish, French, and
British each posed substantial military and economic threats. Second, granting that
modem risks include extinction where previously the greatest danger was subjugation,
it would take a far more immediate danger than we currently face to make it even
worth considering subjecting ourselves to a surveillance state. See generally OSCAR H.
GANDYJR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
(1993) (analyzing panoptic thinking by integrating several social science perspectives);
Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
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When the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, speech took place
between persons who saw each other eye-to-eye, or who wrote
letters by hand, or printed pamphlets, books, and newspapers using
hand-set type. Today those forms of communication have been
supplemented, and often supplanted, by electronic communications
including telephones, desktop publishing, and e-mail; additionally,
letters are often typed on computers before being mailed. These
new media-particularly the telephone, but increasingly e-mail-are
the bases of modern social and commercial relations. They play
significant roles in political and cultural organizations as well. 8
Broadcasting via radio and television (including cable television) is
now the dominant mode of mass communication, having long
supplanted the written word. But new forms of electronic commu-
nication such as the electronic bulletin board, the Internet USENET
newsgroup, and the Internet mailing list promise to revive the
importance of the written word.
Under current law, a person communicating via new media is
less able to ensure her privacy than were speakers in the late
eighteenth century. If Thomas Jefferson wanted to speak privately
toJohn Adams, they could go for a walk in an open field where they
could see any potential eavesdroppers from a mile away.
589
Letters could be encoded with the then-unbreakable Vigen~re
cipher, although this would have been a slow process and was thus
rarely used.590 In contrast, modern eavesdroppers, particularly
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349 (1986) (discussing the
enlarged role of the executive in national security matters).
' See, e.g., Frank Odasz, Big Sky Telegraph, 71 WHOLE EARTH REV. 32, 32 (1991)
(describing the use of the Big Sky Telegraph in linking Women's Centers in distant
parts of Montana); Graeme Browning, Zapping the Capitol, 43 NAT'L J. 2446, 2446
(1994) (discussing the use of "the worldwide web of computer networks" to lobby
Congress); John H. Fund, We Are All Pundits Now, WALL ST.J., Nov. 8, 1994, at A22
(reporting on the role of e-mail in the campaign to defeat Speaker of the House Tom
Foley in the 1994 elections).
" In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), the Supreme Court held that
an open field was not a protected area for Fourth Amendment purposes. This does
not detract from the point in the text, which refers to attitudes that long predate both
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Hester. The open fields doctrine
was restated in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984) (finding no
Fourth Amendment violation stemming from a search of a field where marijuana was
growing), which appears to create a safe harbor for eavesdropping. See Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by
the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 25 n.105 (1986) (criticizing Oliver for
permitting new means of surveillance that are "used to invade areas which people
have traditionally believed were closed to outsiders").
" See supra note 372.
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wiretappers, are invisible. Strong cryptography offers the prospect
of restoring the privacy enjoyed by Jefferson and Adams to anyone
with a computer or a scrambler telephone, thereby making it again
possible to enjoy this privacy, albeit with a larger number of
correspondents spread out over greater distances.
As the preceding sections have shown, however, it is far from
obvious from the Court's recent decisions that the Constitution will
be read to block a future government's attempt to dampen the
privacy-enhancing effects of the cryptographic revolution. Part III
argued that the constitutionality of hypothetical mandatory key
escrow legislation would most often turn on a balancing test in
which the Supreme Court would seek to weigh security claims
against privacy interests.591 Regardless of how the Court decides
to strike the balance, it will involve a process requiring decisions not
compelled by any precedent. As is often the case when the law
encounters new technology, the decisional law is indeterminate or
at the very least distinguishable. In order to predict where the law
relating to cryptography may be going and to suggest feasible
alternatives, one needs to understand the concerns that are likely to
influence the balance between claims asserting security and privacy
interests. The remainder of this final Part looks at how this
balancing of incommensurables might work.
A. Caught Between Archetypes
The protections we find in the Constitution turn in part on the
horror stories and heroic legends we tell ourselves; constitutional
law is indeed "haunted by archetypes."5 92 Examples of archetypes
in constitutional law include Chief Justice Marshall, President
Lincoln, the Lochner Court, President Nixon, and the phenomenon
of McCarthyism.59 The key escrow debates have the misfortune
5 See supra part III.D.2.
Seth F. Kreimer, Sunligh Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1991). The archetype
can be seen as a special type of idealized cognitive model, usually concerning
something feared or loved. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2233-34 (1989).
Like other idealized cognitive models, archetypes serve as reference points used to
categorize experiences.
... For a discussion on McCarthyism as an archetype, see Kreimer, supra note 592,
at 14 (finding that McCarthyism "has achieved the status of a negative archetype in
contemporary political discourse ... as a term of opprobrium, of classic political
impropriety"). See generally ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992)
(deriving archetypes implicitly from American constitutional history from the figures
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to be situated at the intersection of entrenched but conflicting
social/political archetypes: the totalitarian state and the conspira-
tor.
1. Big Brother
There can be no doubt that the power of the national govern-
ment has grown with every response to a national challenge, be it
the Civil War, subsequent wars, the depression, or the moral,
political, and practical demands of the modern welfare state. The
original American constitution, the Articles of Confederation,
collapsed because it was too decentralized. The replacement, our
current Constitution, was bitterly opposed by a substantial minority
who believed it to be an overcorrection towards centralized
rule.594 Since the adoption of the Constitution, or at least since
the installation of Chief Justice Marshall, the tendency has been to
ratchet power towards the center, away from states. This progres-
sion is exemplified by the evolution of the Commerce Clause.
Gradually, the federal power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause has come to encompass almost all economic transactions, no
matter how local. 595 The evolution of the formal relationship
between the central government and the individual is, however,
more complex. The size and complexity of the national govern-
ment's economic, legal, and regulatory powers have grown greatly,
but so too (if perhaps not as quickly) have the formal legal rights of
the paradigmatic citizen.
96
Despite these developments, no sophisticated constitutional
analysis is necessary to recognize that the government still lacks the
authority to require that every television set sold in the United
States carry with it a microphone for police to eavesdrop on
of Hamilton, Madison, and Lincoln).
594 See generally HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR
(1981) (explaining the role of the Anti-Federalists and arguing that they should be
counted among the Founding Fathers); HERBERTJ. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST (1981).
... See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (holding that Congress
has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate home-grown wheat); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (finding that Congress may regulate
interstate shipment of goods under Commerce Clause power).
" By referring to the paradigmatic citizen, I mean to indicate that where once the
free, white, usually property-owning male was the person whose political rights were
the subject of rights talk, the pool of relevant rights claimants now has expanded to
include all adult residents.
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conversations in the home. 9 7 The deficiencies in this proposal
would not be cured by hedging the microphone's remote controls
with the most elaborate safeguards and requiring careful judicial
review before activating any of the devices. The very idea is,
fortunately, laughable, so much so that it is hard even to imagine
any government official proposing it.598
Similarly, it is hard to imagine that a statute designed to ease
surreptitious entry by the police, requiring every citizen to give the
government a set of keys to her house, would survive even cursory
judicial review.599 These hypothetical statutes require so little
analysis because they immediately evoke George Orwell's 1984.600
Big Brother and his thought police provide a vivid archetype of state
overintrusion into private life.6"1
Vivid as the Orwellian archetype may be, it is far from all-
powerful, as demonstrated by the large number of dissenting
opinions vainly invoking it.60 2 It may be that mandatory key
597 1 owe the example to Mark Eckenwiler, Letter to the Editor: This Chip Can "Clip"
Americans' Civil Liberties, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 1, 1994, at A18.
" Even here, alas, a small qualification may be in order. Five years ago I would
have written only slightly less emphatically that a proposal to require that every
telephone switching system be modified to make government wiretapping easy would
be constitutional, but of course would have no chance of passage. Now this country
is committed to paying at least half a billion dollars to make that plan a reality. See
supra notes 138, 425 and accompanying text (discussing the Digital Telephony
initiative).
.. It is disturbing to note, however, that most household locks use reproducible
patterns. Armed with the serial number, a call to the manufacturer makes it easy to
fabricate a duplicate. The keys to most household locks are in effect held in "escrow"
by their manufacturers.
6o GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948).
601 A similarly chilling vision is found in Bentham's concept of the Panopticon-
although Bentham himself found his vision of pervasive surveillance utopian rather
than dystopian. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS
& OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 146-48 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980). The Orwellian
archetype also gathers some of its power from the existence of surveillance states such
as North Korea, the People's Republic of China (at least in some times and regions),
and the former Soviet Union. See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE FEAR OF CONSPIRACY 265
(1971) (noting that Americans often find it "easier to blame communist conspirators
for every conflict in the world than to study the origins and complexities of civil
[strife]"). Orwell's 1984 is powerful because it rings too true.
o See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2882 (1992) (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting) (stating that the effect of Roe's sudden elimination of abortion's moral
stigma from the minds of many is "nothing less than Orwellian"); Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing a state law that prohibits the Chamber of Commerce from advertising
support for political candidates as Orwellian); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
1995] THE METAPHOR IS THE KEY- THE CLIPPER CHIP 849
escrow will produce the same public outcry as the wiretap-ready TV
set603 or a telephone that can be turned into a bugging device
even when on the hook." 4 It should. And if it does, half of this
Article is an exercise in pedantic overcaution, and the fact that the
state of the law produces a need for such caution is a deeply
damning indictment of the Burger/Rehnquist Court's privacy
jurisprudence. For if it is obvious from the Zeitgeist that mandatory
key escrow is impossible, yet far from obvious from the relevant
cases, then the cases are revealed as being significantly more state-
oriented and illiberal than what "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 605
Even overcaution has its place. The spirit of the times is always
subject to change. As a result, we have a human court to interpret
the Constitution in light of changing conditions. 616 Interpreters
of the Constitution are unable to be completely insensitive to the
felt necessities of the times, whether consciously or not. The
decision about the constitutionality of mandatory key escrow would
be no exception to this rule. The same dynamic that produced the
facts of Korematsu v. United States and the decision itself might arise
again, 607 especially if those necessities are felt strongly by officials
gripped by a sense of insecurity or danger.611 "Collectively we
part) (describing as Orwellian the Court's screening out of religious symbols from
public displays); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(comparing the Court's allowance of police surveillance from aircraft to a passage
from Orwell's 1984).
See supra note 416 (describing popular opposition to Clipper). But see supra
note 138 (describing the Digital Telephony initiative).
' See Letter from Ron Rivest, E.S. Webster Professor of Computer Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to Dorothy E. Denning, Professor and Chair,
Computer Sciences Department, Georgetown University 1 (Feb. 25, 1994) (on file
with author) ("There are all kinds of wonderfully stupid things one could do with
modern technology that could 'help' law enforcement. But merely being of assistance
to law enforcement doesn't make a proposal a good thing; many such ideas are
objectionable and unacceptable because of the unreasonably large cost/benefit ratio
(real or psychological cost).").
605 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(contending that Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence should accommodate contempo-
rary standards of reasonable privacy).
Io See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (noting that the Constitution, like common law, is interpreted
dynamically).
607 See supra note 77.
s There are, of course, magnificent examples of executive andjudicial resistance
to security paranoia. See e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
718-19 (1971) (allowing a newspaper to publish the contents of classified documents);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (striking down Ohio's criminal
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face no greater challenge than maintaining sensible perspectives on
national security issues," but we sometimes fail the test.60 9 One
need not believe that the executive is inevitably repressive or that
the judiciary is inevitably supine to recognize that both of these
tendencies can be found in our nation's history, and that we
therefore cannot rule out their recurrence with total confidence.
2. The Conspirator
Cryptography is the conspirator's ideal tool. This fact, more
than anything else, will provide the emotional (if not the legal)
justification for any attempt to control the use of unescrowed
cryptography. Anxiety that people will be able to do terrible things
without being detected until it is too late has been a recurring worry
since the Puritans colonized North America.
610
Given the public opposition to Clipper,"' the government is
unlikely to propose mandatory key escrow without some triggering
event. In the wake of a great crime, perhaps by terrorists or drug
cartels-the detection of which could plausibly have been frustrated
by encryption-that which today looks clearly unconstitutional might
unfortunately appear more palatable.612  Suppose, for example,
syndicalism statute); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that passports
cannot be denied on the basis of past or present membership in the Communist
party). It was resistance by the Department of the Army-in the executive
branch-that triggered the fall of McCarthy. See RIcHARD M. FRIED, MEN AGAINST
MCCARTHY 282 (1976) (describing climatic moment of Army-McCarthy hearings).
o Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 587, at 349.
610 In fact, the worry has deep English roots, even if these are sometimes exagger-
ated. See Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 393, 397 (1922)
(discussing the period between the reigns of Edward III and Elizabeth I, duringwhich
a number of statutes were passed to suppress combinations for various specific
purposes, such as treasonable designs, breaches of the peace, raising prices, and the
like); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922-23
(1959) (discussing the conspiracy indictment). The first conspiracy statutes, which
defined the crime in narrow terms, were enacted around 1300 in the reign of Edward
I. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 525 (2d ed. 1986).
61 See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
612 In fact, wartime has often provided the impetus for U.S. government
censorship of communications between the United States and foreign countries. See,
e.g., Exec. Order No. 8985 (Dec. 19, 1941), reprinted in 3 C.F.R. 1047 (1938-1943)
(establishing the Office of Censorship to censor, at the "absolute discretion" of the
Director, "mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission" to or from other
countries), revoked Exec. Order No. 9631 (Sept. 28, 1945), reprinted in 3 C.F.R. 435
(1943-1948) (abolishing the Office of Censorship); seealso MatthewJ.Jacobs, Assessing
the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REV. 675,
679-86 (1992) (outlining the history of U.S. wartime battle-zone censorship).
The World War II domestic censorship regulations required that all written
1995] THE METAPHOR IS THE KEY- THE CLIPPER CHIP 851
that Senator McCarthy had been able to demonstrate in 1952 that
Communists were using strong encryption to protect their secrets.
It is not hard to believe that some form of key escrow or an outright
ban on cryptography would have been proposed, if not adopted.
Big Brother may yet look more comforting than the reigning
criminal archetypes.
a. Panics Over Plotters
The fear that two or more persons may unite in common cause
to carry out an unlawful or reprehensible plot against a social
community and its privileged ideals is an archetypical American
concern."'3 The real or imagined conspirators have varied, being
alternately foreign, domestic, or an unholy alliance of the two.
6 14
The fear of conspirators is not a recent phenomena dating back to
the McCarthy era, but rather is rooted in the Puritan jeremiad about
the dangers of succumbing to Satanic, Catholic, or nonconformist
messages-including those hand-carried-be passed to a censor. See U.S. Censorship
Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1801.3 (1945). Letters from the United States to foreign
countries or U.S. possessions were to be written "in English, if possible" but if written
in another language then "the name of the language used should be written in
English on the face of the envelope." Id. § 1801.21(b). Cables and radio traffic were
permitted only in English, French, Portuguese, or Spanish without special authoriza-
tion. See id. § 1801.48.
Letters employing codes and ciphers were specifically prohibited unless autho-
rized. See id. § 1891.22. Cable transmissions could use any one of nine specified
commercial codes, but private codes required a special license from the Department
of Censorship. Applicants for these licenses were required to provide 15 copies of
their code with the application. See id. § 1801.49.
Telephone calls to Mexico were permitted to be in Spanish, while French was
allowed in calls to Canada. Radiotelephones could use English, Spanish, French, and
Portuguese "except in the event that translators are not available at the censorship
point." Id. § 1801.74. Anonymous international calls were prohibited. All callers
had to identify themselves to the censors in advance. See id. § 1801.71. Callers from
hotels had to be identified by the management, whereas calls from pay phones were
banned. See id. §§ 1801.72-.73.
61
3 See ROBERT S. LEVINE, CONSPIRACY AND ROMANCE 5 (1989) (describing various
fears of conspiracy in early America); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to
Turn Back from an Ever Expanding Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 3-4 (1992) (discussing the generally accepted notion that consipracy is
punished because joint action is more dangerous than individual action). Webster's
defines conspiracy as "[a]n agreement between two or more persons to commit a
crime or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action." WEBSTER'S II NEW
RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 302 (1983).614 See DAVIS, supra note 601, at xiii ("If the United States has enjoyed uncommon
security from the time of independence, the Americans have also been subjected to
continual alarms and warnings of imminent catastrophe.").
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conspiracies. "In a nation in which every man is supposed to be on
the make, there is an overriding fear of being taken in."615 Fear
of conspiracy is hardly unique to America,6 16 although "Americans
have been curiously obsessed with the contingency of their
experiment with freedom." 617 The fear of conspiracy in America
is a subject so vast that no small sketch can do it justice.
The seventeenth-century Puritan colonists of New England
worried about conspiracies among Indians, Quakers, witches, and
the (Catholic) French, all of whom threatened the new Israel, and
in so doing also threatened to prevent the fulfillment of the
millennial vision that informed those communities' founding
religious vision. 618 When their relations with England soured, the
colonists blamed imperialistic conspiracies they believed were
aiming to destroy their liberties.
619
In the eyes of the victors, independence only made the new
nation a more attractive target to its enemies. George Washington's
instantly canonical Farewell Address sounded the theme, warning of
the danger posed to the American nation by secret enemies. To
President Washington, it was "easy to foresee that from different
causes and from different quarters much pains [would] be taken,
many artifices employed, to weaken" the American commitment to
its new nation. Commitment to the American experiment was
precarious, vulnerable, and thus would be "the point in your
political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external
enemies will be most constantly and actively" directing their
energies, "though often covertly and insidiously." 6 ' The diversity
of the American people, with widely varying ancestries, differing
615 Id. at xvi.
616 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 6-7 (1965) (noting that
"Americans have no monopoly on the gift for paranoid improvisation").
617 DAVIS, supra note 601, at xiii.
618 See LEVINE, supra note 613, at 6-8 (arguing that conspiratorial fears helped New
England colonists to define and create communities); PERRY MILLER, THE NEW
ENGLAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE 395 (1953).
619 
See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORICINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 95, 144-159 (1967) (arguing that the sentiment that the American
colonists were faced with a conspiracy to deprive them of their freedom had deep
roots in Anglo-American political culture predating the events of the struggle with
England); Gordon S. Wood, Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in
the Eighteenth Centuy, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 411 (1982) (discussing the prevalence of
conspiratorial fears in colonial America).
6 0 George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), in A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205, 207 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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sects and creeds, and different experiences depending on class and
region, served to make the nation even more vulnerable to "faction"
and conspiracy.
621
Indeed, New England was soon gripped by a panic that the
(mythical) Bavarian Illuminati, a secret, French-controlled, atheistic,
antidemocratic cabal, was conspiring to undermine American liberty
and religion. Despite the absence of any extant Bavarian Illuminati,
many believed that the United States was in grave danger and "the
vast majority of New England Federalists accepted the conspiracy
charges as entirely plausible, if not completely proven." 22 The
evils of the Terror in post-Revolutionary France only served to
confirm the awesome power of conspirators, for only a vast
conspiracy could explain the otherwise bewildering series of
events.6 23 The image of the Terror, and the Masonic or Jacobean
conspirators behind it, was one of the themes sounded to justify the
Alien and Sedition Acts.624
A related, if less sanguinary, imagery dominated the attack on
the Second Bank of the United States, an institution thatJacksonian
Democrats viewed as a secretive "hydra of corruption" designed to
favor the rich against the majority of the country.625 Here, per-
haps for the first time, the conspiracy was understood to be home-
grown, if dominated by "aristocratic" elements fundamentally alien
in spirit to the American popular democracy desired by the
Jacksonians.
In the decades before the Civil War, as the threat of foreign
military invasion receded, Americans were gripped by the threat of
vast shadowy conspiracies in which various groups, including
621 See DAVIS, supra note 601, at 68 (pointing to anti-Catholic writers who observed
that the "key to Catholic strategy" was the maxim "'[d]ivide and conquer,'" by which
Catholics supposedly wished to "keep the diverse groups and interests of society from
fusing into 'a bona fide American character'"); Washington, supra note 620, at 207
(warning of the dangers of factions).
622 PETER AMAZEEN, THE BAVARIAN ILLUMINATI SCARE 3 (1988) (unpublished B.A.
thesis, Harvard University); see also VERNON STAUFFER, NEW ENGLAND AND THE
BAVARIAN ILLUMINATI 229-43 (1918) (noting that the panic, which lasted almost two
years, was touched off by a sermon given by Reverend Jedeidiah Morse on May 9,
1798, based on his reading ofJohn Robison's 1797 book, Proofs of a Conspiracy Against
All the Religions and Governments of Europe).
623 See DAVIS, supra note 601, at 35.
624 See id. at 36. For a discussion of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see supra note
75 and accompanying text.625 
BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE CIVIL WAR 379 (1957) (quoting PresidentJackson); see also id. at 395-96, 405-09
(describing the various evils of the Bank as perceived byJacksonians).
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Freemasons, Mormons, or Catholics, plotted secretly to subvert the
American (Protestant) way of life.62 The American commitment
to openness meant that any organization that was not itself open,
that held secret meetings or, worse, had secret rituals, was not just
suspect, but threatening.6 7 The Civil War itself came to be
portrayed as an apocalyptic battle between the forces of freedom
and a conspiratorial "Slave Power."
28
Post-Civil War industrialization provided the environment for a
redefinition and bifurcation of the nature of the conspiracy, one
which persisted until the First World War. On the one hand, there
was the conspiracy of labor organizations, be it the International
Workers of the World, the Socialist International, or the beginning
of the American union movement. An illustrative example was the
reaction to the Haymarket Riot of 1886, in which Chicago workers
battled police, and which culminated in the explosion of a dynamite
bomb that was widely ascribed to anarchists. Convictions were
returned by a jury made up of persons who admitted prejudice
against the defendants, and whom the judge charged to convict if
"there was a conspiracy to overthrow the existing order of society"
and that the defendants and the bomb-thrower, whoever he might
be, were parties to it.6 29 Others, notably the Progressives, focused
on what they perceived was the conspiracy among corporations,
trusts and a small cabal built on wealth and privilege.. designed,
they thought, to wrest control of the economy and thus undermine
the democratic process.6"' The entry of the United States into the
62 See David B. Davis, Some Themes of Countersubversion: An Analysis of Anti-
Masonic Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature, 47 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 205
(1960), reprinted in DAVIS, supra note 601, at 9, 10-11. Fear of Freemasons gave rise
to a major political party, the anti-Masonic party.
127 See id. at 14 (citing Richard Rush for the idea that "[o]f all governments ...
ours was the one with the most to fear from secret societies, since popular sovereignty
by its very nature required perfect freedom of public inquiry and judgment").
628 See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE
62-86 (1969) (describing various formulations of the "Slave Power" thesis).
62JAcOB EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL 5-7 (1970).630 See DAVIS, supra note 601, at 153.
6s See; e.g., Robert M. La Follette, A Small Group of Men Hold in Their Hands the
Business of This Country, 42 CONG. REC. 3434-36, 3450-51 (1908), reprinted in DAVIS,
supra note 601, at 200. Consider too this lawyer's view of the danger:
We have heard much of the dangers of corporations in late years; but, while
our publicists had hardly whetted their swords to meet this question, we are
confronted with a new monster a thousand times more terrible. Every
student knows how corporations have grown from a monastic institution to
the predominance they now occupy in the business world; but American
ingenuity has invented a legal machine which may swallow a hundred
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First World War shortly after President Wilson's promise to stay out
of it, combined with Communism's triumph in Russia, unleashed an
orgy of antisubversive activity, although the distinction from simple
nativism was not always clear.
63 2
Late-twentieth-century anti-Communist antisubversion is a topic
all of its own, spanning McCarthyism,6 33 loyalty oaths, 6 4 and a large
number of important civil liberties decisions, notably those
alternately expanding and contracting the protections of the First
Amendment.6 3' The low water mark, achieved in Dennis v. United
States,636 amounted to the criminalization of "any radical political
doctrine." 637 Recently, in a climate of lessened insecurity, the
courts have been considerably more willing to allow a wide range of
radical speech.6 ' The important points for present purposes are
corporations or a hundred thousand individuals; and then, with all the
corporate irresponsibility, their united power be stored, like a dynamo, in
portable compass, and wielded by one or two men. Not even amenable to
the restraints of corporation law, these "trusts" may realize the Satanic ambi-
tion,- infinite and irresponsible power free of check or conscience.
F.J. Stimson, Trusts, 1 HARV. L. REV. 132, 132 (1887-1888).
652 See DAVIS, supra note 601, at 205-10 ("The years from 1917 to 1921 are
probably unmatched in American history for popular hysteria, xenophobia, and
paranoid suspicion."). At its peak in 1924, the Ku Klux Klan, which blended
nativisism with its anti-Black, -Catholic, and -Jewish ideology, had about 4.5 million
members. See id. at 215.633 See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF
JOE MCCARTHY (1983) (tracing Senator McCarthy's life and political career).
6 See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN AMERICA 340-67 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding loyalty
oaths).
63 See, e.g., Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam) (reformu-
lating the test first outlined in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919), to
require objectively inciting language in a context that makes it likely to produce direct
lawless behavior in order to regulate speech); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
516-17 (1951) (upholding a conviction under the Smith Act for the mere advocacy of
Communism); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (creating the "clear
and present danger" test for any attempted regulation of speech). See generally
THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963)
(tracing the Supreme Court's development ofjurisprudence protecting freedom of
expression); Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970)
(discussing the conflict between conspiracy law and First Amendment rights).
636 341 U.S. 494,516-17 (1951) (upholding petitioner's conviction under the Smith
Act despite the absence of evidence of any overt act other than the advocacy of
Communism); cf. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.14, at 56 (1986) (attributing Dennis to the Supreme
Court's bowing to the "tone of the times ... as it managed to avoid direct
confrontation" with Congress and the Executive).
63 MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT ANDJUDICIAL
REVIEW 65 (1966).
615 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) (emphasizing
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that, although one could debate what constitutes the norm,
decisions significantly curtailing civil liberties are far from unique
and that these decisions are often driven by a fear of criminal or
subversive plotters, a fear with deep roots in our culture. Given an
appropriate trigger, it is entirely possible that a similar dynamic
could apply to the regulation of cryptography.
b. Modern Incarnations: The Drug Kingpin and the Terrorist
Today's most significant criminal archetypes are the drug
kingpin and the terrorist. Perhaps because criminal, anarchist, and
terrorist archetypes arise from events rather than literature, there
is no single figure or movement with the evocative power of Big
Brother, now that the international communist conspiracy has left
the anxiety closet and joined the Wobblies and the Jacobins in the
care of the History Department. Jack the Ripper, the prototypical
serial killer, may be the closest thing to a threatening criminal
archetype that has lasted more than two generations, although Al
Capone, Charles Manson, and the urban gang member all have
achieved some near-mythic status as well.
What criminal archetypes lack in longevity, they make up in
menace. At least until his capture, the terrorist archetype for many
years was Carlos the Jackal.639 Carlos's capture, coming as it does
on the heels of the collapse of any credible international communist
movement, may create a small window of opportunity for privacy
activists to seek legislative or judicial ratification for their argument
that Big Brother is a greater menace. This window may not be open
for long.
640
the requirement that speech must be "intended to produce, and likely to produce,
imminent disorder" to be punished by the state); Brandenburg, 396 U.S. at 447
(reformulating Schenck to require objectively inciting language in a context that makes
it likely to produce direct lawless behavior in order to regulate speech). See generally
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (arguing that over the past few decades freedom of speech
has developed a new significance that helps to account for the extremes to which the
principle has been taken).
69 See DAVID YALLOP, TRACKING THE JACKAL: THE SEARCH FOR CARLOS, THE
WORLD'S MOST WANTED MAN (1993); see also CLAIRE STERLING, THE TERROR
NETWORK 129-46 (1981) (tracing the career of Carlos the Jackal).
6"0 "Big Brother is dead. The only serious likelihood of his resurrection lies in
reaction to the chaos and disintegration" that might be caused by "[t]errorists with
secure phones... [who] could bring down notjust a few buildings but large sections
of a modern economy." Nicholas Wade, Method and Madness: Little Brother, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 23.
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The "War on Drugs" proclaimed by President Ronald Reagan in
1982 and enthusiastically endorsed by Presidents Bush and Clinton
may be our "longest war." 1 "Refusing to shoulder" the "unbear-
able burden" of communities "devastated" by drugs, "Americans
have given the government a mandate to eliminate the scourge
before its effects become irrevocable." 642 Champions of the War on
Drugs claim "almost universal acceptance [of the notion] that the
drug problem is 'the worst disease that plagues our nation to-
day.v" 643  Notably, "[b]y the mid 1980s ... anti-drug sentiment
encompassing even casual use became a national cause."
644
Likewise, fear of the drug kingpin quickly reached Congress,
which reacted first by passing the continuing criminal enterprise
statute, better known as the drug kingpin statute, imposing long
mandatory minimum sentences. 645 When that was not enough,
Congress passed a statute permitting the death penalty in drug cases
connected to a killing.646 Along the way, Congress made attempt-
ing to be a drug kingpin and conspiring with a drug kingpin
punishable by the same penalty as the offense itself.
647
With Congress and the Executive in such agreement, it is no
surprise that the War on Drugs is a major social phenomenon,
having criminalized behavior engaged in by somewhere between
fourteen and twenty-three million Americans per year.648 Experts
641 STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING
OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS at xv (1993).
642 Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to the
War on Drugs, 19 AM.J. GRIM. L. 219, 224 (1992) (discussing Supreme Court cases
dealing with the "War on Drugs" in relation to the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amend-
ments).
Sandra R. Acosta, Imposing the Death Penalty upon Drug Kingpins, 27 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 596, 596 (1990) (quoting Representative James A. Traficant, a Democrat
from Ohio).
644 Krasnow, supra note 642, at 221 n.3.
64 See Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (1970) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). A person engages in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise if she "occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position,
or any other position of management" of five or more persons who act feloniously,
in concert, to violate drug laws. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (1988).
" See Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387 (1988) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (making the death penalty
applicable to convictions for killings committed during illicit drug-related activity).
64 See Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, § 406, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (1970) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988)).
64 ' See Michael Isikoff, Federal Study Shocks Drug Experts: "Casual" Use of Po
Cocaine Plummets, but Coke Addiction Rises, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 1, 1989, at Al, A12
(noting that casual use of marijuana and cocaine fell from 23 million people in 1985
to 14.5 million in 1988); see also Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the
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recently began to study the war's longer-term effects, including the
incarceration of hundreds of thousands of persons, clogged courts,
corrupt police officers and corrupt judges, and a disproportionate
impact on African-American males (and, through them, on their
families). 9 The War on Drugs has achieved these and other
dubious results through the expedient of demonizing the drug user,
the drug "pusher," and especially the drug "kingpin."
650
The fear of drug trafficking puts great pressure on the police.
The mutually consensual nature of the drug crime requires a special
type of police work because "law enforcement lacks its staunchest
ally, the victim," 51 who might report the crime and testify against
the perpetrator. As a result, the police are driven to use surveil-
lance, wiretapping, and informants because they have little else
upon which to rely.652  In 1993, about two-thirds of the court-
ordered wiretaps were for drug-related offenses. 55  A similar
dynamic has stimulated the expansion of surveillance into the
workplace.
654
The attempt to control drug trafficking also puts pressures on
the courts that go beyond increasing caseloads. The War on Drugs
creates pressure to support efforts to eradicate the drug "plague."
The results of such pressure include Supreme Court descriptions of
drug traffickers as "sophisticated criminal syndicates" that create
Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE LJ. 2593, 2613 n.65 (1994) (book review of DUKE
& GRoss, supra note 641).
649 See DUKE & GRoss, supra note 641, at 160-61 (discussing the social costs of
drug prohibition); Barnett, supra note 648, at 2610-14 (same).
65o See Barnett, supra note 648, at 2613 (noting that demonization is made easier
by the relatively small number of drug users).
65 DUKE & GROSS, supra note 641, at 107.
652 Cf Barnett, supra note 648, at 2612 (describing the view of some commentators
that police are given so much deference in searching and arresting drug suspects that
there is a de facto "drug exception" to the Bill of Rights).
65 See WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 145, at 4.
' See Cornish & Louria, supra note 514, at 95 (discussing the effects that mass
drug testing will have on our culture by examining employment drug testing as a
means of surveillance). The authors report that mass drug testing entails:
(1) Fourth Amendment tolerance of systematic preventive searches; (2)
increased use of biochemical surveillance as a means of monitoring and
deterring undesired behavior; (3) increased use of the workplace and
economic sanctions as a tool of regulating undesirable behavior; (4) privat-
ization of traditional law enforcement functions; (5) shrinkage of our
expectations of personal privacy; (6) increased use of "profiles"; (7) erosion
of the presumption of innocence; and (8) erosion of dignity and autonomy.
Id. at 96.
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an unprecedented obstacle for law enforcement. 55 In addition,
the antidrug crusade has had a major impact on the Fourth Amend-
ment: since President Reagan declared the War on Drugs, the
government has prevailed in nearly every search and seizure case
before the Supreme Court.65
As James Boyd White points out in his analysis of Chief Justice
Taft's majority opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 5 ' the "organi-
zation, scale, enterprise, and success" of a criminal enterprise can
become the occasion for a morality tale in which the government
represents good struggling against the forces of evil. 5 ' In the
context of actions that can be painted as enormous threats,
constitutional texts like the Fourth Amendment can be made to
seem irrelevant.6 59 The implication for mandatory key escrow is
obvious: the more closely the purposes of a statute are aligned with
control of drugs or terrorism, and especially the more closely the
facts of a test case conform to the apprehension of an archetypical
evildoer, the less chance it will be declared unconstitutional.
6 1
B. Mediating the Clash: A Metaphoric Menu
Social and political archetypes influence constitutional decision-
making, but the decisions themselves are couched in more tradition-
ally legal terms. These terms have a power of their own, which
accounts for some of the law's partial autonomy as a discipline.
Thus, for example, the homeless defendant in Connecticut v.
Mooney66 1 sought to exclude evidence seized from his habitual
abode on public land under a bridge abutment on the ground that
" United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 n.5 (1983).
' See Krasnow, supra note 642, at 240; see also SilasJ. Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CpIM. L. REV. 257, 264 (1984) (arguing that the
Court has not only weakened the warrant and probable cause requirements, but has
also avoided them by expandingTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and contracting the
definition of a search); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception"
to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 907 (1987) (noting that "[i]n recent years
... the courts have almost always upheld the government" in search and seizure
cases).
657 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'James B. White,Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835, 854 (1986).
"9 See id. (arguing that Taft's opinion is drafted to evoke a "sense that the fourth
amendment has nothing to do with what is really going on in the case").
o Another possible trigger might be the use of cryptography to hide a child
pornography ring. For an example of the likely reaction, see generally John C.
Scheller, Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child Pornography, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 989 (1994).
"' 588 A.2d 145 (Conn.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
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the place had become his "home."662  "Home" is a powerful
metaphor; it is also a legal category that implies certain outcomes
and forecloses others.
It is old news that common-law legal reasoning is both analogical
and taxonomical, 6" and that metaphor is a powerful tool for
both.66' Nevertheless, the observation that "[t]he power of a
metaphor is that it colors and controls our subsequent thinking
about its subject"66 is particularly relevant and powerful when the
law encounters a new technology.16  The law's first reaction to a
662 See id. at 152. The Court did not decide whether the abutment was the
defendant's home for Fourth Amendment purposes. See id. at 155. Compare Teryl
S. Eisenberg, Note, Connecticut v. Mooney: Can a Homeless Person Find Privacy Under
a Bridge?, 13 PACE L. REV. 229 (1993) (arguing that a homeless person may be
afforded an expectation of privacy in the area the individual reasonably considers
"home" based on societal understandings of the privacy associated with a "home")
with David H. Steinberg, Note, Constructing Homes for the Homeless? Searching for a
Fourth Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508 (1992) (arguing that the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy inquiry is based on property interests, and concluding that a
homeless defendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in belongings
left beneath a public bridge abutment).
m See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-3 (1948)
(outlining the case method of legal reasoning); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH
70 (1951) ("There was a view, and I suppose some hold it still, that law is made up
of principles and rules. A master craftsman would be able to arrange them in one
great hierarchical scheme.").
6" See, e.g., D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial
Self, 82 GEO. LJ. 437, 447-87 (1993) (applying an analysis of social and legal uses of
metaphor to illuminate social construction and significance of race); Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1382-94 (1988) (describing cognitive and legal functions of metaphor).
665 Winter, supra note 664, at 1383; see also Donald A. Sch6n, Generative Metaphor:
A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 137, 137
(Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (discussing the use of "metaphor" as both a kind
of product and a kind of process by which "new perspectives on the world come into
existence").
"' Others have made this point before in the context of computers. See I. Trotter
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for 'Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 996-1015
(1994) (distinguishing between problems such as defamation, for which existing legal
categories work, and problems such as reasonableness of behavior in cyberspace, for
which existing legal categories do not offer clear-cut solutions); David R.Johnson &
Kevin A. Marks, MappingElectronic Data Communications onto ExistingLegal Metaphors:
Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487,
489-90 (1993) (arguingfor a contract regime in cyberspace); Henry H. Perritt,Jr., Tort
Liability, the First Amendmen4 and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, HARV. J.L. &
TECH., Spring 1992, at 65, 95-113 (arguing that the common law of defamation
should inform courts' treatment of tort claims arising out of communications on
electronic networks); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Metaphors and Network Law (Oct. 15,
1992), available online URL gopher://ming.law.vill.edu:70/00/.chron/.papers/.files/
Metaphors.and.Network.Law.txt (arguing that print shop, broadcasting, and telephone
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new technology is to reach for analogies and to explain why the new
technology can be treated identically to an earlier technology.
Railroads, for example, could be slotted into the existing legal
categories created to deal with highways, collisions, and freight
tariffs. 67 In contrast, airplanes-a technological advance on the
same order as the railroad-required a significant change in the law
because to be useful the airplane must fly over land, a classical
trespass, without a right of way.668
In the case of cryptography, as with other new technologies, the
dominant mode ofjudicial and perhaps political judgment is likely
to be classification by analogy and argument by metaphor. Given
that in recent years Big Brother seems to have inspired less fear in
any branch of government than has Big Drugs, the selection of the
right metaphor is critical.
Four metaphors seem particularly likely to appeal to the courts,
which can be summarized under the rubrics of "car," "language,"
"house," and "safe." These four metaphors reflect two fundamental-
ly different characterizations of cryptography. Both "car" and
"language" characterize cryptography as part of the means used to
transmit the message. In this view, an encrypted message is simply
another communication, one which can best be understood as a
special case of the general rules regulating communications. In
contrast, "house" and "safe" treat cryptography as something that
happens before the message leaves the sender. Both "house" and
"safe" suggest that the proper approach is to start with the sender's
decision to encipher the message in order to exclude unwanted
recipients, and then explore the implications of this choice for the
government's ability to monitor communications. The differences
metaphors are inadequate, and proposing alternatives based on a tort system).
"7 John Perry Barlow suggests that the development of the railroads provides a
better metaphor for the growth of the Internet than does the information superhigh-
way, because in both cases large private industries sought government-imposed
standards and regulations that served to give early entrants commanding market
positions. See John P. Barlow, Stopping the Information Railroad, available online
URL http://www.ora.com/gnn/bus/ora/features/barlow/index.html.
"' See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937) (giving airplanes right of way over private property);
Vincent M. Brannigan, Biotechnology: A First Order Technico-Legal Revolution, 16
HOFSTRA L. REv. 545, 549 (1988) (noting that some new technologies, like railroads,
did not require an adjustment in legal conceptions, whereas others, like the airplane,
required fundamental adjustments); Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 52, at 27
(noting that the advent of air travel "required fundamental shifts in the nature of the
right to property").
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among these metaphors go beyond putting a positive or negative
gloss on encryption; they amount to different definitions of the
nature of the thing itself. Interestingly, both the general metaphor
of communication and the metaphors of exclusion are sufficiently
indeterminate to permit the introduction of more specific, and
contradictory, metaphors that support both sides in the mandatory
EES debate.
1. Focus on Communication
"Communication" as we tend to understand it is itself a
metaphor. English speakers tend to speak as if they share a
particular mental image of how words work. As Michael Reddy has
persuasively demonstrated, the English language defaults to a
metaphor of communication as a conduit for human thoughts and
feelings.669 In this cognitive shorthand, the speaker begins with a
meaning that she "puts into words," which are then "gotten across"
to the auditor who then "unpacks," "gets," or "absorbs" the
speaker's meaning.6 7 To put it another way, the speaker/author
"encodes" meanings into words that "convey" meanings that are
then "decoded" by the recipient.
67 1
The ubiquity of the conduit metaphor suggests that encryption,
if understood as a communications conduit, stands the best chance
of being accepted by the courts, Congress, and the public. The
same ubiquity, however, also means that different analogic embodi-
ments of the same general metaphor can lead to diametrically
opposite views of the constitutionality of a hypothetical ban on
unescrowed cryptography. Indeed, if the encrypted message is seen
... See Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in Our
Language About Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 665, at 164, 165.
See id. at 189-201 (giving hundreds of examples).
61 Reddy argues that the conduit metaphor is dysfunctional because it obscures
a reality in which the auditor/recipient of the communication must actively construct
a new text with meaning in light of the recipient's own referents. See id. at 184-87;
see also ROLAND BARTHEs, THE PLEASURE OF THE TEXT 3-67 (Richard Miller trans.,
1975) [hereinafter BARTHES, PLEASURE] (posing questions about and offering
commentary on a reader's finding pleasure in the text she reads); ROLAND BARTHES,
S/Z at 4 (Richard Miller trans., 1974) [hereinafter BARTHES, S/Z] ("Our literature is
characterized by the pitiless divorce... between the producer of the text and its user,
[which leaves the reader] with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or
reject the text ... ."). See generally DAVID HOLDCRoFr, SAUSSURE: SIGNS, SYSTEM,
AND ARBITRARINESS (1991) (discussing signs as a semantic system). The validity of this
critique is not at issue here; what matters for present purposes is the accuracy of the
claim that the conduit metaphor is pervasive.
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as a mobile message unit-a "car" on the information superhigh-
way-then mandatory EES appears far less troubling than if the
encrypted messages are analogized to language itself.
a. "Car'--How Messages Travel
One could say that the escrowing of a key is akin to having one's
picture taken when applying for a license to drive on the informa-
tion superhighway. Or, perhaps, the chip's unique key could be
seen as something like a license plate. If the reigning metaphor for
use of electronic communications is that of a car on the road, it is
but a small step to fixed or random checkpoints, and other minor
electronic detentions.
The LEAF feature in Clipper and Capstone makes checkpoints
for compliance with mandatory key escrow particularly easy to
implement, in a way that other forms of escrowed encryption might
not. Telephone and e-mail messages can be intercepted and copied
at random, or according to some pattern, then decrypted with the
family key. If there is no LEAF at all, the message is clearly in
violation of the mandatory escrow rule. If there is a LEAF, although
the text of the message remains inaccessible without recourse to the
escrow agents, 67 2 public servants can check whether the message
has been encrypted with an EES-compliant device because the chip
serial number is supposed to contain a recognizable string identify-
ing the manufacturer.6 7  If this string is instead random, law
enforcement knows it has encountered a spoofed LEAF. 674 The
beauty of this system from a constitutional perspective is that the
intrusion on privacy rights is relatively small. Law enforcement
does not need to decrypt actual messages without a search warrant.
The car metaphor also provides law enforcement with a solution
to a timing problem. The information highway patrol may not want
to wait to obtain a warrant to find out whether a message's
cryptography is registered. Just as police who stop cars on the
highway have authority to conduct a search without a warrant,
6 7 5
672 Because the message remains unreadable, there is no way to tell whether it was
preencrypted with unescrowed cryptography.
673 See supra text preceding note 413.
674 This check does not detect preencryption of e-mail. See supra text following
note 413.
675 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (applying the exigency
exception to the warrant requirement to an automobile); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (allowing an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement in the case of movable vessels).
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the same might be done on the information highway, and for similar
reasons. Waiting for a warrant takes too long-the car is gone; the
message is gone.
676
The car metaphor leads naturally, at least from the law enforce-
ment perspective, to random traffic stops. If the analogy is to
vehicular checkpoints, the examination of the LEAF can easily be
characterized as a minimally intrusive investigation in a way that it
cannot be if the focus is on the act of encryption as something
occurring in the home or office. In the case of real cars, the
Supreme Court applies a reasonableness analysis to vehicle stops,
weighing the gravity of the public concern, the degree to which the
seizure advances that concern, and the interference with the
individual's liberty. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,677 the Court
held that limited seizures of vehicles for questioning of the
occupants could be constitutional even absent a particularized
suspicion due to the government's compelling interest in reducing
the influx of illegal aliens, the Border Patrol's inability to do so at
the border, and the minimal harm to the traveller.6 7 8 In Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 679 the Court found that even if
only 1.5% of the drivers stopped were drinking, the governmental
interest was great enough to justify the intrusion of a highway
checkpoint."' Sitz used a three-prong test68' requiring (1) a
676 The ECPA presumably protects against the warrantless interception and
recording of encrypted communications even when the public servants recording the
message lack the capability to decrypt it. Otherwise, public servants would routinely
be able to record encrypted messages and then decrypt them if they were later able
to amass sufficient evidence to convince ajudge to issue a valid warrant. Any other
construction of the ECPA would make it almost a dead letter.
In this perspective, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994), is troubling but inapposite.
The Fifth Circuit imposed a narrow construction on the ECPA prohibition against
"intentionally intercepting" e-mails, 18 U.S.C § 251 1(1)(a) (1988), to exclude e-mail
communications residing on a computer bulletin board but not yet received by the
intended recipient. In the Fifth Circuit's stunted view, an "intercept" can only occur
if the communication is overheard during transmission. Id. at 461-62. The court held
that the capture of an unread e-mail stored on a bulletin board is governed by the
less stringent provisions of Title I of the ECPA, which covers the electronic storage
of messages. See id. at 461-63.
The Steve Jackson decision is worrisome because it suggests that courts will
interpret the ECPA narrowly. It is inapposite because the recording of an encrypted
communication during transmission clearly falls under Title II of ECPA. See also id.
at 462 n.7 (explaining that a search warrant would be required to obtain access to
contents of a stored electronic communication).
67 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
617 See id. at 558-67.
679 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
680 See id. at 455.
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weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
(2) some empirical evidence that the program was effective,6 82 and
(3) a weighing of the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.
68 3
The car metaphor will no doubt have appeal beyond law
enforcement if only because it is already commonplace to talk about
the Internet as a highway, complete with "on-ramps," "fast lanes,"
and "maps." Perhaps it is time to abandon these convenient
phrases. If the car metaphor prevails, there will be far fewer




A cipher resembles a foreign language. Indeed, during World
War II, the U.S. Navy used speakers of obscure Native American
languages to exchange radio messages that could not be understood
by the Japanese." 5 A federal law requiring that English be the
sole mode of communication for telephones or e-mails would be
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds and would violate
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.68 6  If one accepts the analogy, it follows that no
" The test originated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
"82 See 496 U.S. at 454. The original formulation of the test weighed the degree
to which the procedure advances the public interest, but the Sitz Court appears to
have lowered its scrutiny of this factor and to have looked instead to some evidence
of effectiveness. See id. at 454-55.
6" See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.
Cf. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (discussing the "automobile
exception" to the Fourth Amendment).
s See KAHN, supra note 6, at 549-50.
See, e.g., Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (discussing the
constitutionality of regulations aimed at foreign language schools); Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 525 (1926) (same); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923)
(findingunconstitutional a state statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages
in public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (recognizing a
parent's right to determine the language to be spoken by her child); Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 37650, *30-*47 (9th Cir. Jan.
17, 1995) (amending 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34195 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1994)) (holding
that Article XXVIII of the Arizona constitution, which requires that English be used
for all official business, violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Asian
Am. Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-32 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(holding that an ordinance requiring one-half of the space of a foreign alphabet sign
to be devoted to English alphabetical characters violated First Amendment free
speech rights and the Equal Protection Clause); see also Antonio J. Califa, Declaring
English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 293,
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cryptosystem may be outlawed. Nor, continuing the analogy, can
the government require that users provide it with a translation of
their messages. Not only would this have Fifth Amendment
implications,1 7 but it would chill free speech."'
Although a cipher resembles a foreign language, it is not
330-46 (1989) (arguing that English-only laws violate the Equal Protection Clause);
DonnaM. Greenspan, Florida's Official English Amendment, 18 NovA L. REv. 891,908-
16 (1994) (arguing that a lack of enforcement saves the constitutionality of Florida's
Official English amendment, and warning that some day Spanish-speaking citizens
might seek to use similar laws against English speakers); Joseph Leibowicz, The
Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 519,
542-50 (1985) (arguing that the English Language Amendment should be rejected
because it embraces a pure form of Anglo-conformity and uses a language issue as a
weapon against those already the objects of cultural or racial prejudice); Wendy
Olson, The Shame of Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First Legislation, 11 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 1, 23-28 (1991) (arguing that English-only laws stigmatize language
minorities and violate their constitutional rights to equal protection and privacy);Juan
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism,
and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 356-57 (1992) (asserting that official
English laws should be subject to heightened scrutiny); Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom to
Speak One Language: Free Speech and the English Language Amendment, 11 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 35, 44-46 (1991) (arguing that English-only laws would be unconsti-
tutional); Michele Arington, Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle
in the States over Language Minority Rights, 7J.L. & POL. 325, 339-42 (1991) (arguing
that official-English laws should be interpreted narrowly rather than as broad
restraints on bilingual programs); Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to
Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1345, 1352-56 (1987)
(arguing that English-only laws violate the Equal Protection Clause and unconstitu-
tionally limit the access of language minorities to the political process); LeoJ. Ramos,
Comment, English First Legislation: Potential National Origin Discrimination, 11
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 77, 92-93 (1991) (arguing that language discrimination is
facial discrimination deserving strict scrutiny); Carol Schmid, Comment, Language
Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public and Private Sector, 20 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 65, 72-76 (1992) (analyzing issues raised by English-only laws).
17 1 have been unable to find a single criminal case in which the government has
attempted to force a defendant to translate her message. There are cases in which
the government provides translations of an eavesdropped conversation and then in
effect challenges the defendant to explain what is wrong with the government's
incriminating rendition. See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1490-93
(7th Cir. 1990) (involving a translation from a Nigerian dialect). Similarly, some
courts have held that parties cannot be required to translate foreign-language
documents as part of civil discovery governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See, e.g., In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 103 F.R.D. 357, 357-58
(D.D.C. 1984) (denying a motion to direct Korean Airlines to provide English
translations of Korean documents). The Supreme Court has held that in cases under
the Hague Evidence Convention a federal court may require a party providing
documents to provide translations as well as descriptions of documents. See Socit6
Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
' See supra part III.A.2.
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identical. No one can speak in DES without mechanical aids, and
no one can understand a DES-encrypted message if they do not
understand the language of the plaintext. Cryptologist Dorothy
Denning argues that these differences are so great that in some
important sense encrypted speech "is not speech."68 9 As Denning
notes, languages have semantic blocks such as words, phrases,
sentences, or ideograms that "carry" meaning and that can be
manipulated, but ciphertext has no such blocks.6"' Also, Denning
argues, all languages share the property that thoughts, emotions,
beliefs, requests, offers, and concepts can be expressed without
knowledge of any other language. 69 1 In contrast, ciphertext not
only needs to be decrypted to be understood, but the recipient must
understand the language of the plaintext in order to comprehend
the message.6 92
Existing First Amendmentjurisprudence provides guidance that
helps determine whether these differences between enciphered
communications and ordinary language speech should be consid-
ered legally significant.69 The First Amendment protects commu-
nicative acts, not specific modes of communication. 694 The First
"' Dorothy E. Denning, Encrypted Speech Is Not Speech 1 (Jan. 16, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In addition to the items discussed in
the text, Denning argues that all languages are capable of direct translation to all
other languages without the intermediation of a third language, but that a ciphertext,
which often consists of strings of ones and zeros, must first be decrypted to its
plaintext before being translated into another language. See id. In an e-mail to the
author, Professor Denning qualified her claim that encrypted speech "is not speech"
by adding: "My conclusion was that encryption must be regarded as a manner of
speech rather than speech (or manner of expression) in a more fundamental sense.
This, of course, does not rule out its protection." E-mail from Dorothy Denning,
Professor and Chair, Computer Science Department, Georgetown University, to
Michael Froomkin (Dec. 7, 1994) (on file with author).
690 Denning, supra note 689, at 1-3. Denning also argues that all languages have
syntactic malleability-that is, the ability to use semantic building blocks in different
orders and combinations that produce meanings-but that ciphertext lacks this
property because reordering the ones and zeros will usually produce gibberish. See
id.
69' Because American English, like many languages, borrows heavily from other
languages, this statement presupposes a very robust conception of the parameters of
a living language.
692 See Denning, supra note 689, at 1-3.
693 In considering the extent to which ciphertext resembles speech protected by
the First Amendment, I am not assuming that it is so protected. To invoke the First
Amendment directly to resolve the constitutional status of ciphertext would be to beg
the question that the invocation of the "language" metaphor is supposed to answer.
The argument in the text seeks instead to use First Amendment cases to classify
differences as relevant to whether a communication is protected speech or not.
69 See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that burning the American
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Amendment protects many communicative acts that do not use
words including photographs, pictures, nude dances,695 and silent
protest.6 6  Although they do not use words, these protected
communications do have messages. They have semantic units and
referents of the type described by Roland Barthes and others.
697
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the importance of
the connection between an unspoken assertion of the speaker's
identity and the communicative content of the message. In City of
Ladue v. Gilleo,698 the Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the
display of signs in the front yard of a house violated the resident's
right to free speech as "the identity of the speaker is an important
component of many attempts to persuade."6 9 Similarly, there is
no reason to believe that the First Amendment is concerned with
the degree to which a communicative system depends upon another
or stands alone. 711 If the First Amendment protects works of art
so obscure that they can only be understood by their creator, 70 1 it
can equally well be applied to protect encrypted speech. Thus, from
a First Amendment standpoint, the differences between ciphertext
and ordinary language identified by Denning are irrelevant to
flag for expressive reasons falls under the protection of the First Amendment); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that the
First Amendment protects the wearing of an armband for expressive reasons); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (finding that the First Amendment safeguards
the burning of a draft card for expressive reasons); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931) (recognizing that the display of a red flag was protected speech).
695 See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975). But see Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (qualifying Doran).
696 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
697 See generally BARTHES, S/Z, supra note 671; HOLDCROFT, supra note 671.
698 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
69
9 Id. at 2046.
71 Cf. Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (stating that whether particular
conduct is protected by the First Amendment depends on "whether '[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it[]'" (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974))).
701 Commentators disagree as to whether the First Amendment protects
communications or communicative intent. Compare Frederick Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional
Language, 67 CEO. L.J. 899, 918 (1979) ("[A]ny rationaljustification for the principle
of free speech requires both a communicator and an intended object of the
communication.") with Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the
First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36 (1973) ("The right to engage in verbal
locutions which no one can hear and in conduct which no one can observe may
sometimes qualify as a due process 'liberty,' but without an actual or potential
audience there can be no first amendment speech right.").
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whether a communication is protected speech.
From the viewpoint of the language metaphor, the most
troubling difference between ciphertext and classic protected speech
is that, in the case of ciphertext, a mechanical aid is required to
both create and comprehend the message. This difficulty should
not be exaggerated-metaphors, after all, are invoked when things
are not identical, not when they are precisely the same. It is
unlikely that the mechanical aid would appear as troublesome if,
instead of a cryptographic system, the device in question were a
prosthetic device, such as a voice synthesizer or an eye-movement
operated computer. 711 In the case of these prosthetic devices, one
would not expect to find arguments that the communication
emanating from the device, or the signals used to operate the
device, were any less entitled to First Amendment protection than
ordinary speech. Again, the ciphertext example is not identical
because the parties to the communication presumably have alternate
forms of communication available to them, but this just underlines
the fact that it is not the mechanization of the communication that
ought to be the stumbling block. As new technologies such as voice
recognition become commonplace, one would not expect to see
arguments that the speech is somehow less protected while in the
binary form that intermediates between sound waves and text, even
if the author could have used a pencil instead of speaking to a
computer. In any event, because a work of art requiring computer
animation or computer-aided virtual reality would depend critically
on the assistance of a machine, it would clearly be entitled to the
same First Amendment protections as a painting.
Encrypted speech is not exactly an ordinary language, but it is
similar to what we ordinarily mean by language. Moreover, most of
the differences are not the ones that usually matter in the First
Amendment context. The most significant difference between
encrypted speech and ordinary speech is the role of a machine.
Indeed, the encrypted communication much resembles the
telephone call, as voice is translated into a ciphertext (an electrical
or fiber-optical signal) that is transmitted to the recipient who then
' "Seen as a prosthetic device, the personal computer extends the limits of the
individual human body, whether within the privatized microworlds of computer
simulations, or through the interactive exchange of messages across global computer
networks." Deborah Heath, Computers and Their Bodies: Sex, War and Cyberspace
1 (1992), available online URL gopher://gopher.cpsr.org-70/OO/cpsr/gender/clark/
Heath.Deborah.
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decrypts it (plays it on a speaker). Telephone calls are subject to
wiretaps not because a machine is involved in the communication,
but rather because once public servants have obtained the appropri-
ate warrant, the signals are in the same position as unmechanized
speech inside the home.
Rejection of the language metaphor might lead to undesirable
consequences. If the government were able to require that users of
strong cryptography ensure the government's ability to decrypt their
messages, it might be only a small step to imposing limits on the use
of languages other than English." 3 Would the last two speakers
of a dying language be required to provide translations of their
conversations if the government charged that they were conspiring
in it? Such a rule would be as difficult to apply as it might be
difficult to distinguish among impenetrable slang or strange accents,
a language, and a code.
2. Focus on Exclusion
Just because somebody wishes to hide something does not mean
that the Constitution necessarily protects it. If desire sufficed to
produce exclusive control over information, successful prosecutions
would be rare. Conversely, just because the government would find
it convenient to know something about an individual does not mean
that the individual has any duty to make the information easily
accessible."' In mediating between these extremes, the Supreme
Court has given at least lip service to the subjective and objective
reasonableness of the individual's desire to block the state's access
to information. Reasonableness of expectations is a particularly
manipulable socially constructed term because the courts' decisions
are an important determinant of what is reasonably expected. If,
despite this, one grants that the idea of reasonable expectations has
some exogenous content, then the courts' willingness to protect
strong cryptography against government control is likely to be
influenced by the extent to which judges find something familiar
and reasonable in the act of encrypting a message. Cryptography
that feels like a PIN number used to access cash machines will be
treated differently from cryptography that feels like the tool of drug
dealers and terrorists.
70 5
70 See supra text following note 468; supra text accompanying note 686.
... The important qualifications to this statement, including regulatory searches,
valid subpoenas, and searches with valid warrants appear supra part III.B.
705 A number of participants in the cypherpunks mailing list, notably cypher-
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a. "Safe"
A cipher is armor around a communication much like a safe is
armor around a possession. A person who puts something in a safe
to which they have the only key or combination surely has both a
subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
the contents.
Simply putting something into a safe does not, however, ensure
that it is beyond the law's reach. It is settled law that a criminal
defendant can be forced to surrender the physical key to a physical
safe, so long as the act of production is not testimonial. 6 Pre-
sumably a similar rule compelling production would apply to a
criminal defendant who has written down the combination to a safe
on a piece of paper. There appears to be no authority on whether
a criminal defendant can be compelled to disclose the combination
to a safe that the defendant has prudently refrained from commit-
ting to writing, and in Fisher v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court
hinted that compelling the disclosure of documents similar to a
safe's combination might raise Fifth Amendment problems.
708
Perhaps the combination lock problem does not arise because the
police are able to get the information from the manufacturer or are
simply able to cut into the safe. These options do not exist when
the safe is replaced by the right algorithm. Although brute-force
cryptography is a theoretical possibility, 70 9 neither safe cracking,
nor number crunching, nor an appeal to the manufacturer is a
practical option when the armor is an advanced cipher. The
recently released Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing
punks' co-founder Eric Hughes, have argued in their postings to the list that
cryptography can only become safe from regulation if it becomes ubiquitous. This
analysis suggests that they are onto something. If nothing else, the push to provide
ubiquitous and user-friendly cryptography could serve to shorten the "cultural lag,"
for court decisions defining the legal regime for a new technology often are made
before the technology is well-understood by the public or judges. See Diane C.
Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 597, 617-18 (1982) (giving as an example of "cultural lag" the issue of nuclear
power plant safety).
71 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988) (analogizing to the
forced production of a strongbox key).
7 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
... See id. at 409 (stating that the Fifth Amendment ordinarily protects against the
compulsion to "restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of documents
sought").
71 See infra Technical Appendix, part A.
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Computers710 suggest that "[i]n some cases, it might be appropri-
ate to compel a third party who may know the password (or even the
suspect) to disclose it by subpoena (with limited immunity, if
appropriate)."
711
Even if ciphertext is analogous to a document in an uncrackable
safe whose combination has never been written down, there are
important differences between a paper in a vault and an encrypted
e-mail. A safe is a container into which people put things and take
them out again, preserving the contents over time by keeping
unauthorized persons from having access to them. 712 Ordinarily,
a safe stays put. E-mails usually move around.
Current law on moving containers is not very friendly towards
privacy. The Supreme Court has stated that "some containers (for
example, a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature
cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance."
7 1l
That, at least, can never be the case with an encrypted message,
because the external appearance of ciphertext gives no clue as to its
content.
The moving safe begins to look a little like luggage.7 1 4 Intu-
itively, the privacy interest in a safe seems greater than the privacy
interest in luggage, which is perhaps fortunate because the privacy
interest in luggage has been shrinking towards the vanishing
point.715  Ordinary luggage can be searched without a warrant
upon reasonable suspicion. 716  There appear to be no recent
710 See 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 2023 (Dec. 21, 1994).
711 Id. at 2038 (emphasis added). It is difficult to see, however, how under the
Fifth Amendment limited immunity could be given to the suspect without preventing
the prosecution from using any information directly resulting from the use of the
password.
712 Words frequently achieve the same effect with regard to the meanings they
"carry," but that is not, one hopes, their primary purpose.
713 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979). What a kit of burglar
tools looks like, or how its looks differ from an ordinary tool box's, the Supreme
Court did not explain.
714 A safe on the move also resembles an armored car. If so, it is constitutionally
unsafe, compared to the stationary safe, because there seems little likelihood of an
armored car exception to the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception. See supra
note 675 and accompanying text.
711 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 575 (1991) ("Law enforcement officers
may seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant.").716 See id. at 575 (stating that "the police often will be able to search containers
without a warrant, despite the Chadwick-Sanders rule, as a search incident to a lawful
arrest"). The prior rule recognized a privacy interest in luggage. See United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
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reported cases of police forcing a combination lock on luggage
without either consent,71 7 a warrant, or an alert from a drug-
sniffing dog.
The privacy interest in locked luggage is insufficient to protect
the owner against brief detentions of her property, in order to
permit a dog sniff.718 According to the Supreme Court, the sniff
is not a Fourth Amendment "search" because the suitcase remains
closed during the test, the dog discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics and cannot reveal the contents of the suitcase,
and the "canine sniff" is the least intrusive method of ascertaining
the presence of narcotics in the baggage.
719
A sniff has some similarities to the investigation of a LEAF-low
intrusion, bag/message remains closed/encrypted during investiga-
tion, and the investigation discloses nothing else about the contents
of the bag/message. Like a dog alert, detection of an invalid LEAF
could tell police that the message has been encrypted with unes-
crowed cryptography. Unlike dog alerts, LEAF-sniffing will prove
generally unreliable because preencrypting a message with another
cipher will hide the contents while presenting a valid LEAF for the
world to see.
720
Overall, the safe analogy is appealing. Unfortunately, it either
13 (1977) for the proposition that persons possess "a privacy interest in the contents
of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment"); see also United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (expanding the warrantless search doctrine
under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), to containers in cars upon
probable cause); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 (1979) (finding luggage to
be a common "repository for personal items" inevitably associated with an expectation
of privacy), rev'd sub noma. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (stating that movable luggage has a greater
reasonable expectation of privacy than automobile), rev'd sub nom. California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
v7 Or at least testimony from which a court might infer consent. See, e.g., United
States v. Cox, 762 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (concluding that by unlocking the
combination lock of a suitcase, the defendant consented to a search); United States
v. Miller, 442 F. Supp. 742, 748 n.5, 753 (D. Me. 1977) (stating that the fact that an
officer told the suspect that a lock would be opened with or without his help did not
vitiate consent); cf. supra note 366 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
intelligence of criminals is not to be overestimated).
718 How brief is unclear. Ninety minutes is too long. See Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10
(stating that the Court has "never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged
90-minute period involved here").
7'19 Id. at 707 ("We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure.").
0 On whether the LEAF is inside or outside the message for ECPA purposes, see
supra notes 330-36 and accompanying text.
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maps the problem onto an equally unsettled area of law or collapses
back to another form of the conduit metaphor.711 It also has the
moderate defect of being vulnerable to technical changes, although
for the foreseeable future high-level encryption will remain far, far
easier than brute-force decryption. It may be, however, that despite
the potential for instability after the next technological or crypto-
graphic revolution, the absence of law relating to combination locks
without written combinations (the case most analogous to a strong
cipher with a secret passphrase) creates an opportunity to make new
law unencumbered by the baggage of the Supreme Court's luggage
precedents. There is no obvious reason why a person's privacy
interest in the contents of a safe, or a ciphertext, should decrease
sharply because the object is in transit, and it would not be difficult
to have the law reflect that reasonable expectation.
b. "House'--Where Messages Come From
Just as the car is a place where constitutional protections are
near their weakest, the house is where they approach their stron-
gest. The difference between the house and car metaphors is
722perhaps best illustrated by California v. Carney, in which the
Court had to decide whether a mobile home was a house or a car.
If it were a house, then it could only be searched with a warrant; if
a car, then no warrant was needed. The Court held that a moving
RV is a car for Fourth Amendment purposes, but left open the case
of a mobile home that is up on blocks.
7 23
The Supreme Court's first encounter with wiretapping produced
a five-to-four decision holding that a wiretap was neither a search
nor a seizure because it took place outside the home and did not
interfere with the transmission of the message. "The reasonable
view," Chief Justice Taft announced, "is that one who installs in his
house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to
project his voice to those quite outside"; having left the sanctity of
the home, those messages and those wires "are not within the
"1 Once one considers movement, the "safe" begins to look like another conduit
metaphor, in which meanings are placed into a safe/cipher that "holds meaning" and
then "conveys" the meaning to another.
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
See id. at 394 & n.3. In Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 113 S. Ct. 538, 549 (1992),
the Supreme Court treated the movement of a trailer home affixed to a foundation
as a seizure, but this would apply whether the object was a home or a car.
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protection of the Fourth Amendment. " 724 The majority's first
encounter with the law enforcement aspects of the telephone
treated it as a familiar thing: an instrument to send a message out
into the world, to meet whatever fate might befall it once it was
outside the constitutionally protected zone of the home-a protec-
tion that relied in large part on the homeowner's property interest
in the residence.725 Justice Brandeis's dissent relied instead on
Boyd's holding that the Fourth Amendment prevents the govern-
ment from forcing a person to produce an incriminating document.
Katz abandoned the idea that the test for Fourth Amendment
protection rested on location. "[T]he Fourth Amendment," Justice
Stewart wrote, "protects people, not places,"7 26 and it thus protect-
ed a conversation originating in an enclosed public telephone
booth. Or rather, as Justice Harlan put it in his concurrence, the
Fourth Amendment protects a person who has "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy" and the expectation is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 727 Justice Stew-
art cautioned that "[ilo read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play
in private communication."7 28  Dissenting in Katz, Justice Black
accused the majority of choosing "to rely on their limited under-
standing of modern scientific subjects in order to fit the Constitu-
tion to the times and give its language a meaning that it will not
tolerate."729 His complaint was that Justice Harlan's concurrence,
and by implication the majority's opinion, argued that it was "'bad
physics' "7 1 to maintain the rule originating in Oimstead v. United
States that electronic eavesdropping was not a search.31 Justice
Black believed that the Fourth Amendment's protection of the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" connoted
the idea of "tangible things with size, form, and weight, things
4 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438, 466 (1928).
' The exception for messages entrusted to the Postal Service, deriving from Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877), which held that the Fourth Amendment
protects sealed letters in the mail, was explained as owing to the government's control
of the mails. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 (1977) (reaffirming
application of the Fourth Amendment to mails).
76 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 352.
' Id. at 372 n.* (Black, J., dissenting).
730 Id.
1 Id. (noting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
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capable of being searched, seized, or both" and that an overheard
conversation, even on a wire, was none of these."'2
In fact, it was Justice Black's physics that were faulty. Electrons
have size, form, and mass, as do digitized and encrypted messages.
Yet despite its questionable physics, Justice Black's legal conclusion
appears to be gaining support: since, Katz, the Fourth Amendment,
and its emanations have been read more and more narrowly. The
Court has examined expectations of privacy that often seem greater,
and more objectively reasonable, than those of a telephoner in a
public phone booth, but has nonetheless found those expectations-
when held by guilty parties-to be unreasonable.7 "' Similarly, Boyd
has been whittled away to the point that what vitality it retains is
limited to personal, noncommercial papers, and even that is now in
doubt. The rationale for Boyd's original holding has been effectively
abandoned.""
In the place of Katz and Boyd, the Supreme Court has substitut-
ed an anemic form of the property theory of the Fourth Amend-
ment that animated the majority in Olmstead and Justice Black's
dissent in Katz, a theory that in its new form rarely seems to extend
outside the curtilage of the home."' Although not stated as a
general principle, as a practical matter the Katz test has come to
depend on the objective reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy,7 3 6 and the Court has routinely turned to legal or adminis-
trative sources to define the parameters of reasonableness
73 7 -
7S2 389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
733 See supra text accompanying note 656 (noting that government has prevailed
in most of the recent search and seizure cases before the Supreme Court).
734 See supra text accompanying notes 467-70 (describing ways in which the Boyd
decision has been limited).
7" The Supreme Court's test for resolving extent-of-curtilage questions demon-
strates the resonance of the idea of "house": the area claimed to be curtilage will be
placed under the home's "umbrella" of protection if intimately tied to the home by
proximity, an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature and uses to which the area
is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
passersby. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (listing the four
factors with which the curtilage question should be resolved).
711 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the privacy "analysis must ... transcend the search for subjective
expectations"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (noting that "the central inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security"); see also Dunn, 480
U.S. at 300 ("[T]he extent of curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon
whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be
treated as the home itself.").
"" The same Court that looked to community standards in order to determine the
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except when it ignores them. 7 8 Thus, for example, once trash is
placed on the curb to be picked up, the property interest in it is
gone, and the trash is up for grabs. 7 9 If it is lawful to fly over a
property, it is objectively unreasonable for the owner to expect that
the property was safe from aerial inspection regardless of the
frequency of such flights or community standards of reasonableness,
whatever those may be. 40 But despite the trespass by the observ-
er, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy against ambulatory
police intrusion into an "open" field, though surrounded by woods,
behind a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign, because the field
is open to view.741
Katz still applies to its facts, which involved a wiretap of a
telephone call from an enclosed area. And the home clearly retains
a special status, because in United States v. Karo42 warrantless
monitoring of a beeper placed by a government informant became
unconstitutional at the point where it "reveal[ed] a critical fact
about the interior of the premises that the Government... could
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant." 4 3 But given the
Court's record with reasonable expectations, the reason that Katz is
still good law seems to have more to do with the existence of Title
III than any constitutional principle. It has come to the point where
the citizen's privacy interests might be better protected if the
line between obscenity and legal pornography has not chosen to apply this
amorphous standard to determine objectively reasonable expectations of privacy.
' For a fuller description, see Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive
Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 249 (1993) (surveying and analyzing the Court's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence).
"' See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) ("An expectation of
privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society
is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.").
4o See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[T]here
is nothing... to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this
country to lend substance to respondent's claim that he reasonably anticipated that
his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude."); see also
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding valid a warrantless aerial
surveillance of yard enclosed by a 10-foot fence).
1 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (finding that "[i]t is not
generally true that fences or 'No Trespassing' signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas"); see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294
(1987) (refining the concept of a protected zone within curtilage); Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 215 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy lacking with regard to a property
surrounded by a 10-foot fence in an age in which private and commercial flight in
public airways is routine).
742 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
74 Id. at 3303.
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discredited property-based theory of Olmstead were revived instead
of reviled.711 Coincidentally, the development of mass-market
strong cryptography means that the property theory, combined with
a computer or a scrambler telephone, produces a level of constitu-
tionally protected communications privacy comparable to the
original Katz standard. 45 Today, with the right cryptography, it
no longer matters as much if Katz is narrowed or overturned, at
least as far as communications privacy is concerned. 46 Now there
is something that the citizen can do, inside the home, before a
message is sent out on its vulnerable journey throughout the world.
The value of the legal protections that can pertain to the home
if based on a property theory like that in Olmstead should not be
overstated. So long as we hold to current conceptions of the home,
as a physical structure with walls and sometimes a curtilage too, the
interconnections between homes will continue to be classified as
"outside" the "house." As a result, regulations, including a ban on
the use of unescrowed strong cryptography in communications that
leave the house, remain a real possibility.
The "house" metaphor may provide some protection against
the complete reversal of Boyd, depending on whether a court could
compel the production of a key that had not been committed to
paper. If the court were unwilling to do this, say on Fifth Amend-
144 See Yeager, supra note 738, at 252-53; Heather L. Hanson, Note, The Fourth
Amendment in the Workplace: Are We Really Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REv. 243,262-
73 (1993) (suggestinga return to a property rights basis for privacy in the workplace);
see also Soldal v. Cook County, IM., 113 S. Ct. 538, 543-45 (1992) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment protects property interests as well as privacy interests). But see
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (refusing to extend constitutional
protection in the context of a defendant's ownership interest in illegal drugs by
rejecting "the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law ought to control the
ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment"); Kreimer,supra note 592,
at 89-94 (discussing the virtues of disclosure); Stephen J. Schnably, Property and
Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theoy of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV.
347, 378 n.153 (1993) (warning that one danger of the reliance upon a property
theory of rights is that the home-as-fortress becomes a refuge for harmful acts that
might be prevented by exposure).
" The argument in the text has mixed implications for other forms of privacy.
Records may be protected to the extent that they are encrypted and that production
of the key cannot be compelled. Note that compulsion may be a subpoena, a grand
jury inquiry, or even civil discovery instigated by the government on pain of tax
forfeiture. See Ann L. Iijima, The War on Drugs: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion Falls Victim to State Taxation of Controlled Substances, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
101,127-34 (1994) (describing how records and other information may be compelled
by taxing authorities to the detriment of drug dealers).46 See infra Technical Appendix, part B.
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ment grounds, strong cryptography would provide a nearly
unbreakable means of protecting one's private papers stored in the
home computer.
747
The decision to classify the cryptographic key as akin to a
private paper located in the home also may have interesting legal
consequences as the idea of the home evolves. Assumptions about
space, about what constitutes the "inside" of a home or an office,
may need to be reexamined:
[I]n the era where people work for "virtual corporations" and
conduct personal and political lives in "cyberspace," the distinction
between communication of information and storage of informa-
tion is increasingly vague. The organization in which one works
may constitute a single virtual space, but be physically dispersed.
So, the papers and files of the organization or individual may be
moved within the organization by means of telecommunications
technology. Instantaneous access to encryption keys, without prior
notice to the communicating parties, may well constitute a secret
search, if the target is a virtual corporation or an individual whose
"papers" are physically dispersed.7 48
In this vision, the cryptographic key becomes the thing after which
it is named and is transformed from a metaphor into the actual key
to a virtual-or is that actual?-electronic home or office.
7 49
C. The Power to Choose
Because the First Amendment case for unfettered cryptography
would be the strongest, "language" would seem to be the metaphor
of choice for advocates of unfettered privacy, although "safe" is
sufficiently unsettled to be turned to any conclusion. "Car" offers
the most to public servants concerned with preserving their
electronic eavesdropping capability. "House" seems like a fair
compromise, because it locks in more limited Fourth Amendment
protections. From the viewpoint of law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies, however, a compromise is almost as bad as a
complete loss if it is difficult to distinguish legitimate unescrowed
messages from illegitimate ones.
A court, or any other interested party, that might be called upon
"' The full ramifications of this question are beyond the scope of this Article.
748 DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 31, at 6.
49 The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Carney suggests that this day is
still some ways off. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985) (holding
that a moving recreational vehicle is a car and not a house).
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to select among competing metaphors will naturally be concerned
about where they might lead. Widespread cryptography may have
social implications that are difficult to predict. Strong privacy may
not be to everyone's taste. Secret identities will protect the
anonymous hate mailer, the drug dealer, the purchaser of seedy
movies, the congenitally shy, and the electronic political pamphle-
teer with equal efficacy. The implications of anonymous transac-
tions for taxes, product liability, and copyright, to name only a few,
remain to be worked out.
Sissela Bok hypothesizes a society in which "everyone can keep
secrets impenetrable at will. All can conceal innocuous as well as
lethal plans, the noblest as well as the most shameful acts, and
hatreds and conspiracies as much as generosity and self-sacrifice.
Faces reveal nothing out of turn; secret codes remain unbro-
ken."750 Although Bok recognizes that some version of such a
society "might develop precisely in response to the felt threat from
increased [information] transparency," 751 she views such a society
as clearly undesirable because "[ilt would force us to disregard the
legitimate claims of those persons who might be injured, betrayed,
or ignored as the result of secrets inappropriately kept."7 52 Strong
protection of cryptography may lead exactly there.
However, the absence of the refuge of digital anonymity may be
worse. As identifying data on each of us becomes more voluminous
and more easily accessible to government and to private parties,
753
our lives are changed, and not necessarily for the better. Indeed,
although law enforcement agencies believe they benefit greatly from
their electronic eavesdropping capabilities, it is unclear whether
society as a whole enjoys a net benefit when one considers both past
abuses and the possibilities for future abuses. To foreclose an
option that would give the lie to justice Douglas's dystopian warning
that "[w]e are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where
everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no
secrets from the government" 754 would be a communal confession
7-0 BOK, supra note 2, at 16.
751 Id. at 18.
752 Id. at 28.
" See, e.g., GANDY, supra note 587, at 15 (noting that the collection, processing,
and sharing of information about individuals and groups is widespread and continues
to expand); see also Kevin Fogarty, Data Mining Can Help to Extract Jewels of Data,
NETWORK WORLD, June 6, 1994, at 40, 40 (describing the practice of "data mining"
by which corporations accumulate and manipulate enormous data bases).
' Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of lack of trust in our fellows and in ourselves. It is chilling to think
we are fully capable of making this confession, and that we may
even deserve it.
In making legal judgments about the Constitution and cryptog-
raphy, one should keep in mind what is possible and what is not.
This means that one should consider both the extent to which long-
held ideas about the meaning of the Bill of Rights need to be
rethought in light of technological changes7 55 and that some
prohibitions simply are unenforceable. Just as the ITAR have failed
to stop the spread of strong cryptography abroad (and the develop-
ment of indigenous substitutes abroad), so too would any attempt
to ban unescrowed cryptography be doomed to failure.
756
Privacy, constitutional law, and law enforcement are not games.
It is unsettling to think that one's rights may turn on the extent to
which people are able to find a technological means to defeat what
would otherwise be legitimate government action. The good news
is that technological change can provide an opportunity to rethink,
and perhaps increase the coherence of, some constitutional
doctrines. When technology changes social realities, interpretations
755 See supra text accompanying notes 582-91. This may give cause to invoke
another archetype-Frankenstein's monster.
" See supra part I.C.l.c.i (discussing the ITAR). A law banning unescrowed
cryptography, or even only unescrowed commercial cryptography, would provide
some advantages for law enforcement. However, under such a regime it might be
easier to prove that someone has used unescrowed cryptography than to prove the
offense that the secret message would tend to prove. If the defendant will not
decrypt the message, she may still be subject to prosecution for the (lesser?) offense
of using unregistered cryptography. Although this smacks of prosecuting Al Capone
for tax evasion, it may still be an effective technique.
Defining some types of cryptography as contraband would be another approach
to the problem, again one with First Amendment problems. Courts have upheld a
variety of contraband statutes, but none affected free speech. For example, courts
have upheld statutes banning radar detectors (fuzzbusters). See generally Nikolaus F.
Schandlbauer, Comment, Busting the "Fuzzbuster": Rethinking Bans on RadarDetectors,
94 DicK. L. REV. 783, 785-89 (1990) (listing the jurisdictions which prohibit radar
detectors). Statutes banning burglars' tools, such as N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35
(McKinney 1988) and FLA. STAT. ch. 810.06 (West 1994), have been upheld also, see,
e.g., People v. Atson, 526 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (N.Y. App. Div.) (requiring more than
"purely circumstantial" evidence to sustain a conviction of possession of burglar's
tools), appeal denied, 528 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y. 1988); Thomas v. State, 531 So. 2d 708,
709-10 (Fla. 1988) (requiring a specific intent to commit burglary when the state
burglary tool statute criminalizes common household tools or devices), as have drug
paraphernalia statutes, such as 21 U.S.C. § 863 (Supp. V 1993), see e.g., Posters 'N'
Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1749 n.5, 1754-55 (1994) (upholding
the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 857 (1988), which Congress repealed and replaced
in 1990 with the virtually identical § 863).
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of the Constitution should recognize the change to the maximum
extent the text permits. Thus, although we might be better off
today with the Olmstead standard than into what the Supreme Court
has turned Katz, we should not lose sight of the fact that Olmstead
was wrongly reasoned. Chief Justice Taft's formalistic unwillingness
to recognize that a telephone call was different from a message on
a billboard or a shouted conversation on a busy street is not an
attitude that deserves emulation.
The bad news is that sometimes a technological development is
unstoppable. It may be that the Administration intends Clipper
only as a delaying action. 57 It may be that a future administra-
tion, acting for what seem to be good reasons at the time, will
attempt a form of cryptological Prohibition. If so, it will fall as
Prohibition failed, as the War on Drugs is failing, and as the ITAR
are failing with respect to cryptography.75
CONCLUSION
The courts, and to a lesser extent Congress, have yet to come to
grips with the legal and social implications of consumer cryptogra-
phy. As a result, this part of the legal landscape is relatively barren.
Irrigation and settlement have begun, however, with the executive
branch and the private sector as pioneers. The spacial metaphor
itself may be inadequate to describe the information revolution of
which consumer cryptography is only a part. In distributed
networks such as the World Wide Web, in which information may
be one mouse-click on a hypertext link away regardless of where it
happens to be physically stored, traditional ideas of distance and
mapping may prove greater impediments than guides to under-
standing. 759  Other concepts, such as density of information,
quality, reputation, or reliability may come to predominate.
The executive branch's primary concern has been to accommo-
date the interests of banks and others who require strong cryptogra-
phy, while also preserving to the greatest extent possible law
enforcement and intelligence capabilities. Noncommercial social
implications of cryptography have received relatively little attention.
s See supra text accompanying note 367.
7 See supra part I.C.l.c.i (discussing the ITAR's lack of effectiveness).
759 See generally E-mail from Rishab A. Ghosh to Michael Froomkin (Jan. 11, 1995)
(on file with author) (arguing, by quoting from his article in Asian Age magazine of
January 2, 1995, that in cyberspace "distance-as we usually understand it-
disappears").
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The private sector's motives are more difficult to summarize, but
there has clearly been a demand for cryptographic products, and
this demand is expected to grow rapidly.
7 6
The executive branch's desire to maintain its ability to eavesdrop
on electronic communications at will has driven it to abuse the
technical standard-setting process. By manipulating the FIPS
procedure, the Clinton Administration has achieved its initial
objective of promulgating a standard that is insulated from any
meaningful public comment and immune from judicial review. The
Administration thus hopes to create a de facto rule where it lacks
the statutory authority to create a rule de jure. Despite the
seemingly underhanded aspects of the executive branch's behavior,
there is no clear evidence that it has failed to comply with existing
laws or the Constitution. There is, however, room for doubt, as
some of the critical information regarding whether NIST retains its
statutorily mandated independentjudgment is classified. Congress
would be well advised to reassure itself and the public that NIST has
complied with the Computer Security Act's requirement that it not
delegate decision-making to the NSA. If the NSA is calling the
shots, firm persuasion, and perhaps corrective legislation, will be
required.
The Administration hopes to coerce acceptance of an escrowed
encryption product through its vast purchasing power, but whether
this hope can be realized remains unclear. If this attempt fails, the
next step may be to seek legislation requiring users of strong
cryptography to allow the government some form of access to their
cryptographic keys. If, despite what currently seems to be a
prevailing opposition to even voluntary key escrow, such a bill were
nonetheless to become law, mandatory key escrow would create
serious constitutional problems that the courts would have to
resolve.
Under current law, the judicial reaction to a hypothetical
mandatory key escrow statute would be limited primarily to a
balancing test analysis, although private noncommercial users would
have a particularly strong Fourth Amendment argument on their
side, and a good First Amendment argument as well. Recent history
suggests, however, that the government's interest in national
security or law enforcement often outweighs the citizen's right to
privacy.
" See supra part IA.
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By their nature, balancing tests almost demand that courts give
some play to the judge's hopes and, especially, fears. A mandatory
key escrow statute would evoke two conflicting sets of fears, one
over control and the other over lawlessness, symbolized by the
archetypes of Big Brother and the criminal cabal. In the end, the
conflict may be decided by the way the courts characterize
cryptography. Just as the cryptographic "key" is a metaphor, so too
may the choice among possible metaphors determine how much
constitutional protection an encrypted message gets. If the courts
treat a ciphertext as if it had been written in a foreign language, it
will trigger a First Amendment analysis that will result in giving
cryptography more protection than if the courts focus on the place
where the message is encrypted. If encryption is considered no
more than the outer envelope in a message transmission system
-essentially a "car" on the information superhighway-it is likely to
receive the lowest level of protection.
Encryption has much to offer the commercial, professional, and
personal users of telephones, computers, and computer networks.
As these and other uses grow, they will breed conflict, some of
which will inevitably be brought to the courts. The legal ecology of
cyberspace is currently underpopulated, but not for long. Clipper
and Capstone are only the first of many attempts by the govern-
ment, and no doubt others, to protect the status quo from changes
that upset long-established power relationships. The choices made
in the next few years will shape the evolution of electronic commu-
nication, and society in general, for decades to come. It would be
sad if cyberspace became the first place that the government
required civilians, in peacetime, to structure their private communi-
cations to make hypothetical future eavesdropping by law enforce-
ment easier.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX: BRUTE-FORCE CRYPTANALYSIS,
PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES
There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography
that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptog-
raphy that will stop major governments from reading your
files.
7 61
Cryptography makes it possible to talk privately even if someone
is listening in on your telephone line:7 62 you can have a secure
communication over an insecure channel. Cryptography also allows
you to keep electronic records in a form that is easily accessible to
you but inaccessible to snoops, whether siblings or governments.
Ironclad protection, however, requires effort.
Part of the art of cryptography consists of choosing an appropri-
ate level of security because, for long texts, the highest-level
encryption can be slow even with a computer. 63 If the purpose
of the encryption is to keep someone from peeking at the answer to
a riddle, printing the answer upside down may be enough. If the
purpose is to keep salacious material out of the hands of the lower
classes, then Latin was for many years the traditional cipher.764 If
the encryption is used, however, to authenticate wire transfers of
funds or to send messages to submarines in wartime, a high-level
method is required. In each case, the determination is driven by
considerations of the time and effort it takes the sender and
receiver to use the system, the resources that a third-party would
761 SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at xv.
762 Note that the best scrambler phones in the world will not protect you from a
listening device in your room.
71 Successful cryptographic systems combine two basic principles: confusion and
diffusion. Confusion is nothing more than some form of substitution-letters or,
more commonly, sets of information bits representing other letters or information
bits in some fashion. Replacing every letter with the one next to it on the typewriter
keyboard is an example of confusion by substitution. Diffusion means mixing up the
pieces of the message so that they no longer form recognizable patterns. Jumbling
the letters of a message is a form of diffusion. Because modern ciphers usually
operate at the bit level, many modern cryptographic systems produce confusion and
diffusion which depends on every bit of the plaintext. Changing a single character
will change the operations performed during encryption, making encryption more
difficult, but also more difficult to crack. See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 193; Feistel,
supra note 7, at 15.
' Cf Note, 17 L.Q. REV. 223, 223 (1901) (urging "prudent persons not to write
defamatory statements of any kind on postcards, even in the decent obscurity of a
learned language").
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likely be willing to devote to cracking the system, and the costs of
guessing wrong.
The strength of a cryptographic system is usually measured by
the amount of effort that would be required to crack it by an enemy
who knows the algorithm. This means, absent the discovery of a
latent vulnerability in the cipher that allows the attacker to take a
mathematical short-cut,765 a "brute-force" attack in which comput-
ers try every possible key.7 66 Surprisingly, modern cryptography
does not require that the algorithm be kept secret. Indeed, the rule
of thumb is that ciphers that depend on keeping the algorithm
secret are unreliable.76 7 In modern cryptography, only the key,
and not the method of encryption needs to remain secret to
preserve the security of the message.
768
The optimal cryptographic system would be easy to use and
impossible to crack. The real world imposes tradeoffs between ease
of use and vulnerability to attack,76 9 although computers now put
very powerful cryptography within the reach of anyone who has
access to a personal computer (PC). Cryptography can be used to
defend against various forms of attack including decryption by third
parties, modification of messages, and fabrication of authentic-
765 As we will see, this vulnerability may have been unknown to the cryptographers
who designed the cipher, or it may have been inserted intentionally.
" The two can sometimes be combined: a mathematical attack might, for
example, demonstrate that only certain types of keys need to be tried, thus lowering
the computational effort involved.
717 Algorithms whose security depends on the algorithm being kept secret have
"historical interest, but by today's data security standards they provide woefully
inadequate security. A large or changing group of users cannot use them, because
users will eventually reveal the secret. When they do, the whole security of the system
fails.... [They are also] trivial to break by experienced cryptanalysts." SCHNEIER,
supra note 12, at 2.
71 Ordinarily, in systems using multiple keys, only one of the keys need be kept
secret.
" The only type of algorithm guaranteed to be secure against all forms of
mathematical and brute-force attacks is known as the "one-time pad." A one-time pad
is "nothing more than a nonrepeating set of truly random key letters .... The
sender uses each key letter on the pad to encrypt exactly one plaintext character. The
receiver has an identical pad and uses each key on the pad, in turn, to decrypt each
letter of the ciphertext." SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 13; see also Gardner, supra, note
128, at 120 (stating that ciphers that provide "absolute secrecy" are not always used
because it is "too impractical"). The critical features of a one-time pad are that the
pad must be kept from the enemy, the characters on the pad must be truly random,
and the pad must never be used twice. Because large pads are difficult to generate,
must be communicated to the recipient in utmost secrecy, and are unwieldy, the one-
time pad is difficult to use for anything other than short messages of the highest
security. See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 14-15.
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looking but spurious messages. A strong cryptographic system
protects messages that may be intercepted by an enemy, and also
authenticates messages received.
A. Brute-Force Cryptanalysis
There are three fundamental ways for a third party to crack a
cipher where the algorithm is known but the key is not. First, an
enemy can simply steal the key or suborn a key-holder. Second, if
the enemy knows the algorithm but not the key, the enemy can try
to analyze the cipher, hoping to find a weakness in the algorithm.
Some very trusted ciphers have fallen to mathematical analysis, at
which point decryption becomes easy.770 Third, and of particular
relevance to modern cryptography, the attacker can mount a "brute-
force" attack using computers, perhaps with large numbers of
specially optimized chips running in parallel, to try every possible
key until the message is decrypted. Finding the sender's key gives
the attacker more than the text of a single message; it gives access
to all future messages that use the same key. If the sender uses a
digital signature, the attacker can forge the sender's signature as
well.
If the only (known) way to decrypt a cyphertext is to try every
possible key, then a longer key makes for a stronger cipher because
a longer key has more possible values. An eight-bit"' key has 2'
(256) possible values. A computer would have to try all 256 possible
values to be certain of finding the key, although the average number
of possible values the computer would have to test before encoun-
tering the answer will be only 128. Similarly, if the key is 128 bits
long, which is the equivalent of the maximum amount of informa-
tion in a sixteen-character message on a personal computer, 7 2 a
77 See Eric Bach et al., Ciyptography FAQ (06/10: Public-key Cyptography) § 6.6
(June 7,1994), available online URL ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/news.answers/
cryptography-faq/part06 ("Historically even professional cryptographers have made
mistakes in estimating and depending on the intractability of various computational
problems for secure cryptographic properties.").
77 A bit is a binary unit of information that can have a value of zero or one.
Computers organize bits into bytes, often 8, 16, or 32 bits in length. For example,
DOS-based personal computers use eight-bit bytes to represent alphanumeric charac-
ters.
" Although a 16-character message on a PC has 128 bits, most 8-bit-to-a-byte PCs
limit the characters that can be represented to fewer than 256 per byte because one
bit is used for error-checking. Hence, although the amount of information in a 128-
bit key is equal to a 16-character text on a PC, such a text itself would in effect be a
much shorter key on most personal computers because an attacker would know that
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brute-force attack would require that 2128 keys be tested to be
certain of finding the key. To put this number in perspective, a
computer processing a million keys per second would require about
1025 years to complete the task, an amount of time 1015 times
greater than the estimated age of the universe.
773
Although 1015 times the age of the universe makes for an
impressive statistic, it is misleading. Chips capable of trying 256
million keys per second are foreseeable within the decade, and
several of these can be harnessed to work together. Trying out keys
is often ideally suited to parallel processing. Parallel processing
allows a problem to be split up between many computer chips
running simultaneously, trying many millions, even billions, of keys
per second. The chips need not be part of a single computer: the
key-cracking problem can be distributed among large numbers of
workstations on a network, with each workstation being only slightly
more powerful than today's desktop PCs. Indeed, the problem can
be parceled out to several different networks, each communicating
with one another only infrequently. A distributed processor of this
nature, or a single optimized parallel processor, can try vastly more
than a million keys per second, making large keys susceptible to
being broken in a reasonable period of time.71 Parallel proces-
sors already on the drawing board might make it possible to break
even a 512-bit key at a cost which, although out of reach of the
average citizen, would be well within the means of the poorest
government. 7m  The cryptographer's solution, of course, is to use
a longer key.
Exactly how large a key would be vulnerable to an economical
brute-force attack is a matter of debate. Advances in computer
power continue to make longer and longer keys vulnerable, but the
same advances make it easier and cheaper to encrypt and decrypt
with longer keys. If one assumes the existence of economically
many possible values for certain bits could be ignored. Limiting the possible keys
only to lowercase letters and digits would have even more drastic effects: a 56-bit key,
which if unconstrained would produce 26 (approximately 1016) possible keys, would
be limited to 1012 possible keys, making it 10,000 times easier to crack. See SCHNEIER,
supra note 12, at 141.
"5 See id. at 7, 129. The universe is estimated to be about 10"0 years old. See id.
at 7.
77 See Garon & Outerbridge, supra note 26, at 179-81; SCHNEIER, supra note 12,
at 7.
"' See Ronald L. Rivest, Responses to NIST's Proposal, COMM. ACM, July 1992, at
41, 44-45 (estimating that today a 512-bit key can be broken with about $8.2 million
worth of equipment, and noting that the cost will continue to shrink).
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rational, albeit immoral, attackers seeking to maximize the return
on an investment in the computing power needed in order to
mount a sustained attack, then high-value secrets are more at risk
than low-value ones. They therefore deserve longer keys. No
consensus exists as to how much security is enough for high-value
secrets, however, and in any case that point is probably well past the
security provided by DES.
DES's inventors originally planned to use a 128-bit key, which
would have provided 40 sextillion (40,000,000,000,000,000,000,000)
times more security, but the NSA persuaded them that 56 bits suf-
ficed.776 A 56-bit key provides a keyspace of 256, or 72 quadrillion
possible keys. 777 Although this is a very large number, even upon
DES's adoption as the U.S. standard in 1977, critics predicted that
an optimized computer costing $20 million to build could break an
average of two 56-bit DES keys a day. Depreciated over the
machine's first five years of service, this would have worked out to
only $5000 per solution.778 This was and is a sum well within the
reach of many governments, and the price would be much lower
today. 779 DES's inventors estimated that the cost of building such
a computer would be closer to $200 million, or $50,000 per key.
780
If DES had used the 128-bit key originally contemplated,
breaking each key would have cost an average of $200 septillion in
the 1970s, even using Diffie and Hellman's lowest-cost assumptions.
Perhaps as a result of its shorter key, DES is not considered
sufficiently secure to protect classified data.781 Despite sugges-
tions from the NSA that DES might not deserve recertification after
1988,782 NIST recently recertified DES as suitable for commercial
purposes for five more years.
783
"6 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 346-47 (describing the "closed door negotia-
tions" between the NSA and IBM that resulted in the key size reduction from 128 to
56 bits).
n See supra text accompanying note 108.
"8 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 348; Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman,
Exhaustive CQyptanalysis of the NBS Data Enrnyption Standard, COMPUTER,June 1977, at
74, 74.
"' See Diffie & Hellman, supra note 778, at 74 (predicting that the rapidly decreas-
ing cost of computation should have, by 1987, reduced the solution cost to the $50
range); Rivest, supra note 775, at 45 (estimating the cost to break a 512-bit key as $8.2
million); see also BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 348.
780 See BAMFORD, supra note 17, at 348-49 (comparing arguments about the cost
of a computer that could break a 56-bit key).
'81 See FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,348.
7 See H.R. REP. No. 153 (Part I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3120, 3133.
' See FIPS 46-2, supra note 106, at 69,347. NIST suggested, however, that it may
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B. Public-Key Cyptography
Before the invention of public-key cryptography in 1976,784 a
sender and receiver who wanted to use a cipher had to agree on a
key in order to communicate securely. This method was very
burdensome to both parties. First, sender and receiver needed a
secure means to transmit the key itself. For example, if you were
trying to send a message to your agent behind enemy lines, and you
were afraid that the bad guys had cracked your cipher, it was too
late to send a coded message saying "the new key is X."785 Sec-
ond, even if the key was transmitted securely (for example, by
handing it to the agent before she left for her mission), the security
of a single-key cipher evaporated as soon as the key was compro-
mised. If you wrote the secret key down, someone could have
found it; if you did not write it down, either it must have been short
or you needed a phenomenal memory. Third, the ever-present
danger of key compromise cast a doubt over the authenticity of
every message. A third party who had the key could use it to alter
messages, or to send fake messages purporting to be from any of
the parties who legitimately held the key.
Public-key cryptography solves all of these problems. As a
result, public-key cryptography has been described as a "revolution-
ary technology," which will make routine communication encryption
ubiquitous. 8 6 In a public-key system, each user creates a public
key, which is published, and a private key, which is secret." 7
not recertify DES when its current five-year certification expires. See id. at 69,350
(noting that in 1998, when the standard will be over 20 years old, NIST will consider
alternatives that offer a higher level of security).
"' For the original papers describing public-key cryptography, see Whitfield Diffie
& Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cyptography, IT-22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS INFO.
THEORY 644 (1976), and Ralph C. Merkle, Secure Communication over Insecure Channels,
COMM. ACM, Apr. 1978, at 294. For further information about public-key cryptogra-
phy, see generally SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 29. More concentrated descriptions
can be found in Bach, et al., supra note 770, § 6; RSA Cyptography Today FAQ, supra
note 129; and in Whitfield Diffie, The First Ten Years of Public-Key Ctyptography, 76
PROC. IEEE 560 (1988) (discussing the history of public key cryptography).
' This proved to be a real problem during World War II, resultingin the capture
of several spy rings. See KAHN, supra note 6, at 530.
"' Bach et al., supra note 770, § 6.2. Despite the prediction of ubiquity, the fact
remains that to date nongovernmental commercial uses of public-key cryptography
have been very limited. "It is easy to build a case for buying cryptography fu-
tures.... Nonetheless, cryptography remains a niche market in which (with the
exception of [sales to the government]) a handful of companies gross only a few tens
of millions of dollars annually." ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 12.
"" The ASCII version of the author's public key for his 1024-bit key in Pretty
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Messages encrypted with one key can be decrypted only with the
other key, and vice-versa. Thus, if Alice wants to send a secure
e-mail message to Bob, and they both use compatible public-key
cryptographic software, Alice and Bob can exchange public keys on
an insecure line. Alice would have to input her plaintext and Bob's
public key. The program outputs the ciphertext, which is a stream
of characters that looks like garbage to anyone who should happen
to see it. When Bob receives the ciphertext, he inputs both it and
his private key to his program, which reveals Alice's plaintext.
One of the wonderful properties of public-key encryption is that,
so far as we know,788 a third party's possession of Alice's public
key and a complete description of the encryption algorithm puts
that third party no closer to deducing Alice's private key or reading
her messages than if the third party had the ciphertext alone. Thus,
it is easy to establish a secure line of communication with anyone
who is capable of implementing the algorithm. (In practice, this is
anyone with a compatible decryption program or other device.)
Sender and receiver no longer need a secure way to agree on a
shared key. If Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, a new
recipient with whom she has never communicated before, Alice and
Bob can exchange the plaintext of their public keys or look each
other up in a freely accessible directory of public keys. Then, Alice
and Bob can each encrypt their outgoing messages with the other's
public key and decrypt their received.messages with their own secret
private key.
78 9
One drawback, however, is that public-key encryption and
Good Privacy is:








-END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-
788 See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 284-85 (stating that security of RSA evaporates
if someone discovers a rapid means of factoring large numbers); id. at 318-20
(explaining that security of certain other public-key algorithms depends on the
continuing inability of mathematicians to solve the long-standing problem of
calculating discrete logarithms).
... Clearly, the security of the system evaporates if the private key is compromised,
that is, transmitted to anyone.
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decryption is much slower than commonly used single-key systems
such as DES.790 Thus, although public-key encryption is ideal for
short messages, it is less than ideal for longer ones, and is particu-
larly unsuitable for high-speed real-time applications like fast data
transfer or telephone conversations. The speed problem can be
overcome, however, by using a hybrid system. In a hybrid system,
two parties who wish to communicate securely over an insecure
medium use a public-key system to agree on a session key which then
becomes the one-time key for a faster, conventional, relatively
secure, single-key cipher such as DES.79 1 Each time the parties
initiate a new conversation, they generate a new session key, which,
though lasting for the entire conversation, is never repeated.
If Alice and Bob are going to change their session key every
time they talk so as to maximize the security of their single-key
cipher, they need a secure means of agreeing on a session key each
time they want to communicate. Ideally, the method would allow
them to choose the session key in public, or on an insecure line,
without fear of eavesdroppers. Public-key cryptography allows Alice
and Bob to achieve this feat in either of two ways. Using the first
method, Alice generates the session key, encrypts it with Bob's
public key, and sends it to him. Bob decrypts the message with his
private key, inputs the session key to his single-key software or
telephone, and then the data exchange or conversation begins.
792
Alternatively, the parties can use Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, in
which Alice and Bob publicly send each other numbers from which
they, and only they, can jointly calculate a session key. In Diffie-
7' For example, RSA, one of the leading public-key programs, is at least 100 times
slower than DES in software implementations, and up to 10,000 times slower in
hardware. See RSA Cryptography Today FAQ, supra note 129, § 2.3.
"' Another popular single-key cipher, which is not hampered by a 56-bit limit on
key length, is called IDEA. See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 260-66.
" If Bob does not have a public key on record somewhere that Alice considers
reliable, then Bob needs to authenticate it in a manner that protects against a "man
in the middle" attack when he sends his public key to Alice. In a "man in the middle"
attack, a third party intercepts Bob's first message. The man in the middle substitutes
his public key for Bob's. Now Alice thinks she has Bob's key, and sends messages that
are easily decrypted by the third party. The third party then reencrypts them with
Bob's public key and sends them on to Bob who may never know the difference. A
"man in the middle" attack will be prevented if Bob signs his public key with a digital
signature that Alice can recognize. But this requires either that Bob register his
public key for digital signatures somewhere trustworthy or that he find someone
whose digital signature Alice already knows and who can affix a digital signature to
Bob's transmission of his public key, thus attesting to the fact that it really comes
from Bob.
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Hellman Key Exchange, Alice and Bob agree on a number, b, which
does not have to be secret, to use as the basis for their calculations.
They also agree, again without any attempt at secrecy, on a large
prime number which will serve as their modulus, m. (A modulus is
the base for arithmetic operations. Usually we calculate in base ten;
in binary arithmetic we calculate in base two. Alice and Bob will
calculate using base m, where m is a large prime number.) Alice
then selects a (secret) large random number A; Bob meanwhile
selects a (secret) large random number B. Alice sends Bob a
number she calculates as bA (modulus m). Bob sends Alice a number
he calculates as b' (modulus in). Both Alice and Bob then compute
bWD (modulus m). This becomes their secret session key.
Diffie-Hellman works because it is computationally easy to
calculate powers of numbers modulus m, but very, very difficult to
find the logarithm of a large exponent of a number modulus m.
Yet, this is what an eavesdropper would have to do to compute bAB
(modulus m) without knowing either A or B. Thus, if m is about
1000 bits long, Alice and Bob can do their calculations in seconds.
At the current state of the art, however, the logarithmic computa-
tion would take a powerful computer a quintillion (a billion billion)
years.793
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange works for real-time communica-
tion because the parties can generate a session key at the start of
the exchange, but it imposes potentially long delays on e-mail
because the parties must exchange several messages to generate a
session key before the parties can have a secure conversation. On
the other hand, e-mail can be encrypted and decrypted at leisure,
so the entire message can use public key encryption rather than just
the session key. As a result, all that Bob needs in order to send
Alice a secure e-mail is a reliable way of getting Alice's public key.
Key servers provide a simple way of making public keys
generally available. Essentially, a key server is a computer with a
white pages approach to public key management. Bob enters Alice's
name and the key server replies with Alice's public key-if she has
registered it. Key servers, whether run by the U.S. Post Office or
793 See ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 8 (noting that the logarithmic computation
would "demand more than 21" (or approximately 1011) operations" and that "today's
supercomputers ... would take a billion billion years to perform this many opera-
tions"); SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 275-77 (discussing Diffie-Hellman); see also Diffie
& Hellman, supra note 784, at 644 (noting that in "a public key cryptosystem,
enciphering and deciphering are governed by distinct keys, E and D, such that
computing D from E is computationally infeasible" (emphasis omitted)).
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others, are likely to be an essential element of the National
Information Infrastructure.
Key servers generally work on one of two principles: the certifica-
tion authority or the web of trust. Under the certification authority
paradigm, some central body authenticates the identity of the
registrant when the key is first deposited. For example, the U.S.
Post Office has proposed that it act as a certifying authority. Alice
could then identify herself to the Post Office by providing identifi-
cation similar to that currently required to get a passport. The Post
Office would then add her key to its server, and/or provide Alice
with a copy of her public key signed with the Post Office's private
key.
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By contrast, there is no central authority for web-of-trust
systems: Alice can upload a key to the key server at anytime. In
order to demonstrate that the key purporting to be "Alice's" is hers,
Alice must then find other persons to "sign" her key by uploading
authentications signed with their private keys. Typically this is done
by meeting face-to-face and exchanging public keys and showing
identification. If Alice has her key signed by Carol, whom Bob
knows or trusts, Bob can safely assume that the signature purporting
to be from "Alice" is not in fact an impostor's. Suppose, however,
that Alice and Bob do not have any friends in common, but that
Bob's friend Carol has signed Ted's key, and Ted has signed Alice's
key. From Bob's point of view this is not as good as if Carol, whom
he knows, has signed Alice's key, but it is considerably better than
nothing. Bob needs to decide how many intermediaries he is willing
to accept before he considers a public key unreliable. The increase
in the length of the chain of authentication can be offset by finding
multiple routes to Alice. For example, Bob may still feel reasonably
secure if he can establish three relatively long but independent
chains of authentication .7" This web-of-trust approach is the
foundation of the PGP encryption system. 9 6
7 See OTA INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 97, at 55-56. For a thorough
survey of the legal and policy issues involved in setting up and running a certification
authority, see generally MICHAEL BAUM, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND
TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND POLICY: LAW AND
POLICY OF CERTIFICATE-BASED PUBLIC KEY AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES (1994).
' 5 See PGPTm User's Guide, supra note 73.
796 See GARFINKEL, supra note 73, at 235-36.
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C. Digital Signatures
Verification of a message's origins takes on a new importance in
the world of electronic mail, a world where all messages arrive on
identical stationery in an identical typeface, having passed through
many electronic hands en route. The fact that a message comes
properly encrypted, even if the cipher is a simple one, tends to show
that it was sent by the person who had access to the cipher and
knew she was supposed to use it.79 7 If the cipher is strong and the
key tightly guarded, the use of the correct cipher strongly suggests
that the message was sent by the person it purports to be from.
Public-key systems in which a private key is held by only one person
take this security feature to its logical extreme.
Public-key systems also allow users to append a so-called digital
signature to an unencrypted message. A digital signature uniquely
identifies the sender and connects the sender to the message.
Because the signature uses the plaintext as an input to the encryp-
tion algorithm, if the message is altered in even the slightest way,
the signature will not decrypt properly, showing that the message
was altered in transit or that the signature was forged by copying it
from a different message.798 A digital signature copied from one
message has an infinitesimal chance of successfully authenticating
any other message. 99
The importance of a Digital Signature Standard (DSS), the
prerequisite to a system of electronic commerce, has not been lost
on the federal government. Nevertheless, for many years NIST was
unable or unwilling to promote a standard. Although NIST had
begun working on a DSS in the early 1980s, its progress was slowed
by the close relation between digital signature and cryptographic
systems: an algorithm that produces a secure digital signature can
7 This is not irrefutable proof because a third party could obtain the key from
the authorized user by stealth, purchase, accident, or torture (also known as "rubber
hose cryptanalysis").
... Consider the following example: To sign a message, Alice does a computation
involving both her private key and the message itself; the output is called the digital
signature and is attached to the message, which is then sent. Bob, to verify the
signature, does some computation involving the message, the purported signature,
and Alice's public key. If the results properly hold in a simple mathematical relation,
the signature is verified as genuine; otherwise, the signature maybe fraudulent or the
message altered, and they are discarded. See RSA CQyptography Today FAQ, supra note
129, § 2.13.
M See SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 35 (noting that a digital signature using a 160-
bit checksum has only a one in 2 "n chance of misidentification).
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also be used to produce a secure cipher. The U.S. government,
however, wished to find a DSS which, although secure enough to be
useful, nonetheless could not be used as an encryption system that
the government might be powerless to break. °0 In August 1991,
NIST announced its selection of the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) which, having been patented by an NSA employee, would be
available royalty-free to all users.801  NIST then encountered
patent difficulties. These were exacerbated when a U.S. corporation
acquired the rights to the main patent allegedly infringed by the
DSA. In June 1993, NIST announced that it would give the
corporation an exclusive license to the DSA; the U.S. government
would have free use but everyone else would have to pay. Reaction
from industry, which was already gravitating towards a competing
corporation's product and was poised to accept NIST's standard
only if it were royalty-free, was very negative.80 2 In May 1994,
NIST announced that it would not give an exclusive license to
anyone, and that the DSA would be available royalty-free after
all.80" The alleged patent infringement was dealt with by the
statement that NIST "has concluded there are no valid claims."
80 4
The DSS is now scheduled to be incorporated into Fortezza
PCMCIA chips.
Meanwhile, academic cryptologists, ever vigilant for intentional
weaknesses in government-sponsored cryptography, found an
interesting property in the DSS proposed by NIST and approved by
sw See, e.g., Sherry L. Harowitz, Building Security into Cyberspace, SECURITY MGMT.,
June 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that the U.S.
government "wants to discourage" the use of digital signatures other than the Clipper
Chip for encryption purposes); Robert L. Hotz, Sign on the Electronic Dotted Line, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al ("Federal officials refused to adopt the earlier technique,
called RSA, as a national standard because they were concerned that it could be used
to conceal clandestine messages that could not be detected by law enforcement or
national security agencies.").
" See A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for Digital Signature
Standard (DSS), 56 Fed. Reg. 42,980, 42,980 (1991). The DSS was to be "applicable
to all federal departments and agencies for the protection of unclassified informa-
tion," and was "intended for use in electronic mail, electronic funds transfer,
electronic data interchange, software distribution, data storage, and other applications
which require data integrity assurance and data origin authentication." Id. at 42,981.
" See Kevin Power, Use DSS with No Fear of Patent Liability, NIST Says, Gov'T
COMPUTER NEWS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 64 (noting overwhelming opposition to NIST's
proposal to give a patent group an exclusive license to the Digital Signature
Algorithm).
" See Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 59 Fed. Reg. 26,208, 26,209 (1994).
W4 Id.
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the NSA. Small "subliminal" messages can be inserted into the
digital signature without the signer's knowledge.0 5 This property
"allows an unscrupulous implementer of DSS to leak a [small] piece
of the [user's] private key with each signature."8 "' One commenta-
tor noted that the DSA "provides the most hospitable setting for
subliminal communications discovered to date."807 The NSA has
not let on whether it knew about this feature when it agreed to the
DSS.8 08
The proposed Capstone Chip combines the encryption functions
of Clipper with the DSA. °9 It will be available in a PCMCIA card
called Fortezza. Thus, if users wish to encrypt computer data
transmissions with a government approved algorithm, they will have
to take the DSA as part of the package.
Although digital signatures use strong cryptographic algorithms,
they raise fewer, and different, policy issues from the Clipper Chip.
The U.S. government is not concerned about the world-wide use of
authentication software because affixing a signature to a plaintext
message does not make that message any harder to read.810 The
real power struggle centers on whether the government will retain
the capability to read private electronic messages and listen to
private telephone conversations at will.
"' A subliminal message is invisible to the user because it is encrypted and mixed
in with the garbage-like stream of characters that constitutes the signature.
8o6 SCHNEIER, supra note 12, at 313; see also id. at 390-92 (explaining how the
subliminal channel works). The DSA is the algorithm used in DSS.
807 Simmons, supra note 56, at 218.
'
0 See id.
'0oSee Capstone Chip Technology, supra note 16 (The Capstone Chip "implements
the same cryptographic algorithm as the CLIPPER chip. In addition, the CAPSTONE
Chip includes.., the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) proposed by NIST.. ").
810 See ACM REPORT, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that "information that is authen-
ticated and integrity-checked is not necessarily confidential; that is, confidentiality can
be separated from integrity and authenticity").

